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This thesis argues that humanism, despite being subject to a sustained critique within the 
social sciences over the past fifty years or more, continues to limit the critical and 
explanatory power of the sociology of work, preventing a fuller understanding of the 
nature of work under contemporary capitalism. Developing Louis Althusser’s (1996) 
critique of humanism and ideology, humanism is shown to be an ideological problem for 
the sociology of work insofar as it brackets, obfuscates or mystifies key social relations of 
work and, by extension, the class struggles reflected in those relations. Humanism 
presents a persistent and pervasive problem for the sociology of work, as both an 
explanatory and critical framework. Because of the persistence of humanism in the 
sociology of work, the problems of contemporary work – and the proposed ‘solutions’ to 
these problems – are located not in an analysis of the social relations of these realities, but 
in ideological discourses of human alienation and human self-affirmation. The thesis 
explores the extent of this ideological problem across three contemporary debates within 
the sociology of work: ‘postcapitalist’ discourse (Srnicek & Williams, 2015) and the 
emergence of a contemporary post-work imaginary; feminist discourses on the 
‘bioeconomy’ (Cooper & Waldby, 2014) and theories of social reproduction in the context 
of sex work, tissue donation and surrogacy; and the figuration of labour and work within 
contemporary social scientific discourses of the ‘Anthropocene’ (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 
2016). In each of these areas, the thesis demonstrates how much of the sociology of work 
continues to rely on humanistic ideas to provide a normative theoretical foundation and 
a critical edge. If the sociology of work is to provide a genuinely critical orientation for 
understanding the changing world of work, this thesis argues, then the critique of 





Humanism and the Ideology of Work 
 
This thesis argues that sociology today is prevented from attaining a fuller understanding 
of the nature of work under contemporary capitalism, by a persistent and pervasive 
humanism that saturates its analysis. Humanism presents sociology with an ideological 
problem, preventing access to the matrix of social relations and the unique class struggles 
reflected in these relations that underpin contemporary work. Humanism mystifies these 
social relations, offering a platter of mythical representations to explain sociological 
phenomena that brackets these social relations or removes them from view entirely. 
Humanism is dangerous because it normalises and naturalises these social relations of 
work, presenting them not as sociological phenomena but as given universals: in this way, 
sociology risks complementing power itself. If sociology is to be adequate for the critique 
of work in the twenty first century, this thesis argues that it must begin in the first instance 
with a critical analysis of humanism as an ideology. The contemporary social relations of 
work and with them the mechanics of both exploitation and liberation, are visible only at 
the end of a theoretical struggle against humanism. Despite the widespread influence and 
recognised importance of critiques of humanism within sociological discourse, humanism 
continues to be mobilised as the normative foundation of much of the sociology of work. 
This thesis argues that the exposure, definition and deconstruction of humanism as an 
ideology remains a key theoretical task in the sociology of work if it is to provide a truly 
critical vantage point from which to analyse and understand transformations of ‘work’ in 
the twenty first century. 
 Historically, humanism has provided an influential set of ideas in which the 
critique of work has been carried and amplified. For example, the appearance of critiques 
of industrial work as it developed through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were 
made familiar in their crystallisation in the “dark satanic mills” of William Blake’s ([1808] 
1966, p.481) poetry, the “organized misery” of industrial work described by William 
Morris ([1890] 1993, p.126), or the “filthy heart of civilization” that George Orwell ([1937] 
1982, p.18) described in his observations of working-class life in pre-war Britain. 
Humanism has been a particularly effective method in pronouncing the harm of industrial 
capitalism as experienced through work, by juxtaposing the cold, mechanic, 
dehumanising and dangerous world of work with the apparent naturalism and humanism 
of the space outside of work. It is a juxtaposition well-articulated in films like Fritz Lang’s 
(1927) Metropolis, as defeated crowds of workers passed one another on their way to and 
from the production line, embodying in their posture, movement and overall behaviour 
the industrial machines on which they worked. Work is critiqued on the basis of the fact 
that it is antithetical to the very essence of human life, in complete contradiction with the 
movements, wants and desires of any human individual: “Man (the worker) only feels 
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himself freely active in his animal functions…and in his human functions he no longer 
feels himself to be anything but an animal” (Marx, [1844] 1981, p.66). The critique of work 
is articulated in the impossibility of finding ‘Man’ in work: “When, in our civilized Europe, 
we would find a trace of the native beauty of man we must go seek it in the nations where 
economic prejudices have not yet uprooted the hatred of work” (Lafargue, 1883, para.3). 
 At the same time, humanism provides a vehicle through which to pronounce the 
liberating potential of work. Work is considered life-giving and self-affirming, as an act 
that goes beyond the mere satisfaction of economic need: “The reward of labour is life. Is 
that not enough?” (Morris, 1993, p.122, original emphasis). Such a maxim could well 
adorn the doors of many contemporary employers, as the celebration of the humanist 
qualities of work is today centralised as the guiding philosophy of twenty first century 
capitalism. The cold, brutal and mechanised factories of old have been replaced 
(apparently) by the high-rise offices designed as spaces in which work and play are fused 
together: the steam press replaced by the smart phone; the boardroom replaced by the 
games room; workstations replaced by bean bags and children’s slides. Work today is 
designed to maximise “essential human experiences in the workplace” (Robbins, 2015, 
para.1), by creating “an environment where people feel safe to bring all of who they are to 
work” (para.1). In this way, contemporary work is “100% human” (Oelwang & Hay, 2015, 
para.4), built around and at all times expressive of what it means to be a human being. 
Take it from the ‘Vice President of People Operations’ at Google: “All it takes is a belief 
that people are fundamentally good – and enough courage to treat your people like owners 
instead of machines. Machines do their jobs; owners do whatever is needed to make their 
companies and teams successful” (Bock, 2015, p.15). This is the new spirit of capitalism, 
in which work is valorised as the place in which “everyone should develop themselves 
personally. The new organizations…appeal to all the capacities of human beings, who will 
thus be in a position to fully blossom” (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2007, p.90). 
 Humanism is also integral to the imagination of life beyond work, of a life lived 
free from work. The consideration of human life or human societies freed of the obligation 
to work is of particular interest from a humanist perspective, as it begs questions about 
the way in which human liberty, human autonomy and individual self-affirmation can be 
re-imagined in relation to the abolition of work. In the New Humanist, Rhian E. Jones 
(2017) asks how considerations of the end of work offer the opportunity to consider “a 
post-work future, no longer shaped by capitalist impulses or built around low-paid and 
insecure drudgery, where we can find alternative channels of meaning and fulfilment and 
cease to regard ourselves as workers above all else” (p.25). Humanism provides the 
philosophical foundation for calls for policies towards this end, such as the greater use of 
automation and robotics as a way of reducing the amount of work (in particular bad 
quality work) that people have to do, but also through the introduction of schemes such 
as a universal basic income (UBI) that unties wages from work, reducing its necessity as 
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an activity of survival. According to Paul Mason (2018), “automation coupled with the 
socialisation of knowledge will present us with the opportunity to liberate ourselves from 
work” (p.31) thereby “ending alienation and liberating the individual” (p.31). In terms of 
a UBI, Jason Hickel (2017) writes that “a basic income might defeat the scarcity mindset 
that has seeped so deep into our culture, freeing us from the imperatives of competition 
and allowing us to be more open and generous people” (para.19). The use of machines and 
of alternative welfare policies is justified and pushed forward by a humanist philosophy 
that sees in its end the greater emancipation of the human individual, free to use their 
time as they please and towards more self-fulfilling ends: “Don’t we all have to work to 
live? No, not really” (Fleming, 2015, p.2).  
 Even though the above accounts of work are markedly different from one another, 
their considerations of work share one common humanist framing. Whether criticising, 
celebrating or transforming work, these accounts each rely on a normative humanism in 
which their expressions are grounded. The ways in which human beings and human 
subjectivity are thought about fundamentally condition the consideration of work across 
a number of different accounts. The critique, the celebration and the transformation of 
work are conditioned by a set of existing assumptions surrounding human subjectivity: its 
alienated condition; its autonomous capacities; or its revolutionary potential. These quite 
divergent considerations of work are manifestations of one persistent and underlying 
theoretical principle: that knowledge of work and society must reflect the knowledge of 
human subjectivity and human experience. The critique of work must reflect the critique 
of alienated and dehumanised human subjectivity; the celebration of work must reflect 
the celebration of the autonomous capacities of the human individual; and the 
transformation of work must reflect the transformational potential of revolutionary 
human subjects. This common requirement of considerations of work to reflect existing 
normative assumptions surrounding human subjectivity is codified here as the 
‘humanism’ of these considerations and is the subject of the critique completed in this 
thesis. 
 However, this thesis argues that when it comes to the sociological consideration 
of work and society, these recurring humanist productions become significantly 
problematic. This is because the framing of work through this normative humanism 
effectively erases the social background from which work as a social relation emerges. In 
particular, the class struggle that determines the appearance of work in capitalist society 
is repeatedly bracketed and side-lined by this normative humanist framework that 
repeatedly conditions the way in which work is thought about. In its critique, it is the 
reification of an alienated humanity that is problematised not the material exploitation of 
one class by another; in its celebration, work is positioned as an expression of the natural 
creative capacities of an autonomous human subject, not as the meeting-point between 
unequal social classes; and in its transformation, work is configured as the revolutionary 
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tool through which human beings re-discover their autonomy, as opposed to the means 
of production themselves. In these ways and to different extents, the social character of 
work as a social relation is relegated to the background in favour of these more moralistic 
or anthropological explanations of work which latch on to existing assumptions 
surrounding the nature of human subjectivity. The objective of this thesis is to study the 
effects of humanism in this way upon the sociology of work. 
In order to complete this study, this thesis will apply an Althusserian critique of 
humanist ideology to the sociology of work. In the context of the changing nature of work 
and employment in the twenty first century, this thesis shows how an Althusserian 
critique of humanist approaches to work enables an escape from the limitations of current 
thinking about work (indebted to humanism). According to Althusser’s ([1964] 1996) 
critique, the humanist framing of work as a social relation is problematic, insofar as this 
humanist framing mystifies the specific social antagonisms (particularly those of class, 
race and gender) reflected in the social relations of work. This mystification is a problem 
insofar as it undermines the critical analysis of power and exploitation as it is deployed in 
the social relations of work and, in so doing, undermines the imagination of appropriate 
social orientations capable of overcoming existing inequalities and injustices. The 
Althusserian critique of humanist ideology provides a dialectical method through which 
to both observe and overcome this problem of humanism within discourses of knowledge, 
providing a conceptual repertoire through which to define humanism as an ideological 
problem and a theoretical mechanism through which the critical deconstruction of this 
ideology resolves itself productively in the exposure of the social relations hitherto 
obscured by this ideology.  
 The application of an Althusserian critique of humanist ideology allows for two 
things. First, it provides conceptual devices through which to recognise and define 
‘humanism’ and how it impacts ideologically upon the sociology of work as a discourse of 
knowledge. Secondly, it points towards theoretical mechanisms that are capable of 
overcoming these ideological effects of humanism and can reveal the social relations and 
social antagonisms hidden beneath these ideological effects. In each of the chapters, this 
thesis applies this dialectical method to specific contributions to the sociology of work, 
defining humanist ideology as a problem and drawing on sources appropriate for its 
deconstruction. The resulting contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is thus the 
exposure of humanism as an ideological problem for certain contributions to the sociology 
of work, but also the revelation of the precise theoretical method (the critique of ideology 
itself) that explains the explanatory strength of the more appropriate sociological 





HUMANISM AND THE IDEOLOGY OF WORK: CHAPTER STRUCTURE 
 
Chapter One of this thesis sets out the parameters of the critique of humanism and the 
methodology through which this critique will be completed. In order to do this, the 
chapter grounds the thesis in the critique of humanism found in the works of Louis 
Althusser. The chapter demonstrates the extent to which humanism has been considered 
a problem within critical contributions to the social sciences, as it attempts to universalise 
the social experience of a very narrow definition of the human subject: namely the white, 
male, heterosexual and non-disabled human. This normative humanism has been 
problematised insofar as it hides the social experiences and voices of those deemed not to 
fit with this normative image and, in the same breath, justifies the social violence and 
domination often wrought upon these groups. Louis Althusser’s critique of humanism is 
useful for this thesis insofar as it is useful in thinking about the relationship between 
humanist ideology and the social relations of work. For Althusser, humanism is 
problematic insofar as it mystifies class domination and class struggle within society, 
deployed by the dominant class as a way of hiding exploitation from view. Though 
Althusser’s work has received a great deal of criticism and even dismissal in places, this 
chapter makes the case for re-visiting the critique of humanism found in Althusser’s work 
as a way of thinking through the obstructive theoretical effect of humanist ideology upon 
the sociology of work. 
 Chapter Two moves to a review of (primarily Marxist) sociological literature to 
reveal the ways in which humanism has become deeply entrenched in the critical analysis 
of work. In various ways and within differing historical contexts, the critical sociology of 
work is here shown to rely heavily upon humanism as a way of articulating its critique: be 
this to pronounce the specific harms of work under capitalism, of sharpening the exposure 
of exploitation or of imagining emancipation and revolution. The critical sociology of work 
has been an important discourse through which these themes have been discussed but 
not, it would seem, without the continuous presence and reproduction of humanist 
ideological tropes. Problematically, the humanism of this critical sociology leads it astray, 
contributing to the construction of a narrow conception of ‘work’ through the 
mystification of particular social relations; by acting as a crutch on which the rigour of 
sociological analysis comes to depend; or by presenting liberation and revolution as 
exercises of individual self-affirmation rather than acts of social upheaval. In various 
ways, humanism is diagnosed as a chronic ideological malaise that persistently afflicts the 
critical sociology of work, preventing this sociological discourse from obtaining a fuller 
understanding of its object. 
 Chapter Three focuses its attention on the zeitgeist of the contemporary sociology 
of work, critically analysing the ‘postcapitalist’ discourse and the emerging post-work 
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imaginary that has accompanied it. This discourse has developed amidst an identified 
‘crisis of work’ in Western Europe and the United States, which bears witness to the 
disintegration of traditional patterns of working in favour of more precarious, informal, 
individualised and sporadic working conditions, mediated by a growing globalised labour 
market and emerging technological innovation: a landscape described by Ulrich Beck 
(2000) as the Brave New World of Work.  This emerging reality has given rise to a critical 
sociology of work that pivots on the advocation of the abolition of work, through the 
embracing of technological innovation (so as to automate vast swathes of work) and 
through the implementation of new welfare policies (such as the UBI or other variations 
of this model). However, despite the apparent radicalism of this sociology, the 
functionality of the postcapitalist discourse is shown to rely upon a very narrow 
conceptualisation of work and upon the universalisation of the experience of a very 
particular social subject: of waged labour that corresponds to the white, male, able-bodied 
worker of the post-war era. The view of both work and welfare that it presents is indebted 
to this image, which consequently sees this critical sociology reinforcing the very 
productivist tropes that it seeks to reject. This chapter argues that these shortcomings are 
reflected theoretically and ideologically in its reliance on humanist concepts. Its contact 
with the Young Marx ([1844] 1981) sees this discourse reproduce an essentially humanist 
critique of labour under the guise of a technologically advanced postcapitalist vision, in 
which key social relations of work are necessarily mystified in order to secure the 
functionality of the discourse as a whole. These ideological roots allow this discourse to 
justify and side-step the limitations that it reinforces, by subsuming the social relations 
rendered-invisible by these limitations beneath an ideological analysis of human 
alienation. 
 Chapter Four engages in a Marxist-feminist analysis of humanist ideology, 
arguing that humanism further prevents a fuller understanding of reproduction and 
reproductive labour in the twenty first century. The contemporary landscape of 
reproduction is one in which reproductive labour has migrated its traditional foundation 
within the family unit and has been opened onto international labour markets through 
the emergence of a host of new globalised ‘trades’: domestic labour, sex work, tissue 
donation and surrogacy, for example. In response to this, an emerging humanist discourse 
has arisen which argues that the contemporary instances of gendered violence and harm 
evident in these emerging industries stems from a process of heightened human 
alienation facilitated by the structure of contemporary capitalism, where innate human 
values, human emotions and human relationships can be commodified and made 
available for sale. However, this humanist framing of the problem, by locating its critique 
of capitalism within an ideological analysis of human alienation, forbids a fuller 
understanding of the precise nature of gendered class exploitation in the twenty first 
century and how this is reflected in contemporary reproductive relations. This emerging 
13 
 
humanist tendency and its observation of critique within the tendency of capitalism 
towards heightened human alienation, mystifies the new regimes of primitive 
accumulation – and the re-orientations of gendered class struggle reflected therein – that 
are implicated in these contemporary formulations of reproductive labour. This emerging 
humanist tendency leaves these social relations of capitalism generally unthought, 
preventing a fuller understanding the precise nature of gendered violence in the twenty 
first century, but also reinforcing the precise ideological schemas on which capitalism has 
historically relied in exercising this gendered violence. In moving towards a Marxist-
feminist analysis of ‘Clinical Labour’ (Cooper & Waldby, 2014), this chapter stresses the 
necessity of revisiting the critique of humanist ideology for feminist sociological critiques 
of reproduction in the twenty first century.  
 Finally, Chapter Five critically analyses the impact of humanist ideology in the 
context of a developing social scientific paradigm set by the urgencies of potential 
ecological catastrophe: collected together under the notion of ‘the Anthropocene.’ This 
chapter pinpoints the figuration of labour within this emerging paradigm, exposing the 
centrality of labour as the pivot of an emerging theoretical humanism at the core of this 
paradigm. The proponents of the Anthropocene discourse rely upon a humanist 
conceptualisation of labour in order to describe the way in which the human subject, by 
virtue of its labour, has in effect made history, producing through its labour upon the 
planet the contemporary conditions of climatological instability that today confront it. In 
order to problematise this, the theorists of the Anthropocene depend upon a theory of 
alienation, arguing that the unstable conditions of the Anthropocene are the product of 
two centuries of alienated human labour: an alienation upheld and reinforced by 
modernity. However, this theoretically humanist configuration of labour and its reflection 
in a problematic of alienation produces severe ideological effects, mystifying the 
relationship between capitalist social relations and the conditions of ecological instability 
that define the ‘Anthropocene.’ This chapter demonstrates that the Anthropocene 
discourse – by virtue of its humanism – again prevents a fuller understanding of the 
nature of work in the twenty first century, particularly in the context of ecological 
catastrophe. This chapter argues that thinking work in a way that is sensitive to the 
planetary conditions that define this contemporary geo-historical epoch demands an 
alternative theoretical approach which centralises the critique of humanist ideology: 
focusing less on the Anthropocene and more on a Marxist world-ecological approach to 
the ‘Capitalocene’ (Moore, 2015). If unable to distance itself from this ideological trend in 
the social scientific interaction with the Anthropocene, the sociology of work, instead of a 
transformative discourse, risks spiralling into obscurity as one of many ideological voices 
to uncritically welcome the world into the ‘Era of Man.’ 
 The sociology of work is met with an urgent set of challenges in the twenty first 
century. The crisis of work, the globalisation of reproduction and impending ecological 
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catastrophe each present serious and immanent problems with which the sociology of 
work must come to terms. However, the adequacy of this sociological discourse in so doing 
depends upon the primacy of an ideological struggle against an old foe: that of humanism. 
Despite the legacy of Althusser and his contemporaries on the sociological discipline, 
humanism continues to present a persistent problem to the sociology of work in 
fundamentally limiting both its explanatory and transformative potential. There is, it 
would seem, power in the sociology of work: the power both to dominate, but also to 
liberate. The sociology of work is important because it provides a unique opportunity to 
know this power: however, this knowledge can only be produced “on the absolute 
precondition that the philosophical (theoretical) myth of man is reduced to ashes” 





Althusser and the Humanist Controversy 
 
This chapter will define and problematise ‘humanism’, looking first at the broader critique 
of humanism within the social sciences and secondly at the position of Louis Althusser’s 
specific contribution within this critique. Though humanism as a term has long been 
associated with the universalisation of human knowledge and human liberty, critical 
approaches to humanism have argued that humanism has in fact facilitated the 
entrenchment of numerous social inequalities. The ‘human’ of the human subject is not a 
diverse figure inclusive of differing social experiences but, on the contrary, a narrowly 
defined figure, embodying only a very particular social experience corresponding to the 
white, male, European and non-disabled human. Moreover, in embodying this narrow 
social experience, humanism is also mobilised to reproduce and justify the structures of 
domination and exploitation which benefit this particular social subject: capitalism, 
patriarchy, colonialism and ableism. In order to position what exactly is meant by 
‘humanism’ in this thesis and why it is to be considered a problem, this chapter will first 
engage with these critiques in more detail. 
 Through the work of Louis Althusser, the critique of humanism becomes available 
for thinking about work and class in much greater detail. For Althusser, humanism 
complements the structures of exploitation vital to the functioning of capitalist society, by 
providing an ideological obstacle behind which these structures can remain hidden: both 
in knowledge and in society itself. Marxism, for Althusser, recognises these ideological 
properties of humanism and arrives at the critique of capitalist society through an initial 
deconstruction of its humanist mystification in theory. For Althusser, humanism is a 
problem insofar as it hides the class character of capitalist society, meaning that the 
explanation of capitalist society – and its expression in key social relations, such as those 
of work – depends upon a deconstruction of this humanist ideology. Althusser’s 
contribution is not without inconsistencies and certainly not without its critics. This 
chapter will engage critically with Althusser’s contribution, assessing it in the context of 
his larger body of work and isolating the key components of his critique which will be 




Humanism is a multi-faceted and often contested set of ideas, beliefs and values that 
emerge in ethical, philosophical and even political forms. It is perhaps, as Davies (2008) 
argues, not appropriate to speak of humanism but of humanisms, as the definition of such 
a term is “never a matter for lexicography alone” (p.6), but “tied inescapably to the 
linguistic and cultural authority (real, absent, wished-for, or fought over) of those who 
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use it” (p.6, original emphasis). It can be conceived of as a set of values, organised around 
common human experience; as a standard of enquiry, prioritising science and rationality 
over faith or spirituality; as a philosophical method, usurping previous theological 
explanations of the world and its phenomena. Perhaps at its basis it is, as Fons Elders 
outlined in his introduction to the 1971 debate between Noam Chomsky and Michel 
Foucault (2011) on the subject, “the question of whether…in spite of our differences, we 
have something we could call common human nature, by which we can recognise each 
other as human beings” (p.2). 
 Popular considerations of humanism tend to link the term with a certain set of 
values and ideas which emphasise human scientific curiosity (rationality, discovery, 
inquisitiveness and contemplation, for example) as well as certain social and political 
values concomitant with this (liberation and autonomy, freedom of speech, freedom of 
thought and freedom of religious affiliation). Within the history of Western knowledge, a 
number of significant periods tend to re-emerge as pointing towards the foundations for 
humanism and humanist thinking. In Ancient Greece and through the philosophy of 
Plato, Aristotle, Protagoras and Epicurus, the social, political and cultural experiences of 
human civilisation were looked towards as the foundation for the human condition, 
challenging more theological interpretations. Between the fourteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the Renaissance is celebrated as a period of scientific discovery and cultural 
advancement. Key technological inventions such as the telescope and the printing press 
coincided with the contributions to human knowledge of Leonardo Da Vinci, Galileo and 
Isaac Newton, challenging the dogmatic teachings of the Church regarding the universe 
and its creation. The period of the Enlightenment is one celebrated for its major social and 
political advancements – cemented by key events such as the American (1765-1783) and 
French (1789-1799) Revolutions – in which the divine right of Kings to rule was challenged 
through the formation of republics, centralising key democratic freedoms of speech, 
association and religious affiliation. These important historical events, though different 
in their own ways, signal the movement towards scientific and philosophical enquiry 
grounded primarily in human experience, where rational human approaches to society 
and to the world begin to give shape to things once left to religion and to God to explain 
and justify. 
 At its most simplistic theoretical level, humanism is the advancement of 
knowledge from the perspective of human experience. It emerges alongside an important 
philosophical moment in Western thought, wherein religion comes to be usurped by the 
concept of history. The cornerstone of modern philosophy is that reality is dictated not by 
divine will or by acts of God, but through historical development or unfolding (Feenberg, 
2014). Humanism as a philosophy emerges in tandem with this historicism, as human 
action is identified as the motor of this historical unfolding: “For this philosophy, ‘reality’ 
is historical, and history itself is to be understood as in essence an object of human 
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practice” (Feenberg, 2014, p.5). The conceptualisation of history in this way makes 
necessary the production of a human subject, imbued with very particular qualities and 
characteristics that allow it to make history in this way. It is here that philosophy produces 
a taxonomy of concepts through which to describe how this subject makes history, such 
as ‘labour’, ‘essence’, ‘nature’ and ‘subjectivity’. In this way, “the constitutive dynamic of a 
conscious (if often misguided) human development is therefore the crux of historical 
change” (Del Valle Alcala, 2013, p.74-74). In short, humanism and the historical human 
subject – as they are predominantly understood in their modern philosophical context – 
are the product of the confrontation of philosophy with theology, of history with religion, 
where the divine figure of God was replaced by the historical figure of ‘Man.’  
 Humanism is not easily identifiable within a specific school of thought. Rather, 
humanism has intersected with a number of other considerations across multiple 
disciplines in the production of a patchwork of modern European philosophical 
interjections. Perhaps the most influential humanist thinkers were those which belonged 
to the school of German idealism such as Immanuel Kant (1781), G.W.F. Hegel (1821) and 
Ludwig Feuerbach (1841). German idealism is largely credited as providing the foundation 
for modern humanist and historicist philosophy, arguing that that which is transcendental 
or essential belongs not to God but to Man, with history the observed development and 
attainment of these transcendental human qualities. The human subject itself becomes 
the motor of history, opening it up to change and adaptation that was previously forbidden 
by more theological interpretations. There are of course other notable philosophical 
contributions to humanism which do not belong to this school of German idealism. 
Spinoza’s (1677) contribution pre-dates German idealism and is often credited as 
foundational to humanist thinking: Spinoza forwarded a monist philosophy, arguing that 
human beings and nature shared the same essential foundations. In Britain, David 
Hume’s ([1738] 2014) philosophical contribution advanced an empiricist understanding 
of human nature, that proved influential in the formation of British political economy and 
political theory thereafter. 
 This image of an historical human subject becomes absolutely crucial for the 
functioning of theory across a number of disciplines in modern social science. Early 
political scientific theories of power and the state depended upon the existence of a human 
subject in order to function. Thomas Hobbes’ ([1651] 2008) theory of power and the state 
depended upon the existence of a human subject whose life was spent in perpetual conflict 
with other humans. The sovereignty of the state was derived from the necessary 
relinquishing of autonomy by these warring subjects, trading the ability to self-govern for 
a more civilized way of existing (Hobbes, 2008). In argument with Hobbes, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau ([1762] 2008) mobilised a more moralistic human subject as a way of advancing 
his theory of the social contract. According to Rousseau (2008), the institutions of 
industrial society and the division of labour it inaugurated encouraged the development 
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of a civil society locked together through a social contract between its members, ensuring 
the triumph of innate human morals over the state of nature within modern politics.  
 Sociologically, a different human subject emerges as an important theoretical 
pivot. For Émile Durkheim ([1893] 1964), the establishment of a human subject with 
distinct values and characteristics was important for his explanation of industrial society. 
Echoing Rousseau’s approach to politics, Durkheim (1964) argued that the institutions of 
industrial society – in particular the workplace and the family – and the distinct division 
of labour it necessitated, were directly compatible with a civilised and moralistic human 
society. The division of labour in industrial society fostered an “organic solidarity” 
(Durkheim, 1964, p.69) between its members, emanating from a relationship between the 
institutions of society and the innate moral behaviours of the human subject: a 
relationship to which Durkheim (1964) would prescribe sociology the task of studying. In 
Max Weber’s ([1905] 2012) sociology, the human subject is less pronounced. However, 
rationality as a key humanist concept is particularly important in Weber’s (2012) 
explanation of the emergence of capitalism and bureaucracy, with the Protestant Ethic 
considered to be the product of a rationalist and more humanist shift towards Calvinism: 
a strand of Christianity which encouraged worldly salvation, emphasising a link between 
human actions in this life and divine salvation in the next. 
 Modern contributions to political economy relied on a productive and consuming 
human subject as a standard measure for economic calculation. For Adam Smith ([1776] 
1991), the human subject was the cornerstone of his calculation of value. For Smith (1991), 
the exchange-value of all commodities was derived from the value of the labour invested 
into their production: “Labour…is the real measure of the exchangeable value of all 
commodities” (p.26). The value of this labour is determined, for Smith (1991), by the cost 
of reproducing the human labourer themselves: that is, the cost of feeding, housing and 
reproducing the human labourer so that they may return to work the next today to labour 
again. In this way, Smith’s (1991) calculation of value – which would go on to influence 
future political economic contributions such as those of David Ricardo (1817) – was 
dependent upon the centrality of a human subject capable of measurable production and 
consumption.  
 In each of these instances, the human subject appears slightly differently and with 
a different function. Some discourses emphasise the transcendental characteristics of the 
human subject, focusing on essence in some form or another. Others claim to understand 
the ‘nature’ of this subject, necessarily measuring the naturally productive or consumptive 
habits of this subject and how these are organised. Be it through its experience, essence 
or nature, the human subject is repeatedly relied upon as a way of bridging the gap 
between the philosopher, the political scientist, the sociologist or the economist and the 
object of their knowledge: that is, that which they are trying to produce knowledge of. 
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Importantly, it is this reliance on the human subject and on the construction of its nature 
or essence that is here codified as humanism.  
 At first glance, the orientation of knowledge around a human subject appears 
progressive, attempting to universalise social, political and economic experience on the 
basis of characteristics shared by everybody by virtue of their simply ‘being human.’ 
However, critical analyses of humanism have indicated that what is universalised is in fact 
the social experience of a very specific image of humanity. What becomes apparent is that 
the experiences of certain groups of people – people of different classes, different genders 
or different races, for example – are unaccounted for in the hegemonic image of the 
human subject that emerges out of these discourses. Moreover, there is a troubling 
correlation between this exclusion and the material social exploitation of these excluded 
groups. 
 
THE CRITIQUE OF HUMANISM 
 
Importantly, this recurring humanist ideology has not passed without criticism. The 
essence of this criticism is that this human subject and the humanist values to which it 
corresponds, speak only to the experience of a very narrowly defined human subject: 
normally an experience enjoyed by a white, male, European, heterosexual and non-
disabled subject. Humanism is therefore criticised as exclusionary, as its functioning 
requires the mystification of social experiences that differ from those of the hegemonic 
human subject to which it corresponds. More dangerously, the establishment of a 
hegemonic human subject and human experience allows for the development of 
hierarchies and structures of domination, where certain social experiences – those of 
different races, genders, sexual orientations or abilities from the assumed human subject 
– are justifiably suppressed by virtue of their difference or divergence from this 
hegemonic form. In many cases, the material forms of oppression and domination 
experienced by particular groups of people – racism, sexism, homophobia or ableism – 
find their theoretical expression in discourses of knowledge that have continued to mark 
their bodies (and the social experience that corresponds with these bodies) as a deviation 
from a normative standard, set by the modern human subject and its humanist values. 
 In her text The Posthuman, Rosi Braidotti (2013) provides a strong introduction 
to the terms of this critique. Braidotti (2013) argues that rather than providing a basis for 
inclusivity, humanism and the human subject have served to provide a lever of exclusion, 
functioning as a hegemonic standard against which difference is recognised and separated 
out. As Braidotti (2013) writes,  
 
The human of Humanism is neither an ideal nor an objective statistical average or 
middle ground. It rather spells out a systematized standard of recognizability – of 
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Sameness – by which all others can be assessed, regulated and allotted to a 
designated social location (p.26). 
 
In this way, humanism provides a basis both for segregation (the separation of difference 
from sameness) but also hierarchy (the placement of sameness above difference). In this 
way, as Braidotti (2013) continues, “to be ‘different from’ came to mean to be ‘less than’” 
(p.28). Thus, with the birth of humanism comes a new and more useful vocabulary 
through which to justify the existence of social hierarchy and the exploitation inherent to 
it. The language of humanism, in producing the hegemonic human subject, at precisely 
the same time produces those subjects which are ‘sub-human’, ‘non-human’ or ‘in-
human’, conveniently attaching these labels to those exploited within these social 
hierarchies (Braidotti, 2013). The exploitation of the working class at work, of women in 
the household and of people of colour in the colonies is organised and articulated through 
the language of dehumanisation, with the establishment of the difference of these social 
groups from the hegemonic human standard providing the justification for their 
subjugation (Braidotti, 2013). In this way, humanism and the figure of the human subject 
in theory, “goes hand in hand with the recognition of the real-life violence which was and 
still is practised against non-human animals and the dehumanized social and political 
‘others’ of the humanist norm” (Braidotti, 2013, p.30). 
 Friedrich Nietzsche is often looked towards as one of the first philosophers to 
launch this critique of humanism: albeit without the sensitivity to issues of gender and 
race brought later to this critique by feminist and postcolonial theory. The essence of 
Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God was the recognition that a new figure had 
emerged to take its place as an organising principle of human behaviour, that is, the figure 
of ‘Man.’ According to Nietzsche ([1901] 2017), the attachment of consciousness, 
autonomy and free will to the human subject becomes the standard against which human 
beings are controlled, judged and punished in modern society. The fiction of “‘the doer’ 
(spirit, ego, rational actor, will), is used to attach a conscious intention to our actions in 
order that we may be held accountable for our behavior” (Weeks, 2018, p.33). In this way, 
so Weeks (2018) continues, “the pre-existing self is a point of access which is exploited by 
outside forces; the ideal of the self-constituting individual is one means by which we are 
enslaved” (p.33). The values of humanism come to replace the Ten Commandments, with 
pre-existing subjectivity replacing divine intervention as the source of morality but also 
the access-point of power. The correspondence of the modern subject to these humanist 
values forms the basis of their social acceptance and vindication, with the phenomenon of 
nihilism central to Nietzsche’s work often conceptualised as the product of a contradiction 
between these values and the realities of modern society for human beings (Weeks, 2018). 
 The initiation and development of this critique of humanism has been an essential 
component in the emergence and establishment of both feminist and postcolonial theory. 
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Simone de Beauvoir’s ([1949] 2011) The Second Sex is a foundational text in feminist 
theory, which launched a sophisticated critique of the modern human subject from the 
standpoint of a feminist existentialism. De Beauvoir (2011) tracked the production of the 
female subject and its position in relation to the dominant, normative, masculine 
interpretations of subjectivity that had accompanied the production of modern 
knowledge. For de Beauvoir (2011), the category of Woman was a necessarily gendered 
one, produced as a result of hegemonic patriarchal considerations of subjectivity 
concomitant with modern knowledge. In this sense, female subjectivity had never been 
defined on its own terms, but always in reference to the masculine standard, which 
produced a deeply problematic conceptualisation of modern femininity, often 
complementary of existing patriarchal social structures (de Beauvoir, 2011). As de 
Beauvoir (2011) wrote, “Humanity is male, and man defines woman, not in herself, but in 
relation to himself; she is not considered an autonomous being” (p.5).  
This critique of humanism is further echoed in key contributions to postcolonial 
theory. In Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon ([1952] 2008) recognised the way in 
which the concept of Man and of the human subject emerged as a pivot of colonial 
domination. The modern human subject emerges as the reference point of being for both 
the white coloniser and the black colonised subject: the coloniser, in dominating man and 
nature alike seeks to embody the ideals of modern Man; and the colonised, convinced of 
its own inferiority in the wake of this image, strives toward ‘whiteness’ as a way of 
compensating for this inferiority (Fanon, 2008). As Fanon (2008) wrote in the opening 
pages of his text, “The black man wants to be white. The white man is desperately trying 
to achieve the rank of man” (p.XIII).  
 Humanism and dominant assumptions surrounding the human subject and its 
values and characteristics have long been problematic by virtue of the ways in which this 
image helps to reinforce and reproduce particular social inequalities. However, this 
critique is by no means one only of the past. In recent years, this critique has been 
reanimated as a way of making sense of emerging social inequalities. From a sociological 
perspective, Imogen Tyler’s (2013) Revolting Subjects explains the relationship between 
the material conditions of society and the invocation of stigma and the notions of disgust, 
deviancy and revulsion used to separate specific social groups away from dominant 
conceptions of humanity. According to Tyler (2013), neoliberalism in Britain and its 
attendant social consequences – the dismantling of workers’ rights, the constriction of the 
welfare state and the criminalisation of immigrants and other racialised groups – is 
facilitated by a machinery of “social abjection” (p.19) which facilitates the social 
oppression of particular groups of people through their marking as ‘other’ from normative 
conceptualisations of human subjectivity. The social injustices wrought upon 
marginalised social groups such as the unemployed, young people, single mothers, 
immigrants, refugees and travellers is justified on the basis of the subjective juxtaposition 
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of these groups against the normative construct of the ideal human subject: a 
juxtaposition facilitated by notions of disgust, revulsion, uncleanliness, infection and 
inhumanity (Tyler, 2013). For example, Tyler (2013) explains the connection between key 
neoliberal policies such as the strengthening of border policy and the shrinking of the 
welfare state in Britain and the development of a “rhetoric of disgust” (p.89) surrounding 
the figure of the ‘asylum-seeker’, which sought to position this figure as distinct from the 
general population through the repetition and reproduction of dehumanising tropes: 
tropes worthy of punishment through stricter immigration and welfare laws. 
 In his text Mistaken Identity, Asad Haider (2018) demonstrates this problem in 
the development of “racial ideology” (p.42). For Haider (2018), racial ideology is a product 
of the attachment of social hierarchies and social structures to particular biological 
qualities: such as, for example, skin colour. The position of certain groups of people within 
social hierarchies is justified on the basis of biological characteristics, with those at the 
top corresponding more closely to a normative standard of ‘human’ and those below 
positioned on the basis of their deviation from this normative standard. As Haider (2018) 
explains, racial ideology was particularly important in the development of capitalist social 
relations. Imperialism and the necessary establishment of social hierarchies through 
which to appropriate and exploit both land and labour abroad, was reflected in the 
development of a racial ideology that attached the now subservient social position of 
colonised peoples to very particular biological characteristics, ‘justifying’ imperial 
expansion by juxtaposing the civilised, rational white European subject with the 
barbarous, uncivilised and uneducated colonial subject (Haider, 2018). As Haider (2018) 
writes of racial ideology within the British Empire, “the early forms of English racial 
ideology represented the Irish as inferior and subhuman, and this ideology was later 
repeated word for word to justify both the genocide of Indigenous people in the Americas 
and the enslavement of Africans” (p.52, emphasis added). 
 This critique is particularly acute within contemporary feminist theory too, with 
the social subjugation of women linked to the deviation of women from normative human 
standards in various ways. Through the example of sex work and the figure of ‘the 
prostitute’, Juno Mac and Molly Smith (2018) demonstrate how these ideas have re-
emerged in the contemporary oppression of women. According to Mac and Smith (2018), 
the crushing of attempts made by sex workers to organise in unions, the denial of various 
rights to sex workers to work and live and the criminalisation of sex workers through 
policing and border control are reflected (again, ideologically) in the notions of disgust, 
degradation and disease that are often attached to bodies of sexually promiscuous women, 
marking them not simply as a deviation from a normative human subject, but as 
threatening to contaminate this image. As Mac and Smith (2018) write in relation to the 
patriarchal dehumanisation of women’s bodies, “Ugly, stretched, odorous, unclean, 
potentially infected, desirable, mysterious, tantalising – the patriarchy’s ambivalence 
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towards vaginas is well established and has a lot in common with attitudes around sex 
work” (p.23, emphasis added). Mac and Smith (2018) here acknowledge a link between 
this process of dehumanisation and the material working conditions of sex workers today. 
 From a perspective in critical studies in disability, Bill Hughes (2012) argues that 
modern approaches to the disabled can be conceptualised in terms of a process of 
‘civilisation’, where bodies that are considered to deviate from a normative human 
standard are either cured or killed. Hughes (2012) argues that modern conceptualisations 
of human subjectivity have been used to treat disabled people in either ‘anthropoemic’ 
(where the purity of the original human subject is preserved through the elimination or 
removal of disabled people from society) or ‘anthropophagic’ (where medical science has 
attempted to correct or cure disabled people to more closely mirror the norms and values 
embodied in the modern human subject) ways, both of which have reinforced social 
inequalities between disabled and non-disabled people. In this way, dominant normative 
conceptualisations of human subjectivity “transmit the same core cultural message: 
disabled people represent ‘what not to be’ and are, therefore, ontologically invalid or 
‘uncivilised’” (Hughes, 2012, p.18). Crucially, this ontological invalidation – possible only 
against the backdrop of a normative human image – reflects the material social 
inequalities faced by disabled people in the workplace, the community and in other 
important social institutions and spaces. 
 As is evident across these critiques, humanism and its mobilisation of historical 
human subjectivity are problematised as entry-points to power and domination within 
modern society. In these different instances, humanism is critiqued because it both 
brackets and reinforces particular social inequalities and experiences. In modern 
conceptualisations of historical human subjectivity, there is little room for the experiences 
of women, of people of colour, of the disabled and of a number of other groups whose 
social experience differs from that of the hegemonic subject. However, it is not only that 
humanism in this way can be ignorant of these perspectives, but that it can also be used 
as a way of reinforcing the inequalities that emerge out of this ignorance. Humanism has 
been shown by these authors to be a co-conspirator in the deployment of racist, 
patriarchal and ableist social structures that deploy social violence upon these groups: 
often necessarily as part of contemporary capitalist accumulation strategies. 
 For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to locate a critique of humanism 
which is useful for thinking about class and work. For such a critique, the thesis turns to 
the critique of humanism found in the works of Louis Althusser. For Althusser ([1972] 
2008), the language of humanism was precisely the language of capitalism and capitalist 
exploitation. Althusser (2008) argued that humanism provided the logic and justification 
for the exploitation of the working class, providing the bourgeoisie with a useful taxonomy 
beneath which to mystify the cruelty of class domination. As Althusser (2008) wrote, 
humanism “serves those whose interest it is to talk about ‘man’ and not about the masses, 
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about ‘man’ and not about classes and the class struggle” (p.98, original emphasis). This 
use of the critique of humanism in thinking about class – and work as a reflection of class 
struggle – will be of particular use for the development of this thesis and its argument. In 
what follows, the chapter critically explores Althusser’s critique of humanism and some of 
those who have engaged with it in order to isolate the useful concepts from this critique 
and justify their position in this thesis. 
  
ALTHUSSER AND THE HUMANIST CONTROVERSY 
 
Louis Althusser’s critique of humanism has been the subject of celebration and significant 
critique both during his life and in the years after his death. Althusser was a problematic 
philosophical character, whose ideas have often been enjoyed vicariously in the work of 
more palatable names such as Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida. 
However, Althusser’s work provides particular conceptual resources which are useful for 
thinking about the problems imbued in the relationship between humanism and 
conceptualisations of work and class. From the expansive and important collection of 
concepts produced by Althusser, this thesis singles out an important pair of concepts 
which Althusser brings together in his critique of humanism and which will be of 
particular importance for the critique developed in this thesis. The first of these concepts 
is the concept of ‘humanism’ itself, which allows for a description of the precise 
characteristics of the problem with which this thesis deals. The second concept is the 
concept of ‘ideology’, which allows for a description of how humanism becomes 
problematic and what humanism ‘does’ to the sociology of work, which this thesis sets out 
to observe and analyse. This section of the chapter will critically isolate, explain and 
position these conceptual resources in Althusser’s work and therefore justify their 
positioning within the thesis. 
 Althusser’s work, the most important examples of which emerged between the 
early 1960s and late 1970s, covered a number of topics and disciplines and attracted 
equally fervent support and criticism with each production. The targets of Althusser’s 
critique have included humanism and historicism and its emergence in German idealist 
philosophy, classical political economy and contemporary ‘communism’ (Althusser [1964] 
1996, [1965] 2015a, 2015b); the role of the state in the capitalist mode of production 
(Althusser [1969] 2014); the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan ([1964] 
2008); the role of philosophy and ideology in the natural sciences (Althusser, [1967] 
2011); and the political theory of Montesquieu (Althusser, [1959] 2007) and Niccolò 
Machiavelli (Althusser, [1971-72] 1999). Despite this corpus of work, Althusser has been 
declared something of a “dead dog” in philosophical terms (Lipietz cited in Elliot, 2009, 
p.XIII). His work received notable criticism and dismissal from a number of places. John 
Lewis (1972) likened Althusser’s work to “a voice crying in the wilderness” (p.25) who was 
25 
 
“highly polemical…arraigning in the dock the enemies and heretics which it is his 
responsibility to expose and denounce” (p.25). E.P. Thompson (1978) penned one of the 
most influential critiques of Althusser’s work in The Poverty of Theory, in which he 
described “Althusserianism as a manifestation of a general police action within ideology, 
as the attempt to reconstruct Stalinism at the level of theory” (chapter XIII, para.46). 
Raymond Williams ([1977] 2009) also implicitly critiqued the “relatively powerless” 
(p.129) ability of ‘Althusserian’ Marxism to comprehend the role of human cultural 
activity under capitalism, citing “one dominant strain in Marxism, with its habitual abuse 
of the ‘subjective’ and the ‘personal’” (p.129) as the prime suspect of this charge.  
 Despite this extensive criticism, the critique of humanism in Althusser’s work 
found salience in the philosophical works of many of his contemporaries and has gone on 
to inspire numerous mainstream contemporary contributions to philosophy and social 
science. Michel Foucault – a heavily-cited author within sociology and student of 
Althusser – made the critique of humanism and the human subject central to his 
deconstruction of Western knowledge and modern subjectivity. Particularly in texts like 
Madness and Civilisation (Foucault, [1961] 2001), Discipline and Punish (Foucault [1975] 
1991) and Volume One of The History of Sexuality (Foucault, [1976] 1998), Foucault 
tracks how humanism and ideas surrounding human subjectivity develop as ideological 
supplements to modern structures and institutions of power. The family, the prison, the 
hospital and the factory as key institutions of capitalist society, produce an ideological 
“machinery” (Foucault, 1998, p.69) through which humanist discourse is produced and 
reproduced in the service of power. These ideas have been continued in updated critiques 
of humanism, particularly those by Donna Haraway (1991) and Rosi Braidotti (2013) in 
their development of ‘posthumanist’ theory. For them, humanism remains an 
anachronism of modern patriarchal capitalism, crucial for the ongoing division of labour 
between genders, races and species in the face of social developments in globalisation and 
technology which continue to blur the lines between these categories. From the 
perspective of Marxist theory, Althusser’s critique of humanism is echoed in the works of 
popular interlocutors such as Étienne Balibar (2017), Fredric Jameson (2016), Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001), Alain Badiou (2012) and Slavoj Žižek (2008). 
Furthermore, a new collection of essays curated and edited by Nick Nesbitt (2017) has 
been recently published, dedicated to a re-reading of Althusser’s Reading Capital (in 
which Althusser’s critique of humanism finds a central place) from a variety of standpoints 
and in the context of twenty first century capitalism and its discontents. 
 Although these authors have all moved beyond Althusser in some way, it is not 
because they reject the Althusserian critique of humanism. On the contrary, this critique 
maintains a central place in these contributions. For Foucault (1970), it was the critique 
of Marxist-humanism that permitted his exposure of how traditional Marxism and the 
‘bourgeois’ political economy it was supposed to oppose in fact shared the same “condition 
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of possibility” (p.262): a condition rooted in humanist ideology and the historical image 
of ‘Man.’ For Braidotti (2013), the Althusserian critique of humanism opened a challenge 
to “the humanistic arrogance of continuing to place Man at the centre of world history” 
(p.23) that persisted at the core of Marxist philosophy at the time, showing how “different 
and sharper power relations emerge, once this formerly dominant subject is freed from 
his delusions of grandeur and is no longer allegedly in charge of historical progress” 
(p.23). Jameson (2016) argued that Althusserian anti-humanism “thematized the attack 
on metaphysics – in a kind of search-and-destroy offensive which tracked its enemy into 
the most unlikely corners, with often deadly results” (p.70), challenging the notion that 
the “(bourgeois) ideal of human nature was somehow eternal and permanently defined 
the species as such” (p.70). For Žižek (2008), Althusser’s contribution to philosophy 
demarcates the “real break” (p.XXIV) with how subjectivity was considered theoretically, 
as Althusser argued that “a certain cleft, a certain fissure, misrecognition, characterizes 
the human condition as such: by the thesis that the idea of the possible end of ideology is 
an ideological idea par excellence” (p.XXIV). 
 Whilst Althusser and his work have therefore enjoyed serious and sustained 
criticism, the continued salience of his critique of humanism in these popular 
contributions is indicative of its explanatory force in the context of emerging social 
developments. Moreover, it is Althusser specifically who teaches his readers how to deploy 
the critique of humanism in the context of capitalism and class struggle. It is in this way 
that the re-visiting of Althusser’s critique is here justified. As a Marxist philosopher, 
Althusser argued that the precise philosophical method which allows Marxism to make 
sense of class struggle and its expression in the various social relations of society 
(especially those of ‘work’) emanates primarily from the critique of humanist ideology. By 
re-visiting the works of Marx, Althusser demonstrates how Marx’s dissection of the 
capitalist mode of production is firmly anchored in both an implicit and explicit critique 
of humanism, where ideological assumptions around human subjectivity are left behind 
in favour of a ‘scientific’1 analysis of society, social relations and social structures. “It is 
against the general background of this history,” so Althusser ([1967] 2003) wrote in his 
essay on The Humanist Controversy, “that we can bring out our carefully considered 
reasons for defending the thesis of Marx’s theoretical anti-humanism” (p.232, original 
emphasis). 
 Firstly, it is important to set about defining ‘humanism’ as a theoretical problem. 
Althusser’s references to ‘humanism’ were references to representations of human 
subjectivity in theory. In his critique of humanism, Althusser was targeting these 
theoretical representations of concrete human subjectivity and their reflection in a 
 
1 Althusser mobilised the ‘scientific’ qualities of Marxism in order to pronounce its opposition to 
‘ideology.’ Althusser was here playing into the debate between science and ideology that persisted in the 
social sciences at the time, evident par excellence in the ‘Positivist Debate’ between Karl Popper and 
Theodor Adorno in 1961 (see Jeffries, 2017). 
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number of different conceptual devices. Althusser (2003) here pointed towards the 
various ways in which these concepts manifest themselves theoretically: 
 
The notion of Man (the essence or Nature of Man); The notion of the human 
species or Human Genus (Man’s generic essence, defined by consciousness, the 
heart, inter-subjectivity, etc.); The notion of the ‘concrete,’ ‘real’, etc., individual; 
The notion of the subject (‘concrete’ subjectivity, the subject constitutive of the 
speculary relation, the process of alienation, History, etc.); The notion of 
consciousness (for example, as the essential defining feature of the human species, 
or as the essence of the ideological); The notion of labour (as the essence of man); 
The notion of alienation (as the externalization of a Subject); The notion of 
dialectic (so far as it implies teleology) (p.273). 
 
Across numerous contributions, Althusser tracks and exposes the persistence of these 
theoretical concepts across various discourses of knowledge. In modern political theory, 
Althusser (2007) demonstrated how modern conceptualisations of law upon which these 
political theories were based were “steeped in exigencies arising from human relations. 
Law thus presupposed human beings, or beings in the image of man, even if they 
surpassed it” (p.31). In philosophy – particularly German idealism – this humanism 
emerges again, in the consideration of history as the expression of the struggle of the 
human subject against alienated reason: “At the end of history, this man, having become 
inhuman objectivity, has merely to re-grasp as subject his own essence alienated in 
property, religion and the State to become total man, true man” (Althusser, 1996, p.226). 
Althusser (2015b) also observes this humanism in theories of political economy too, 
arguing that “Political Economy relates economic facts to their origin in the needs (or 
‘utility’) of human subjects” (p.314, original emphasis), where “it is the need (of the human 
subject) that defines the economic in economics” (p.315, original emphasis).  
 Through these examples, it is possible to infer a very specific definition of 
humanism in Althusser’s work. It is a distinctly theoretical problem for Althusser, relating 
to the ways in which discourses of knowledge rely on various assumptions surrounding 
human subjectivity in order to draw conclusions about their object of study. Though the 
distinction was not always convincing, Althusser (1996) took steps to distinguish this 
observation of theoretical humanism from the values of human freedom and human 
liberation often characterised as ‘humanist.’ As Althusser (1996) conceded in the opening 
passages of his essay Marxism and Humanism, “the objective of the revolutionary 
struggle has always been the end of exploitation and hence the liberation of man” (p.221). 
For Althusser (1996) as a Marxist, humanist values themselves were not the problem: 
rather, the problem was these humanist theoretical tropes which obfuscated the class 
struggle necessary for achieving this human emancipation. Though human liberation was 
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the desired outcome of every revolutionary struggle, “as Marx foresaw…this struggle had 
to take the form of the struggle between classes. So revolutionary humanism could only 
be a ‘class humanism,’ ‘proletarian humanism.’ The end of the exploitation of man meant 
the end of class exploitation” (Althusser, 1996, p.221, original emphasis). In other words, 
in order to understand how to liberate human individuals, it was important to theorise the 
social (class) structures responsible for this unfreedom, rather than the individuals 
themselves. 
 In order to articulate humanism as a problem, Althusser relied on another 
concept: the concept of ideology. Althusser ([1970] 2008) defined ideologies as “the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (p.36). In 
Althusser’s writings, the concept of ideology can be seen to have two different (but not 
unrelated) positions (Montag, 2013). In later works – particularly in his theorisation of 
the role of the state under capitalism – ideology was conceptualised by Althusser (2008) 
as a set of ideas and cues through which the capitalist state interpellates individuals into 
their role as subjects. Through key capitalist institutions such as the workplace, the school 
and the family, these ‘ideological state apparatuses’ continue to produce and reproduce 
ideas which transform individuals into the capitalist subjects which correspond to these 
different institutions and the roles expected of them: as workers, as students and as 
housewives, for example (Althusser, 2008). In earlier works however, ideology was 
conceptualised by Althusser (2003) in terms of a theoretical ‘obstacle’, as a false 
theoretical representation behind which the real is hidden. In theory, ideology provides 
the scientist with a false representation of that which they are seeking to produce 
knowledge of. As Althusser (2003) wrote, theories travel along a path towards the object 
of their study, however “at some point, this path is blocked by an obstacle that prevents 
the theory from approaching and attaining its object” (p.271, original emphasis). This 
obstacle is ideology, which “blocks a path and hides objects that are in some sense behind 
it” (Althusser, 2003, p.271, original emphasis). It is this more theoretical 
conceptualisation of ideology which is useful for this thesis. 
 As a Marxist philosopher, it is in this way that humanism serves as an ideological 
problem for Althusser (1996). Humanism is a problem insofar as it serves as a theoretical 
obstacle in discourses of social science, behind which the realities of class struggle and its 
allegories in capitalist society are hidden (Althusser, 1996). Where humanism emerges in 
theory, it has the ideological effect of removing class struggle from view by reducing 
structural social phenomena down to mere relations between concrete individuals 
(Althusser, 1996). In this way, humanism does not serve as an adequate basis for the 
construction of a critique of capitalist society: on the contrary, it provides the precise 
ideological covering behind which class exploitation is repeatedly hidden and justified 




When, during the eighteenth century, the ‘rising class,’ the bourgeoisie, developed 
a humanist ideology of equality, freedom and reason, it gave its own demands the 
form of universality, since it hoped thereby to enroll at its side, by their education 
to this end, the very men it would liberate only for their exploitation (p.234). 
 
Humanism as an ideology provides individuals with the speculary relation between 
themselves and their material conditions of existence. Reproduced across various 
discourses of knowledge – discourses whose formation accompanied the formation of 
capitalist social relations themselves – humanist ideology mystifies the class character of 
various social phenomena, representing these phenomena in more humanist forms at 
every turn (Althusser, 1996). For example, rather than presenting labour and work as an 
activity in class exploitation, bourgeois political economy mystifies the class character of 
the social phenomenon of work, hiding the material conditions of work behind humanist 
appeals to the supernatural and transcendent qualities of human labour: “And why does 
the bourgeoisie want to keep quiet about the natural-material conditions of labour? 
Because it controls them. The bourgeoisie knows what it is doing” (Althusser, 2008, p.98, 
original emphasis). 
 In order to demonstrate the ideological qualities of humanism in this way, 
Althusser (1996) developed his most influential – and indeed, most controversial – 
theory: that of the epistemological break between the works of ‘Young’ and ‘Mature’ Marx. 
Althusser (1996) developed the distinction between the early works of the ‘Young Marx’ 
and the more sophisticated political economy of the ‘Mature Marx’ in order to highlight 
how the ability to theorise class struggle and society was possible only on the critique of 
humanist ideology as an absolute precondition. Althusser (1996) argued that whilst the 
mature political economy of Marx critiqued capitalism through particular concepts which 
allowed him to think about the primacy of class struggle in the capitalist mode of 
production, the works of the ‘Young Marx’ were much less sophisticated, relying on 
humanist ideology in order to construct this critique of capitalism. Therefore, Althusser 
(1996) argued that the sophistication of Marx’s mature political economy (and the 
development of the concepts that defined it) was anchored fundamentally in the 
deconstruction of humanism as a theoretical obstacle in the move between the ‘Young’ 
and ‘Mature’ Marx, with the disappearance of humanism in his works the sine qua non of 
the emergence of Marxist philosophy. The concepts of Marx’s mature political economy 
and the theory of society driven by historical class struggle there developed, emerged 
“because of his ferocious insistence on freeing himself from the myths which presented 
themselves to him as the truth” (Althusser, 1996, p.84, original emphasis) in the form of 
the humanist ideology of his youth. 
 According to Althusser (1996), the early works of the ‘Young Marx’ (those texts 
written before 1845 such as The Holy Family and The Economic and Philosophic 
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Manuscripts of 1844) critiqued capitalism on the basis of a fundamentally humanist 
problematic, which Marx “borrowed” (p.46) from the German idealism of Ludwig 
Feuerbach. In his critique of religion, Feuerbach (1841) argued that religion was the 
manifestation of an alienated human reason, obstructing the human subject’s full 
attainment and enjoyment of its human capacities. Althusser (1996) argued that this 
central humanist problematic was traced by the Young Marx into his critique of 
capitalism. The Young Marx argued that capitalism is but the manifestation of alienated 
human reason, reflected in the alienation of human labour in private property. 
Communism, for the Young Marx, was therefore no more than the human overcoming of 
this alienated condition, as the process through which “the proletariat will negate its own 
negation and take possession of itself” (Althusser, 1996, p.226). In analysing these early 
works, Althusser (1996) argued that the central theoretical problematic of the Young Marx 
was not society, but Man. Althusser (1996) charges the Young Marx with “merely applying 
the theory of alienation, that is, Feuerbach’s theory of ‘human nature’” (p.46) to political 
economy, in which he does not espouse his own original theory of society but “literally 
espoused Feuerbach’s problematic” (p.46) of human nature and its alienation in society. 
Crucially, the theoretical consequences of this predominant humanist ideology in the 
work of the Young Marx were that it acted as a theoretical obstacle in Marx’s political 
economy, mystifying the role of class struggle and its reflection in the relations of society. 
In these early works, the critique of capitalism through the lens of class struggle and social 
structure is silenced by the persistence of humanist ideology throughout his analysis:  
 
Marx could not state what he was trying to say – not only because he did not yet 
know how to say it, but also because he prevented himself from saying it by dint 
of the simple fact that he began his first sentence with the phrase ‘the essence of 
Man’ (Althusser, 2003, p.254, original emphasis). 
 
The developed concepts of class struggle and its reflection in the social relations of 
capitalism for which Marx’s political economy would be become well-known remain silent 
in the works of the ‘Young Marx’ because they are hidden behind the theoretical obstacle 
of humanist ideology. Althusser (1996) here demonstrated how the Feuerbachian 
ideological problematic of human nature and the Marxist problematic of class struggle 
cannot coexist and instead compete with one another in these early works, with the former 
decisively silencing the latter to the detriment of the sophistication of Marx’s political 
economy.   
 The sophisticated critique of capitalism that Marx developed in his mature 
political economy – where the capitalist mode of production is shown by Marx to be the 
reflection of historically determined class struggle in both the forces and relations of 
production – emerged with the abandonment of humanist ideology and the replacement 
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of the humanist problematic for one of class struggle and social structure (Althusser, 
1996). The analytic method of the mature Marx “does not proceed from man but from a 
given economic period of society” (Marx, 1881, para.82, original emphasis), critiquing 
capitalism not as the alienation of human reason but as the product of an historically 
determinant class struggle. For Althusser (1996) this fundamental break with humanist 
ideology is specifically responsible for the emergence of class struggle at the forefront of 
Marx’s political economy and thus responsible for all the concepts Marx provided to his 
readers in order to understand it. As Althusser (1996) wrote, “Marx established a new 
problematic, a new systematic way of asking questions of the world, new principles and a 
new method” (p.229). In replacing humanist ideology with this new set of theoretical 
postulates organised around class and society, “Marx did not only propose a new theory 
of the history of societies, but at the same time implicitly, but necessarily, a new 
‘philosophy’, infinite in its implications” (Althusser, 1996, p.229). This epistemological 
break in Marx’s work was a formative development in his critique of capitalism and of 
political economy. As Althusser (2015a, 2015b) went on to demonstrate in Reading 
Capital, not only did Marx recognise the role of humanist ideology in his own work, but 
he also recognised it as the foundational ideology of classical political economy as well. By 
pulling at the thread of humanist ideology in the works of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, 
Marx “rejected the very structure of the object of Political Economy” (Althusser, 2015b, 
p.319), exposing the inaccuracies of classical political economy by showing how “the social 
relations of production do not bring men alone onto the stage, but the agents of the 
production process and the material conditions of the production process, in specific 
‘combinations’” (p.328, original emphasis). 
 Althusser (1996) positioned the critique of humanism to demonstrate not only the 
originality of Marx’s individual contribution, but also to demonstrate the origins of the 
explanatory power of Marxist philosophy itself, which would be taken up by many long 
after Marx. Despite the novelty of Althusser’s (1996) argument, significant critiques of this 
particular theoretical contribution emerged at the time and have been revised in recent 
years, that have disputed the accuracy of Althusser’s claims. One of the more influential 
critiques of Althusser’s theory comes from István Mészáros (1970) in his text Marx’s 
Theory of Alienation. Mészáros (1970) disputed the severity of the ‘break’ between the 
Young and Mature Marx stressed by Althusser and argued that humanism maintained its 
place as a continuous and necessary theoretical component of Marx’s work, even in his 
mature political economic works. Mészáros (1970) argued that the explanatory power of 
Marx’s philosophy was not derived from a break with humanism but from the continuity 
of humanism throughout his work. Mészáros (1970) demonstrated this by focusing on the 
concept of alienation in Marx’s work: though Althusser (1996) had dismissed alienation 
as a humanist inflection that Marx had borrowed from Feuerbach, Mészáros (1970) 
argued that, on the contrary, human alienation was “the basic idea of the Marxian system” 
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(p.93, original emphasis). For Mészáros (1970), the theory of alienation provided Marx 
with the conceptual tools to think about how the social position and experience of the 
working class is reified in the structures and social relations of society and, more 
importantly, also provided Marx with the teleology through which the proletariat would 
overthrow these conditions. Attempts to think about Marxism in terms of an 
epistemological break with humanism deprive “the Marxian system of its revolutionary 
meaning and converts it into a dead butterfly-collection of useless pseudo-scientific 
concepts” (p.96). In this way, the originality of Marx’s contribution emerges not out of a 
break with humanism, but with its continuity across his corpus of work (Mészáros, 1970). 
This critique has been updated in recent years, in texts such as Andrew Feenberg’s (2014) 
The Philosophy of Praxis. Feenberg (2014) argues that the humanism of Marx’s early 
works provided the basis for the originality of his philosophy, transforming the concept of 
alienation from one merely of idealism to one of political praxis: for Marx, “The ordre des 
raisons must be reversed: when alienation is overcome in real life, then and only then will 
it be possible to overcome the alienation of reason” (p.15). 
 Though Mészáros (1970) prompts a reconsideration of the severity of the 
proposed ‘break’ between the two versions of Marx, he does not convincingly allay fears 
as to the ideological problem of humanism in Marx’s work more generally. In fact, in order 
to justify the theory of alienation as the defining concept of Marxism, Mészáros (1970) was 
forced to concede the central Althusserian point: that humanism acts as an ideological 
obstacle which must be transformed by Marxist philosophy in order to reveal the class 
relations and social structures that lie behind it. In thinking about social transformation 
and the struggle against capitalism, Mészáros (1970) was in agreement with Althusser 
(1996), arguing that ‘bourgeois’ humanism remains an obstacle to emancipatory thinking 
that must be overcome. For example, Mészáros (1970) argued that the humanism of 
German idealism and classical political economy did in fact conceal the class relations of 
capitalist society and that Marx deals with a different humanism, to which the social and 
historical context is necessarily added. As Mészáros (1970) wrote, 
 
If by ‘man’ one means, as Marx’s opponents did, ‘abstract man’ or ‘man in general’ 
who is ‘abstracted from all social determinations’, then this is completely beside 
the point. He was, in fact, never interested in this ‘Man’, not even before 1843, let 
alone at the time of writing the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. 
On the other hand ‘real man’, the ‘self-mediating being of nature,’ the ‘social 
individual’ never disappeared from his horizon (p.221, original emphasis). 
 
The ‘epistemological break’ to which Althusser (1996) points is used in his work to 
demonstrate the workings of Marxist philosophy when confronted with the ideological 
problem of humanism. The severity of the break itself is subject to debate, but where it is 
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relied upon in this thesis, it is done so to serve this demonstrative purpose alone. Though 
Mészáros (1970) provides an influential critique of the concept of epistemological break, 
his work appears to concede the point that humanism as an ideology was a problem for 
Marxist philosophy and by extension a problem for social scientific considerations of class 
struggle and its reflection in social structure.  
 Althusser’s critique of humanism is forceful but not without criticism. However, 
it provides a useful framework for thinking the problematic relationship between 
humanism and class struggle, which even its critics cannot help but concede. It is 
important in progressing further to ask to what extent Althusser’s critique of humanism 
helps to think specifically about class struggle and capitalism in the context of work. In 
the following section this chapter poses this question, taking leave from Althusser’s own 
considerations of work and labour in the context of his critique of humanism and ideology. 
 
‘THE IDEOLOGY OF WORK’ 
 
In his text On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Althusser ([1969] 2014) cited a manuscript 
that he had intended to attach to the final version of his text, but unfortunately remains 
lost or was never completed. The proposed title of this manuscript was ‘The Ideology of 
Work’ (Althusser, 2014, p.139). This is significant because, though it remains missing, it 
indicates that Althusser (2014) believed work to be, in some form or another, an important 
site to which this critique of ideology ought to have been extended. Clues as to how this 
critique would have been structured can be found in the existing writings that Althusser 
dedicated to the topic of work and ideology. In this final section, this chapter looks more 
closely at these examples in order to better understand how Althusser’s critique of 
humanism and ideology can be useful for thinking about work. 
Through the example of work, Althusser (2014) demonstrated the extent to which 
humanism, rather than simply a neutral set of ideas, was an ideological weapon wielded 
by the dominant class to facilitate the exploitation of those who laboured in its service. In 
the opening chapters of On the Reproduction of Capitalism, Althusser (2014) described 
the landscape of work with which he was faced at the time: a landscape emblematic of the 
post-Fordist shift to ‘white-collar’ work, expressed in a peculiar and more detailed division 
of labour of “workers and diversely qualified technicians on the one hand and, on the 
other, the whole hierarchy of managers, administrators, engineers, upper-level 
technicians, supervisors, and so on” (p.35). Signified by this contemporary landscape of 
work was, for Althusser (2014), a very peculiar set of class relations: the division of labour 
inherent to the post-Fordist workplace signified a social division of labour, stratified 
along class lines. As Althusser (2014) wrote, “the division [of society] into social classes is 
thus present in the division, organization and management of the process of production, 
by virtue of the distribution of posts on the basis of the class affiliation of the individuals 
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who hold them” (p.37, original emphasis). In this instance, work was a useful area of study 
precisely because it held clues as to the composition of class antagonism in wider society: 
and it was precisely, therefore, through the primacy of class struggle (and the social 
relations of work that reflected this struggle) that work itself was to be understood at all. 
Crucially, Althusser (2014) identified humanism as a vital ideological tool in the 
maintenance and mystification of this class division at work. Humanism emerged as an 
ideological tool of class domination at work because it presented this division of labour to 
the consciousness of the worker, not as the result of a socially reproduced class 
antagonism, but as the ‘natural’ outcome of specific differences between individuals. 
Althusser (2014) exposed the existence of an “economistic-humanist” (p.36) ideology of 
work – reproduced through the bloviations of “an ‘ultramodern’ staff trained in the 
pseudo-scientific techniques of ‘human-resources’ [and] ‘social psychology’” (Althusser, 
2014, p.39) – which mystified the class character of this division of labour by asserting 
that it was a division of labour stratified not along lines of class, but along lines of 
education, technical know-how, skill and work-ethic. Humanism was not used to 
invisibilise the division of labour (for this division was in no way denied), but humanism 
allowed for this division to be represented in a mythical form, expressed not as the direct 
result of class positioning in capitalist society, but as an expression of the differing 
capabilities and personalities of individual workers, that anyone could traverse providing 
they had the right attitude. As Althusser (2014) wrote, 
 
As for the worker who becomes an engineer or even a manager, he is, in our 
society, a museum piece exhibited to encourage belief in the ‘possibility’ of the 
impossible and the idea that there are no social classes or that someone born a 
worker can ‘rise above his class’. Plain, unvarnished reality cries out against these 
disgraceful exhibitions (p.37).  
 
According to Althusser (2014), this ideological operation, rooted firmly in humanism, was 
an integral part of the social mechanics of capitalist exploitation that existed in the 
workplace at the point of production. The mystification in this way of the social relations 
of work and of the class character of these relations was an important ideological 
precondition for the justification of exploitation and all its related exercises: the 
interpellation, motivation, reward and repression of workers on the production line. 
Exploitation at work did not, for Althusser (2014), simply operate through the ownership 
of the means of production, or the appropriation of surplus-value, but “also ‘works’ thanks 
to the bourgeois ideology of work. The workers are the first to be subjected to its effects 
because it is an ideology of the capitalist class struggle” (p.42, original emphasis). 
 Althusser (2014) therefore identified the synonymity between the Marxist critique 
of work and the critique of ideology (particularly humanist ideology) as both were part of 
35 
 
the same theoretical movement: the critical analysis of capitalism and its social 
manifestations demanded, at the same time, a critical analysis of ideology. However, in 
his essay on The Humanist Controversy, Althusser (2003) demonstrated how this crucial 
theoretical lesson of the Marxist tradition was repeatedly being forgotten, as ‘Marxist’ 
critiques of labour began to emerge which attempted to sharpen their analytical edge on 
humanist ideology. The result, so Althusser (2003) described, was the emergence of a 
‘Marxist’ theoretical critique of labour in which these social relations of work were being 
moved to the background of analysis, in favour of recurring ideological themes regarding 
alienation and the struggle for human autonomy. In this way, humanism was not 
amplifying Marxist theory: it was foreclosing it (Althusser, 2003).  
 Analysing these emerging theoretical discourses focused upon the problem of 
labour, Althusser (2003) identified an “ideological enterprise” (p.286) at their heart, 
which turned “either [on the notion] of labour (the essence of Man is labour) or the 
apparently more ‘Marxist,’ but in fact equivalent notion of ‘social labour’” (p.286). With 
appeals to the political economy of the Young Karl Marx, these theoretical discourses 
constructed a critique of work under capitalism – with particular focus on the tendency of 
the division of labour toward an individualisation of the worker – through the 
centralisation of the humanist notion that in labour exists the ‘natural’ propensity towards 
the social cooperation of the human species and that capitalism depends upon the 
alienation of the human worker from this essential life-activity (Althusser, 2003). It was 
a theoretical approach that turned on the notion that “man…is essentially a social animal 
who becomes himself in society by accepting its obligations to create, serve and maintain 
the human fellowship” (Lewis, 1972, p.18), with the critique of work under capitalism 
observed in the propensity of the capitalist social formation to alienate human workers 
from this essential life-activity that defines their very species.  
 For Althusser (2003), the centrality of humanism in this critique rendered it 
particularly unhelpful in making sense of work under capitalism. The fact that it accepted 
from the beginning that society is the product of Man’s conscious activity rather than the 
social expression of particular class relations, rendered its interpretation of contemporary 
work severely limited (Althusser, 2003). This humanist critique was unable to adequately 
explain the contemporary division of labour as an expression of the division of society into 
classes, instead more convinced by the explanation of the division of labour as the product 
of an essential alienation of the human worker. Classes, suddenly, disappeared from the 
stage under this humanist critique of work and with them so too did the social relations 
that explain the mechanics of contemporary work (Althusser, 2003). As Althusser (2003) 
wrote of this ideological critique, “everything that is ‘social’ designates, not the structure 
of social conditions and the labour-process or the process of the realization of value, but 
the externalization/alienation (via as many mediations as you like) of an originary 
essence, that of Man” (p.288, original emphasis). Not only did this humanist ideological 
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approach to labour immediately preclude the existence of class and therefore of social 
relations but, in so doing, settled accounts precisely to the benefit of capitalism itself, by 
reproducing the precise ideological tropes on which its exploitation had relied. As Marx 
([1875] 1945) himself wrote, “the bourgeois have very good grounds for falsely ascribing 
supernatural creative power to labour” (p.18, original emphasis), centralising it as the 
motor of societal development (instead of class), because from here it follows that “the 
man who possesses no other property than his labour power must…be the slave of other 
men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour” (p.18). 
Marxist theory, in constructing a critique of work under capitalism, cannot begin from the 
notion of ‘Man’, but must set out from the view of work’s inherent social relations: “In 
order to think the nature of ‘labour’, one has to begin by thinking the structure of the 
social conditions (social relations) in which it is mobilized” (Althusser, 2003, p.290, 
original emphasis). 
 From this analysis of Althusser’s (2003, 2014) theory and of his interjections into 
Marxist theoretical critiques of labour, there is an evident justification for the extension 
of the Marxist critique of ideology to the sociology of work. The problem here identified 
by Althusser (2003, 2014) is not one of the past, but one very much of the present, with 
which the contemporary sociology of work must necessarily get to grips. In much the same 
way as it had for these Marxist theorists, humanist ideology has the effect of obstructing 
the sociological analysis of its object, in this case preventing a fuller understanding of the 
nature and character of work under capitalism. It is the argument of this thesis that this 
ideological problem is the most pressing one with which the contemporary sociology of 
work is today faced. The explanatory capability of the sociology of work in the twenty first 
century depends upon, so this thesis argues, the centralisation of the critique of ideology 
as a fundamental theoretical task. These humanist ideological tendencies, according to 
Althusser (2014), demanded immediate attention, for “if they are not seriously criticized 
and corrected, and very soon at that” (p.45-46), then this critical discourse would end up 





This chapter has demonstrated how Althusser’s critique of humanism allows for thinking 
about humanism as a problem within the sociology of work. Humanism presents a 
particular problem when it comes to thinking about work, as it hides from view the class 
antagonisms reflected in the social relations of work. It mystifies the exploitation inherent 
in these social relations, reducing these relations to individual interactions as opposed to 
structural occurrences. Though Althusser’s work has enjoyed significant criticism, it is 
clear that the critique of humanism found in his work is still powerful and provides a set 
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of conceptual devices which, when applied, expose the limitations of critical discourse still 
dependent upon humanism as a normative theoretical framework. Althusser reveals a 
tension between humanist ideology and the analysis of society which cannot go 
unresolved, observing the persistence of this tension in considerations of work and labour. 
Examining the extent to which this tension persists today in contemporary analyses of 
work and society will be the objective of this thesis, with the conceptual devices provided 
by Althusser’s critique serving an important role in so doing. 
 In the following chapter, the thesis will begin this examination by looking more 
closely at contributions to the Marxist sociology of work, analysing key themes within this 
discourse and exposing the reliance of these contributions upon humanist ideological 
concepts. Marxist contributions have provided the sociology of work with a number of 
frameworks and ideas through which to think critically about the nature of work in 
capitalist society. However, as this next chapter shall demonstrate, closer examination of 
these themes reveals their repeated reliance on humanist ideology and its provision of a 
normative theoretical framework from which to advance the critique of work. The chapter 
does not say that this reliance removes all value from these critiques. Rather, by exposing 
the role of humanism in these formative and influential contributions, the chapter seeks 
to establish a genealogy of the development of humanist ideology within the sociology of 
work, which will help in the explanation of its continued evolution within the more 






Humanist Ideology in the Sociology of Work 
 
This chapter of the thesis critically analyses predominant theoretical approaches to labour 
and their translation into sociological analyses of work across the twentieth and early 
twenty first centuries. The chapter exposes the persistent reproduction of humanist 
ideological tropes that has underwritten the unfolding of the sociology of work during this 
period, demonstrating the limitations presented by these ideological reproductions. The 
chapter focuses on critical analyses of work inspired primarily by Marx and Marxism, 
focusing specifically on five key concepts that have come to form the bedrock of Marxist 
sociological understandings of work: ‘labour’; ‘alienation’; ‘degradation’; ‘knowledge’; and 
‘refusal.’ Despite Althusser’s (1996) important interjection into Marxist theory in the 
twentieth century, the production of critical analyses of work under the aegis of Marxism 
throughout this period are shown here to have relied on and reproduced humanist 
ideological tropes in order to articulate their critique. Consistently, this pervasive 
humanism has reproduced a sociological critique of work in which critical analysis is not 
observed in the social relations of work and in the class struggle reflected in these social 
relations but instead is observed primarily in the historical human struggle against 
alienation and against a social formation that repeatedly separates human beings from 
labour as their essential activity. In various formulations – and to varying degrees – the 
sociology of work is here shown to reproduce this ideological formula, observing work as 
a phenomenon not of antagonistic social relations but of human alienation and the 
conscious struggle of the human subject against it. 
 The chapter begins its analysis with a critique of the humanism of the Young Marx, 
in particular of his humanist framing of labour in the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx [1844] 1981). It is noteworthy that the ideas contained within 
these manuscripts are the result of Marx’s initial interaction with one of the first and most 
comprehensive examples of empirical sociology: that of his friend Friedrich Engels 
([1844] 2009) in his text The Condition of the Working Class in England (Liedman, 
2018). In his text, Engels (2009) revealed a contradiction in the cities of the Industrial 
Revolution, where the workers who had produced vast amounts of wealth through their 
labour at the same time found themselves living in the most miserable and impoverished 
conditions, where disease, addiction and premature death among children and adults 
alike was rampant. It was to these conditions of work under capitalism, exposed by Engels’ 
(2009) sociology, that Marx (1981) would apply the conceptual repertoire he found in the 
philosophies of Hegel and Feuerbach, to produce his first notable contribution to political 
economy and with it the concepts that would define this contribution: those of labour and 
alienation. The contradiction highlighted by Engels (2009) in his sociological 
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investigation could only be explained, according to Marx (1981) in terms of alienation, 
where the control and autonomy of labour had been removed from the humans who 
undertook this labour and placed instead in the hands of another, alien power: namely, 
the property-owning capitalist. Capitalism, for Marx (1981) was not merely a system of 
social exploitation but of essential human alienation, which, at its core, demanded a 
process of dehumanisation, the results of which were laid plain on the pages of Engels’ 
(2009) sociological work. 
 This chapter explores the theme of alienated labour in the Young Marx (1981) and 
his approach to the problem of work. The chapter then tracks and exposes the persistence 
of these humanist ideas within more contemporary Marxist contributions to the sociology 
of work, exploring the extent to which this humanism of the Young Marx is foundational 
to the theoretical functionality of these contemporary contributions. Specifically, the 
sections of this chapter will analyse the role of humanism in the following contributions 
to the Marxist sociology of work: how humanism framed the theories of alienation 
developed by those like E.P. Thompson ([1968] 1991) and Raymond Williams (1968); the 
role of humanism in the theory of the degradation of work forwarded by Harry Braverman 
(1974); the humanism imbued in the conceptualisation of knowledge as production by 
those like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001); and the humanism that underwrote 
the theories of the refusal of work found in the writings of those such as André Gorz 
(1983).  Across the range of Marxist sociological contributions covered in this chapter, the 
extent to which the humanist ideas of the Young Marx persist in the way that work and 
labour are framed and thought about are here highlighted and analysed. Sometimes this 
occurs as a result of a direct citation of and interaction with the works of the Young Marx 
and the Manuscripts in particular. In other cases, the relationship is indirect, but through 
analysis this chapter demonstrates how these ideas stem from one and the same 
theoretical principle. In each case, this chapter agrees with Althusser (1996) and argues 
that the persistence of this humanism has the effect of foreclosing the sociological 
investigation of social class by reducing work and labour to a relationship of and between 
concrete individuals. With each production of humanist ideology, this chapter 
demonstrates how class struggle and its manifestation in the social relations of work is 
mystified beneath this humanism, diluting the social character of work and labour with 
moralistic or anthropological explanations. 
 
LABOUR AND THE YOUNG MARX 
 
To speak of ‘labour’ is to speak of a concept rooted in modernity and in the modern 
epistemological arrangement: Michel Foucault (1970) described the concept of labour as 
one of the vital “empiricities” (p.250) that underpinned modern knowledge. Labour as a 
modern concept is descriptive not merely of an activity, but of a distinctively human 
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activity, a specifically creative activity rooted in the human interaction with nature. 
Labour is descriptive of the human interaction with the objective world, through which 
they not only produce the resources on which to subsist, but create commodities, society 
and history itself (Foucault, 1970). It is, as Adam Smith ([1776] 1991) wrote, the 
“consequence of a certain propensity in human nature…common to all men, and to be 
found in no other race of animals” (p.12). As hinted in Smith’s (1991) words here, the 
modern concept of labour also implicated the existence of a modern subject, a particular 
and exceptional human subject who was capable of engaging in this labour. The concept 
of labour dictates that human society – and indeed, human history itself – is powered by 
the confrontation of this human subject with their own finitude and their consequent 
struggle to circumvent this finitude for as long as possible by solving the problems of 
scarcity presented to them by their world. As Foucault (1970) wrote, 
 
History exists (that is, labour, production, accumulation, and growth of real costs) 
only in so far as man as a natural being is finite: a finitude that is prolonged far 
beyond the original limits of the species and its immediate bodily needs, but that 
never ceases to accompany, at least in secret, the whole development of 
civilizations (p.259). 
 
In this modern formulation, human societies and history itself are considered as the 
product of human labour, the product of the very efforts of the human subject as a finite 
natural being to attempt to escape this finitude for as long as possible and circumvent the 
harsh realities of the natural world with which they are faced. As Foucault (1970) 
continued, “it designates in labour, and in the very hardship of that labour, the only means 
of overcoming the fundamental insufficiency of nature and triumphing for an instant over 
death” (p.257). 
 Crucially, this modern concept of labour was entirely compatible with the set of 
social relations emerging at the same time: namely, those of capitalism. This concept of 
labour was vitally important in the justification of capitalist social relations as the 
expression par excellence of human civilisation, as capitalism was justified as the most 
rational organisation of human labour and thereby the most competent social 
arrangement in allowing human beings to escape their finitude and overcome the problem 
of scarcity. In this way, the concept of labour underpinned political economic discourse 
and its justification of capitalism. As Foucault (1970) wrote,  
 
The economists of the eighteenth century…thought that land, or labour applied to 
the land, made it possible to overcome this scarcity, at least in part: this was 
because the land had the marvellous property of being able to account for far more 




By virtue of the concept of labour, capitalism approaches the political economist as a 
homogenous space of economic laws, which correspond not to particular social relations 
(and certainly not to class struggle) but to the requirements and wants of this finite human 
subject: “The homogenous space of economic phenomena implies a determinate 
relationship with the world of the men who produce, distribute, receive and consume” 
(Althusser, 2015b, p.314, original emphasis). In this way, capitalism is not only justified 
but is not even up for debate, as it confronts its observer as the only socio-economic 
system capable of rationally organising human labour and solving the problem of scarcity. 
 There is a clear problem here indicated, in that this modern humanist concept of 
labour entirely mystifies the social relations in which it is mobilised from view. Labour is 
not here considered a social expression of the capitalist social relations of private property 
or of wage-labour; its value is not considered a product of social exploitation, underpinned 
by inherent inequalities; nor are the class antagonisms inherently reflected in these 
relations visible either. Instead, labour here corresponds to the inherent, ‘natural’ activity 
of the human subject, of which capitalism is considered simply the most rational 
expression. Despite these clear problems, the unspoken ideological limitations of this 
humanist concept of labour are silent enough to pass quietly in the early political-
economic works of the Young Marx (1981). Rather than refuting this humanist conception 
of labour, the Young Marx (1981) takes up his critique of capitalism from the same 
ideological ground as his adversaries, which prevents the Young Marx (1981) from 
obtaining a fuller understanding of the nature of labour under capitalism.  
The humanist critique of labour inherent to the work of the Young Marx is best 
expressed in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Marx, 1981). For Marx 
(1981), the modern humanist conception of labour was absolutely central to his critique. 
Labour was descriptive of the “continuous interchange” (Marx, 1981, p.67) between Man 
and nature, in which the human individual must necessarily engage in order that they 
could survive. Labour, this interchange, defined what Marx (1981) called the “species-
being” (p.68) of the human animal, that is the very quality that marked them as human 
from other animals. As Marx (1981) wrote, 
 
In creating a world of objects by his practical activity, in his work upon inorganic 
nature, man proves himself a conscious species-being, i.e., as a being that treats 
the species as its own essential being, or that treats itself as a species-being (p.68, 
original emphasis). 
 
Crucially, Marx (1981) argued that it was the ability to consciously engage in this labour 
that separated human beings from animals. Whereas animals only interacted with nature 
in order to secure the means of their immediate subsistence and reproduction, human 
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labour differed because it could be engaged in spontaneously and freely: the animal 
“produces only under the dominion of immediate physical need, whilst man produces 
even when he is free from physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom” 
(Marx, 1981, p.68). Human society was therefore viewed by Marx (1981) as a product of 
this conscious activity, as the very objectification of this species-being. 
 Marx (1981) used this concept of labour as the pivot for his critique of capitalism. 
For Marx (1981), capitalism was a system of production that depended inherently upon 
an interruption of this continuous interchange between humans and nature. Capitalism, 
so Marx (1981) argued, alienated the human worker from both the product and process 
of this activity, transforming its nature from one of universal human production into an 
activity productive of private wealth alone. Marx (1981) argued that capitalism depended 
fundamentally upon both an interruption and, crucially, an alienation of labour as the 
continuous interchange between Man and nature, a fact that was mystified by discourses 
of political economy: “Political economy conceals the estrangement inherent in the nature 
of labour by not considering the direct relationship between the worker (labour) and 
production” (Marx, 1981, p.65). For Marx (1981), this alienation of labour explained the 
inherent inequalities of production under capitalism: 
 
It is true that labour produces wonderful things for the rich – but for the worker 
it produces privation. It produces palaces – but for the worker, hovels. It produces 
beauty – but for the worker, deformity. It replaces labour by machines, but it 
throws one section of the workers back to a barbarous type of labour, and it turns 
the other section into a machine. It produces intelligence – but for the worker, 
stupidity, cretinism (p.65). 
 
For Marx (1981) all the elements of capitalist society – private property, the price of wages, 
profits and class divisions – stemmed from this initial alienation of the human species-
being from the activity that defined its being: that is, its labour. Under capitalism, “labour 
is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, 
therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself” (Marx, 1981, p.65, original 
emphasis). 
 For Marx (1981), the crime of capitalism was that in order to direct the labour of 
human beings towards the ends of accumulation, it must transform this process from one 
of social praxis, to one of alienated production. The problem of alienation under 
capitalism was thus twofold in relation to the human subject: firstly, the worker was 
alienated from labour as their essential species-activity (as that which allowed them to 
transcend nature); secondly, the social relations that were produced out of the process of 
labour under capitalism were thereby relations of alienation themselves (workers under 
capitalism reproduced their own alienation) (Marx, 1981). For example, the primacy of 
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alienated labour was used by Marx (1981) to explain the origins of private property as a 
social institution. If labour was a distinctively human process that was conducted both 
collectively and universally, then the establishment of private property required an 
interruption and enclosure of this process (Marx, 1981). Private property relied upon the 
alienation and enclosure of the products of what was, essentially, a universal process. 
Private property (1981), that is, the privatisation of the products of labour, thus confronted 
the worker as an external or alienated product. Rather than intelligible as products of the 
human world, generated through the dialectical process of labour with the natural world, 
private property was totally unintelligible as something belonging to the worker: “Private 
property is thus the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of alienated labour, 
of the external relation of the worker to nature and to himself” (Marx, 1981, p.72, original 
emphasis).  
 Alienated labour was also reflected in the proletarian’s experience of work under 
capitalism. That which the worker came to understand as ‘work’ was essentially the 
systematic organisation of their alienation into a labour process that produced wealth for 
the capitalist and misery for the worker (Marx, 1981). The concepts that Marx ([1867] 
2013) would later use to describe how this production of wealth functions – for which 
concepts such as ‘surplus-value’ and ‘surplus labour’ are important – were not here 
forthcoming, because Marx (1981) had not yet discovered them. Instead, Marx (1981) 
pronounced exploitation through this discourse of alienation, locating its roots in the 
separation of the human subject from the object of their labour. For example, in describing 
work under capitalism, Marx (1981) wrote, 
 
This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity 
not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as 
emasculating, the workers own physical and mental energy, his personal life – for 
what is life but activity? – as an activity which is turned against him, independent 
of him and not belonging to him (p.66-67, original emphasis). 
 
This tendency is reproduced right throughout this early set of manuscripts produced by 
Marx (1981). Marx (1981) recognised that something was occurring under capitalism that 
was producing such profound inequalities. There was something which produced the 
appearance of the labouring masses in such beleaguered and beaten form. But precisely 
what produced this was still missing, that is the precise social relations and the class 
struggle reflected in these relations that facilitated this mass exploitation. Every time 
Marx (1981) was faced with this something, he expressed it through this humanist prose, 
in discourses of alienation, problematising capitalism in the only way available to him: as 
a problem of the alienation of the human subject. 
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 It is reproduced in Marx’s (1981) thinking beyond capitalism too. Marx (1981) 
centralised labour in order to express the origins of revolutionary potential in the working 
class and to describe the development of communism as the society that would follow this 
revolution. The achievement of communism was no less than the re-introduction of the 
human species-being to their life-activity, of the labourer to the product of their labour 
(Marx, 1981). Communism was an exercise in the “complete re-winning of Man” (Marx, 
[1844] 2012, p.12). As Marx (1981) wrote, 
 
This communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and a fully 
developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the conflict 
between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of strife 
between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, 
between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species (p.90, 
original emphasis). 
 
In the works of the Young Marx (1981), the critique of labour was saturated with 
humanism. The critique of capitalism and the imagination of life beyond it was articulated 
through the concept of labour, descriptive of the human species-being and its relationship 
with the natural world. In Marx’s (1981) early critique of political economy, labour was 
not expressive of particular social inequalities expressed in the commodification of labour 
as labour-power, the arrangement of the labour process or the production of capital out 
of its exploitation. Rather, Marx (1981) reproduced a humanist problematic in relation to 
labour as the expression of human activity and productivity that was not so much the 
kernel of his own discovery but was in fact a problematic borrowed from the very modern 
epistemological landscape – and its reflection in classical political economy – that he set 
out to critique. Through this humanist framing, Marx (1981) convincingly articulated 
human harm under capitalism but provided little conceptual material through which to 
know or understand this harm in its social context: something that would emerge 
fundamentally out of his break with this humanist problematic.  
 
ALIENATION, CAPITALISM AND DEHUMANISING WORK 
 
This humanist critique found in the works of the Young Marx (1981) was reproduced in 
Marxist sociological analyses of work, particularly those developed in the second half of 
the twentieth century. The middle of this century saw the widespread publication and 
translation of many of these early works of the Young Marx in Europe and the United 
States, including the Manuscripts of 1844. Disillusioned with the Soviet Union and the 
‘sanctioned’ Marxism of its allied Communist Parties in Europe, the publication of these 
early works had a particular resonance with disaffected Marxist intellectuals at the time. 
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Whilst texts such as Capital were associated with the dogmatism and economic 
determinism of the Soviet Union, these early texts provided a more fluid, interpretive and 
communicable version of Marx, less interested in economic structure, instead valorising 
themes of human essence, human liberation and human autonomy. This newly available 
version of Marx would come to form the bedrock of an intellectual movement commonly 
referred to as the ‘New Left.’ As Stuart Hall ([1958] 2017), pre-empting the English 
translation of these early works wrote, “it would be of immense value if the whole body of 
the earlier studies – particularly the untranslated and, one suspects, unfashionable 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts – were restored to their proper place” (p.45). Of 
particular interest to Hall (2017) were Marx’s writings on alienation, which Hall (2017) 
argued offered “a body of analytic concepts and not a sealed house of theory” (p.45). 
 The second half of the twentieth century was witness to a fundamental re-
organisation of work in Western Europe and the United States: a re-organisation famously 
characterised by C. Wright Mills (1951) as the shift from ‘blue-collar’ work (manual, 
industrial labour based primarily in manufacturing) to ‘white-collar’ work (post-
industrial, managerial and clerical work based in emerging service-industries). As 
Althusser (2014) pointed out in his own analysis of this shift, it inaugurated not just a re-
orientation of production but, by consequence, a re-orientation of capitalist social 
relations. For example, it made necessary a new and more detailed division of labour, the 
erection of more substantial workplace hierarchies, the widening of inequalities between 
different workers as well as the introduction of greater quantities of more advanced forms 
of machinery. However, the analysis of these new developments and their reflection in 
contemporary class struggle is mystified in the critique of work evident in the ‘New Left’, 
as this analysis was shielded behind a more central ideological fascination with the 
particular forms of human alienation evident in these developments. The concern of the 
historical separation of Man from their activity took priority in this emerging sociological 
discourse, tending to overlook the social relations of work and their reflection of class 
struggle in capitalist society.  
The concept of alienation of course has not been limited to this time period and 
has enjoyed consistent consideration in the context of changes to work in the twenty first 
century. For example, in Peter Fleming’s (2017) text The Death of Homo Economicus, 
Fleming (2017) argues that the development of work in capitalist society has been 
accompanied by the reification of a false, alienated economic subjectivity to which human 
beings have always been encouraged to aspire. The lack of meaning found in the work of 
twenty first century society, so Fleming (2017) argues, places the survival of this image in 
peril. In his text Class Matters, Charles Umney (2018) relies on the conceptualisation of 
“alien powers” (p.34) as a way of pronouncing the problem with work today as culminating 
in the “tension between…a worker’s entirely human desire to control their own activity 
and use their own initiative, and…the need for capital to make a profit which is dictated 
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by the alien power of competition” (p.83). Umney (2018) utilises the concept of alienation 
as a way of articulating the contradiction between human labour and its manifestation in 
the contemporary economy, in a way that seeks to demonstrate how the technologies and 
working patterns that might signal liberation (more flexible work and advanced 
productive technologies, for example) have in fact resolved themselves in greater levels of 
exploitation. The concept of alienation has also framed more empirically grounded 
sociological analyses of work. Looking at the experience of academics working in higher 
education, Richard Hall (2018) uses alienation as a way of describing the re-organisation 
of work within this sector, arguing that the greater flexibilization and digitalisation of 
academic work is grounded in “a process of dispossession of time, agency and autonomy 
for academics and students” (p.101). The concept of alienation has been central in 
contemporary studies of the experiences of social workers (Lavalette & Ferguson, 2018; 
Yuill, 2018), with interviews with social workers in Britain revealing that such workers 
“are not free to realise their human nature in the form of the compassionate self” 
(Lavalette & Ferguson, 2018, p.286), but instead, “become estranged from it as their 
labour is not working with people in need of help, but rather the technocratic and 
reductive reports that seek to rationalise and discipline” (p.286-287) this work and its 
participants. It also figures prominently in contemporary studies of workplace 
management and control (Azambuja & Islam, 2018; Finney et al., 2018), where the 
experiences of an expanding layer of middle-management workers is one defined by a 
tension between autonomy and alienation at work. 
The humanist ideological pivot of the critique of work within the ‘New Left’ was 
also the concept of alienation. It was argued that the alienation of the human subject from 
their labour was the definitive outcome of capitalist social relations. However, this 
alienation was not only the precondition for the exploitation of the worker: rather, the 
‘New Left’ concentrated on developing the notion that alienation was the necessary 
precondition for class struggle and for the eventual emancipation of the worker. 
Developing the Young Marx’s (1981) observation of human historical development as the 
subjective overcoming of this alienation, “as the negation of the negation, and hence…the 
actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of 
human emancipation and rehabilitation” (p.101, original emphasis), this emerging 
intellectual movement observed the formation of class and class struggle in the human 
historical push against their own alienated condition. Work and labour under capitalism 
became centralised as important sites of this historical struggle, however the humanist 
parameters of their investigation reinforced numerous theoretical limitations. 
 According to this line of critique, class and class struggle was catalysed by, 
fundamentally, the human experience of alienation. The antagonistic social relations that 
reflect class positioning within a capitalist society are here bracketed and moved aside, as 
class is instead interpreted as an experience (Middleton, 2016), as something which comes 
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into being through human confrontation with the conditions of their own existence. It is 
an interpretation described succinctly by Foucault (1970) in his critique of Marx’s 
humanism: 
 
Thrust back by poverty to the very brink of death, a whole class of men experience, 
nakedly as it were, what need, hunger, and labour are. What others attribute to 
nature or to the spontaneous order of things, these men are able to recognize as 
the result of a history and the alienation of a finitude that does not have this form. 
For this reason they are able – they alone are able – to re-apprehend this truth of 
the human essence and so restore it (p.261). 
 
As Foucault (1970) here pointed out, the exceptionalism of class and of the proletariat as 
a revolutionary agent is located fundamentally in their experience of alienation. It is this 
experience that defines their class character in this interpretation, not their proximity to 
the means of production. In this formulation, “the penetration of philosophy into the 
proletariat will be the conscious revolt of the affirmation against its own negation, the 
revolt of man against his inhuman conditions” (Althusser, 1996, p.226). This is the 
interpretation of alienation that forms the bedrock of this emerging intellectual movement 
collected together as the ‘New Left’. 
 This ideological emergence was particularly strong in British Marxism, evident in 
the works of E.P. Thompson, Raymond Williams and Eric Hobsbawm, among others. For 
example, John Lewis (1972) – a noted British adversary of Althusser’s and key contributor 
to this ‘New Left’ tradition – wrote in reply to these criticisms of humanist revisionism, 
that “to strip Marxism of its concern for man, for human interests, for the fulfilment of 
human aspirations and the human personality would be to deny everything that Marx, 
and after him Lenin, stood for” (p.19). For Lewis (1972), history – and therefore, class 
struggle – was to be viewed in the historical struggle of the human subject against its 
alienated condition, drawing attention to this internal human struggle, identified by the 
Young Marx (1981), which is consistently agitated at the base of capitalism: “Man’s 
making of his world is at the same time his making and re-making of himself and his 
achievement of his own full development as man” (Lewis, 1972, p.20). For Lewis (1972), 
labour was an important manifestation of this struggle. The struggle of human beings over 
the control and direction of their own labour was the expression par excellence of this 
historical fight for self-affirmation: “Man knows what he makes, and changes his 
environment by the knowing and activity which is his life” (Lewis, 1972, p.21, original 
emphasis). Crucially, the struggle by the human subject over the control of labour is made 
equivalent, as it was in the Young Marx (1981), with the acquisition of the class-





For Marx capitalism does not break down and transform itself into socialism 
automatically. Men have to discover what has gone wrong, how the internal 
contradictions arise, and why they cannot be finally overcome unless they set to 
work and change the pattern of society. Once again Man re-makes Society (p.23, 
original emphasis). 
 
Here, as Lewis (1972) made plain, class struggle did not correspond to the confrontation 
of workers with the social conditions of their means of existence but was in fact reflective 
of this internal human struggle against the alienation of their inherent capacities. The 
overthrow of the social structures of capitalism was to be preceded by the attainment of a 
“higher level of consciousness” (Lewis, 1972, p.24) by the working class of their alienation, 
which catalyses a historical struggle against it. 
 The role of alienation in the explanation of human historical development was 
particularly prevalent in the historical analyses of class and the labour movement 
produced by the likes of E.P. Thompson ([1968] 1991) and Eric Hobsbawm (1964). Both 
Thompson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1964) produced influential historical accounts of the 
history of class struggle in Britain, analysing the socio-political underpinnings of British 
labour movements and developing the ways in which these movements translated into 
historical class struggle. However, closer examination reveals that these authors were 
dealing with a very particular definition of ‘class’ that corresponded to a more humanist 
theoretical framing, in which class was considered not as a social expression of a particular 
actor’s proximity to the means of production, but as a human experience, developed in 
the subject’s interaction with its conditions of life and its activity in the context of these 
conditions. As Thompson (1991) wrote, in the preface to his influential tome, The Making 
of the English Working Class, 
 
By class, I understand a historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate 
and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in 
consciousness, I emphasize that it is a historical phenomenon. I do not see class 
as a ‘structure’, nor even as a ‘category’, but as something which in fact happens 
(and can be shown to have happened) in human relationships (p.8, original 
emphasis). 
 
This conceptualisation of class was reflected in the historical works of Hobsbawm (1964), 
particularly in his considerations of ‘tradition’ and ‘custom’ in the context of the labour 
movement. Hobsbawm (1964), for example, juxtaposed the characteristics of the labour 
movements in France and in Britain by analysing the class traditions that had pervaded 
the histories of these nations, arguing that the historical trajectory of particular labour 
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movements could be analysed as the reflection of particular traditions or customs of 
radicalism in the consciousness of the worker (Hobsbawm, 1964). For example, 
Hobsbawm (1964) identified the prevalence of a ‘revolutionary’ tradition in French labour 
movement as the cause for its greater advancement and success, in contrast to the “radical 
non-conformist traditions” (p.372) of the British labour movement. 
 It is not that these analyses are without truth or unworthy of consideration. 
Rather, the humanist framing of class as an experience between human beings dilutes the 
social character of the wage-labour relation and thrusts a particular human subject (and 
its particular experience of class) to the forefront of examination and making it the 
determinant factor in the character of social relations, rather than the other way around.  
Culture, tradition and even religion came to define class experience for Thompson (1991) 
and Hobsbawm (1964), in a way that moved historical shifts in the material conditions of 
production to the background, as the theatre on which these cultural experiences were 
played out as opposed to the defining conditions of this experience itself. As Thompson 
(1991) wrote,  
 
The making of the working class is a fact of political and cultural, as much as of 
economic, history. It was not the spontaneous generation of the factory system. 
Nor should we think of an external force – the ‘industrial revolution’ – working 
upon some nondescript undifferentiated raw material of humanity, and turning it 
out at the other end as a ‘fresh race of beings’. The changing productive relations 
and working conditions of the Industrial Revolution were imposed, not upon raw 
material, but upon the free-born Englishman – and the free-born Englishman as 
Paine had left him or as the Methodists had moulded him (p.213). 
 
Thompson (1991) and Hobsbawm (1964) asserted a particular human subject at the centre 
of economic history, examining how the history of capitalist development and of the 
labour movements that arose to meet these developments, had always to be viewed in the 
context of the cultural human experiences of class and the historical human subject to 
which these experiences gave rise: “Class is defined by men as they live their own history, 
and, in the end, this is the only definition” (Thompson, 1991, p.10). However, where the 
particular experience of a defined human subject becomes the determinant factor in the 
definition of class rather than the social relations themselves, this can lead to the 
exclusion of other human subjects from this definition of class. As Marxist-feminists like 
Selma James ([1972] 2012) have noted, such exclusions have particularly harmed women 
as workers, whose experience of class differed from their male counterparts, for which 
they suffered an exclusion from working-class politics (“For those of us who are deprived 
of wages for our work…unions don’t know we exist” [p.66]). 
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 This trend spread beyond historical sociologies of work to more contemporary 
sociological analyses of the experience of work at the time. For example, Ronald Fraser 
(1968) edited a volume of first-hand accounts from a collection of workers across a 
number of industries, collating them into a sociological account of work in the mid-to-late 
twentieth century. The theoretical parameters of this project were set from the beginning, 
rooted in the humanist considerations of class, history and labour already discussed. As 
Fraser (1968) wrote in the introduction to this collection, the objective of this project was 
not to discuss the structural realities of work and employment, but to better interrogate 
the human experience of work at this particular historical juncture: “We talk shop, yet we 
rarely say what we intimately feel about work” (p.7). Citing Marx’s (1981) Manuscripts of 
1844, Fraser (1968) echoed the ideological farming of the analysis of work that is now 
familiar: the notion that work was not just an activity, but a conscious experience of 
historical and societal development. As Fraser (1968) wrote, “by work, by the 
transformation of the environment through work, we produce the society we live in, 
produce ourselves” (p.7). 
 At the end of this collection, Raymond Williams (1968) offered an essay on ‘The 
Meanings of Work,’ arguing that the sociological analysis of work should be observed 
through the meaning that human individuals ascribe to the work that they do. Williams 
(1968) argued in his essay that the conventional description of ‘class’ was rigid and often 
limiting, instead arguing that ideas of ‘meaning’ might provide a better starting point, as 
they centralise human beings as actors: “If, as I believe, the conventional class description 
conceals and is sometimes meant to conceal as much as it illuminates, then to start from 
actual men and women is right” (p.283). Williams (1968) reproduced a number of the 
humanist tropes already discussed here, particularly in the way that he argued that labour 
or work had a particular correlation to inherent human values or desires and provided a 
common denominator beneath all human individuals: “This is the meaning of human 
work, as distinct from the energy of animals: an articulation of need, a definition of co-
operative means, in what is felt and known to be a common condition” (p.280). Williams’ 
(1968) critique of capitalism here took place in his identification of the way in which 
capitalism necessitated a separation between workers and this activity, divorcing the link 
between labour and the fulfilment of desire: “Even when we are doing what is socially 
recognized as work, in the conventional sense, many of us…would hesitate before calling 
it giving human energy to a personally desired end” (p.287). In his essay, Williams (1968) 
celebrated the personal accounts from workers that preceded his own contribution, 
insofar as the discussion and communication of the ‘meaning’ of work, more so than any 
structural analysis, provided knowledge and a consciousness of this reproduced gap in 
capitalist society. By talking about the meanings of work, workers were able to 
acknowledge the realty of the gap between what they do and their own desires: a form of 
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class-consciousness that must necessarily precede the change of society. As Williams 
(1968) wrote, 
 
There may, indeed, be work fit only for fools, but it is being done, at an unknown 
cost, by actual men and women; many of them aware of this situation, though to 
make this awareness common, and to carry the response right through, would be 
to revolutionize a whole social order (p.289). 
 
The discussion of the meanings of work, developed out of the first-hand confrontation of 
workers with their own conditions of existence, was, for Williams (1968), the necessary 
first step in taking “back from the activity not only the physical means to live but also a 
confirmation of significance, of the process of being oneself and alive in this unique way” 
(p.291). However, in this quote, as well as in Williams’ (1968) entire approach, the idea of 
class struggle as a reflection of particular social realities gives way to a notion of class 
struggle as motivated by human experience, the revolutionary potential of which could be 
formed in the confrontation of the human subject with the meaning of their work (or its 
lack thereof). 
 For other critics such as Stuart Hall (2017), the specific characteristics of work in 
the second half of the twentieth century saw this gap between labour and human desire 
heightened to an almost irreversible degree. Though authors such as Williams (1968) 
celebrated the development of automation and machinery as offering a potential escape 
route from work devoid of meaning (“If they are used to reduce not cost but labour, that 
is to relieve and release human energy for our own purposes, they are the means of 
liberation which has often seemed only a dream” [p.297]), Hall (2017) argued that the 
technological advancements that were changing the workplace at this time, signalled the 
coming of a more severe form of alienation than had been experienced by the working 
class before: “It may have been just possible to ‘humanise’ a nineteenth-century textile 
shop: it is impossible to ‘humanise’ a computing machine” (p.35). According to Hall 
(2017), the contemporary conditions of production – signalled by a shift from industrial 
working patterns and manual labour, towards post-industrial working arrangements in 
clerical, managerial and service-based industries – inaugurated a heightened form of 
alienation: unlike the factory worker who could see the crystallisation of their alienated 
labour move up the assembly line, alienated labour in contemporary production is often 
manifest “in the form of pieces of corporate property, shares in the anonymous, complex, 
modern industrial firms which spawn across the face of modern business” (p.32). Hall 
(2017) reproduced the humanist notion that class-consciousness arises in the 
confrontation of alienation, as the pivot of his argument was that alienation in 
contemporary production becomes sublime, built into contemporary production in such 
52 
 
a way as to present workers not simply with an alienated condition, but with a “false-
consciousness” (p.35), which seeped into the labour movement itself:  
 
It is part of the new ‘class consciousness.’ It makes people more responsive to the 
managerial patter about ‘productivity’ and ‘the responsibility of the firm’, and thus 
leads even the organised trade union movement to a greater involvement with 
‘keeping the firm competitive’ (p.32). 
 
For Hall (2017), contemporary work presented a danger insofar as it muddied the 
potential for class-consciousness by inaugurating a more sublime form of alienation. For 
Hall (2017), the structures of capitalist production – the machines and automation it 
made available – were there for the taking and could potentially revolutionise society. The 
problem, for Hall (2017), was not a problem first and foremost of the social re-
organisation of capitalist production. Rather, the problem was that the sublime nature of 
this alienation and its reproduction not only through work but through the consumer 
society, meant that “the structure of human, social and moral relationships are in 
complete contradiction” (p.42): a contradiction that risked the foreclosure of effective 
class struggle. It is only through the absolute restructuring of this relationship, of this 
experience of class itself, that the consciousness of this class could become a force for 
emancipatory potential. Until then, “the working class will be men as things for other 
people, but they can never be men for themselves” (Hall, 2017, p.42). 
 In each example here analysed, key social relations of work and capitalism have 
been shown to have moved to background of sociological analysis due to the reliance on 
alienation and the humanist framing of the social relations of work that it provides. The 
social relations of production inaugurated in the work of second half of the twentieth 
century – replete with an expansion of consumerism, the proliferation of automation, 
widening global inequalities and post-industrial working patterns – were interpreted as 
reflective of class struggle only to the extent that they were reflective of a heightened 
alienation of the human subject. These authors traced and reproduced many of the same 
limitations experienced by the Young Marx (1981) in his own humanist framing of the 
problem of work under capitalism: a convincing articulation of the experience of work but 
an inadequate conceptual framework for understanding it. This inadequacy is consistently 
reflected in the humanism of this emerging intellectual movement as the historical 
alienation of the human subject was centralised as the prism through which to observe 
class struggle, rather than an observation of the material changes inaugurated by 
developments of work in this post-industrial era. As Althusser (1996) argued, in his 
critique of this emerging intellectual movement, “the shadow of the Young Marx is no 




DEGRADATION, THE LABOUR PROCESS AND HUMANIST IDEOLOGY 
 
One of the foremost Marxist contributions to the sociology of work has been the 
development of labour process theory from the mid-to-late twentieth century onwards. 
Labour process theory is the study of how labour-power “enters a production process in 
which labor is realized to produce a concrete commodity or service that contains a use and 
exchange value (and surplus value that the employer or capitalist takes as reward)” 
(Smith, 2015, p.224). Labour process theory has often been celebrated for providing a 
concrete and even ‘scientific’ (Ackroyd, 2009) analysis of how human labour is exploited 
under capitalism. However, closer analysis demonstrates that the mobilisation of 
humanism in the deployment of a moralistic critique of capitalism has resolved itself in a 
number of shortcomings within labour process theory. In particular, this section will focus 
on the link between the humanism mobilised by Braverman (1974) in his critique and the 
invisibilisation of questions of gender and reproduction from his work as one of its most 
sustained critiques. 
The defining contribution to this school of knowledge was Harry Braverman’s 
(1974) Labor and Monopoly Capital, in which he forwarded an analysis of the historical 
development of strategies deployed by capitalism to structure, control and adapt the 
labour process, culminating in his thesis that the history of the labour process was one of 
the ‘degradation’ of work: where the worker continues to lose autonomy over their work 
to a growing echelon of managers, supervisors and technicians. Braverman’s (1974) 
contribution was built upon by a number of other sociologists at the time including 
Michael Burawoy (1979), Andrew L. Friedman (1977) and Richard Edwards (1979). It was 
updated again in the late twentieth and early twenty first century by scholars such as Paul 
Thompson (Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Smith, 2010). The salience of labour process 
theory has continued in contemporary sociological analyses of work, even as the labour 
process has shifted from firm roots within the factory and the office, to more flexible and 
ill-defined locations concomitant with the contemporary ‘gig’ economy (Gandini, 2019; 
Moisander et al., 2018; Morris et al., 2016). 
In his text Labor and Monopoly Capital, Braverman (1974) set out to produce an 
historical analysis of the capitalist labour process and how capitalists had used 
technology, hierarchy and ideology in order to exercise control over the labour process in 
different ways and to different degrees. Whilst theorists like Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy 
(1968) had developed a theory of the exploitation of labour from an economic perspective 
(through the exploration of the labour theory of value found in Marx’s political economy), 
Braverman (1974) added significantly to this by exploring the social mechanisms through 
which surplus-value was exploited by capitalists, arguing that it was through the labour 
process and through the realisation of labour in commodities that capitalism was able to 
produce and capture this surplus-value. Through his focus on the labour process, 
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Braverman (1974) set out to understand, sociologically, how capitalist accumulation 
functioned at the level of the workplace. 
Key to understanding this was Braverman’s (1974) theory of the ‘degradation’ of 
work. Braverman (1974) argued that in order to exploit greater amounts of surplus-value 
from the labour process, the worker must be relieved of as much autonomy over their work 
within that labour process as possible. The less control that the worker has over the pace, 
direction and object of their labour, the more control the capitalist has over the labour 
process and, crucially, the surplus-value that it produces. As Braverman (1974) wrote, 
 
The unity of thought and action, conception and execution, hand and mind, which 
capitalism threatened from its beginnings, is now attacked by a systematic 
dissolution employing all the resources of science and the various engineering 
disciplines based upon it. The subjective factor of the labor process is removed to 
a place among its inanimate objective factors. To the materials and instruments 
of production are added a ‘labor force’, another ‘factor of production’, and the 
process is henceforth carried on by management as the sole subjective element 
(p.171).  
 
For Braverman (1974), the development of technology is crucial in this historical process 
of degradation. It is the greater inclusion of machinery and other technologies within the 
labour process that facilitates the degradation of work, as the greater automation of tasks 
on the production line reduces the autonomy that the human worker has over the process 
and relegates the worker into a passive supervisory role as opposed to an active, 
productive one. As Braverman (1974) wrote, the development of machinery is not a source 
of liberation for workers but of enslavement and degradation as machinery ensures “the 
confinement of the worker within a blind round of servile duties in which the machine 
appears as the embodiment of science and the worker as little or nothing” (p.194-195). 
 Braverman (1974) produces a history of the labour process, demonstrating how 
developments in productive technology have always been accompanied by developments 
in strategies for controlling the labour process by the capitalist class. Braverman (1974) 
points towards Taylorism as the example par excellence of this relationship between 
technology and control within traditional industrial production. Taylorism was expressive 
of a labour process in which productive technologies allowed for a very detailed division 
of labour, where workers were made responsible for the repetitive completion of one or 
two tasks which contributed to the eventual production of a larger commodity. Through 
the tactical deployment of technology and the division of labour in this way, the managers 
of the Taylorist labour process were able to exact control over individual parts of the 
process, tweaking each division through the measurement of workers’ movements or the 
greater introduction of machinery in order to create the most efficient labour process 
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possible. The result, however, was an intense degradation of human labour where the 
human worker was stripped of all autonomy and control over the labour process, reduced 
to the attendant of a machine or responsible only for the completion of small, servile tasks 
that enjoyed a significant separation from the realisation of the finished product 
(Braverman, 1974). Under Taylorism, “not only do the workers lose control over their 
instruments of production, but they may lose control over their own labor and the manner 
of its performance” (Braverman, 1974, p.116). 
 In the movement from ‘industrial’ to ‘monopoly’ capitalism – an era of capitalist 
development that begins at the close of the nineteenth century, in which “huge firms 
exerted dominance over the markets” (Renton, 2004, p.130) and “generated surpluses 
which could be reinvested on a layer of technicians who were not directly employed in 
production” (p.130) – this relationship changes and, in Braverman’s (1974) view, becomes 
heightened. The advent of monopoly capitalism sees an expansion of more professional 
and clerical occupations such as technicians, school teachers, salespeople and service 
workers. The labour process shifts away from the traditional factory, towards new 
locations in offices, restaurants and shop floors. However, even though the labour process 
shifts into these new locations, the strategies of division and control perfected in industrial 
production find themselves reproduced in the workplace of monopoly capitalism 
(Braverman, 1974). New divisions of labour emerge, new workplace hierarchies involving 
technicians and middle-managers develop and, crucially, new technologies such as 
computers, telephones and other communication technologies become embedded within 
the labour process, cementing the ability of the capitalist class to maintain its control over 
this process and further degrade the work of the labourer. As Braverman (1974) wrote,  
 
Just as in manufacturing processes – in fact, even more easily than in 
manufacturing processes – the work of the office is analyzed and parcelled out 
among a great many detail workers, who now lose all comprehension of the 
process as a whole and the policies which underlie it (p.314). 
 
The successful development of monopoly capitalism and the continued ability of 
capitalists to accumulate capital under these new conditions of production depends, so 
Braverman (1974) argued, upon the ability of capitalists to innovate in new ways to 
degrade workers and their work, to continue to remove as much as possible any autonomy 
that the worker has over their activity. New developments in technology, new market 
structures and a re-orientation of the state and its institutions around this market all, for 
Braverman (1974), serve the end goal of degrading work in this way, which is visible most 
clearly at the level of the labour process. 
 Through the development of this theory, Braverman (1974) provided sociology 
with an important conceptual repertoire through which to analyse the social relations of 
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the workplace and how they materially function in the production of capital. Importantly, 
a closer analysis of Braverman’s (1974) theory also reveals that it is couched quite 
significantly in a humanist ideology. It is clear that Braverman (1974) finds consensus 
with the thesis of the Young Marx (1981): that the alienation of labour by capitalism is not 
simply a matter of social exploitation but one of ontological separation. Echoing a 
Marxist-humanism, Braverman (1974) argued that the capitalist labour process requires 
a “subdivision of the individual” (p.73) as well as a social division of labour: a subdivision, 
which “when carried on without regard to human capabilities and needs, is a crime against 
the person and against humanity” (p.73). What is evident is that the social process of the 
degradation of work is at all times accompanied by a subjective dehumanisation of the 
worker. 
 Braverman’s (1974) theory of the degradation relies on a humanist formulation of 
labour found in the Young Marx (1981). In texts like the Manuscripts of 1844, Marx (1981) 
distinguishes between the activity of animals whose purpose is to satisfy only the 
immediate need of survival and reproduction and the autonomous and conscious activity 
of human beings that transcends this immediate need and provides the universal 
foundation for human society. As Marx (1981) wrote,  
 
An animal only produces what it immediately needs for itself or its young. It 
produces one-sidedly, whilst man produces universally. It produces only under 
the dominion of physical need, whilst man produces even when he is free from 
physical need and only truly produces in freedom therefrom (p.68). 
 
Braverman (1974) relies significantly on this humanist ideological conceptualisation of 
labour in order to articulate his thesis on degradation. For Braverman (1974), the capacity 
of productive technologies to degrade work and reduce the autonomy of workers over the 
labour process is not simply a social process (the product of unequal class relations), but 
is fundamentally a subjective process facilitated by the reduction of universal human 
labour to its animalistic functions. The degradation of work through technology, is at the 
same time a dehumanisation of labour: 
 
This dehumanization of the labor process, in which workers are reduced almost to 
the level of labor in its animal form, while purposeless and unthinkable in the case 
of the self-organized and self-motivated social labor of a community of producers, 
becomes crucial for the management of purchased labor (Braverman, 1974, p.113). 
 
What is clear here is that Braverman’s (1974) thesis of degradation is not enough to 
accurately describe what takes place in the labour process of capitalist society. Capitalism 
is not able to produce and capture surplus-value through the degradation of work alone. 
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Rather, it also relies on the dehumanisation of the worker, on the separation of the human 
worker from the activity that corresponds to its life and on the reduction of the universal 
activity of human labour to an animalistic satisfaction of immediate need. The 
introduction of productive technologies to the labour process is but a material reflection 
of the dehumanisation of human labour, of the separation of the qualities of conception 
and execution that make human labour distinct and unique, with this dehumanisation 
providing the anchor for the social degradation of work thereafter (Braverman, 1974). As 
Braverman (1974) wrote, “the separation of hand and brain is the most decisive single step 
in the division of labor taken by the capitalist mode of production” (p.126). 
 It is important to ask, therefore, precisely what social process or operation this 
thesis on dehumanisation compensates for in Braverman’s (1974) analysis. One of the 
starkest oversights in Braverman’s (1974) analysis of the labour process was the lack of 
serious and sustained engagement with the social relations of reproduction which operate 
outside of the labour process (normally within the family and the household) but 
nonetheless contribute materially to the production of surplus-value (Renton, 2004; 
West, 1990). Though labour process theory has paid attention to the social division of 
labour on the production line, it has paid less attention to the gendered division of labour, 
maintaining a silence regarding the reproductive labour of cooking, cleaning and child-
rearing that takes place in the household and is completed predominantly by women 
workers (Mohandesi & Teitelman, 2017). In the case of Braverman (1974), the humanist 
ideology of dehumanisation allows his theory of the degradation of work to side-step the 
social relations of reproduction. The question that social reproduction theory answers is 
that of precisely how the worker arrives at the gates of the factory each morning and 
therefore how their labour-power becomes available for the capitalist to exploit every day 
(Bhattacharya, 2017). For theorists of social reproduction, the answer to this question is 
through the exploitation of reproductive labour, mediated through patriarchal social 
relations within the family unit. However, the thesis of dehumanisation in Braverman’s 
(1974) theory provides a different answer to this question, arguing that the arrival of 
labour-power for exploitation each day is a product of subjective alienation as opposed to 
gendered social exploitation. This can be observed in Braverman’s (1974) writings on 
‘skill’ towards the end of his work, the closest that Braverman (1974) comes to addressing 
the question of reproduction. For Braverman (1974), the process by which human labour-
power becomes available to capitalists for exploitation is not the social process of 
gendered exploitation within the household, but rather the ongoing reproduction of 
alienation through the ‘education’ of children and the ‘training’ of workers. For 
Braverman (1974), it is the processing of workers through more intricate regimes of 
training and education that prepares them for exploitation at the workplace each day: 
regimes of which the specific function is the dehumanisation of the worker and the 
subsequent degradation of their work. As Braverman (1974) wrote, the greater amount 
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that the worker ‘learns’ through training and education, the less that they know of 
themselves and of their own labour: a contradiction which “prefers to leave the worker 
ignorant despite years of schooling, and to rob humanity of its birthright of conscious and 
masterful labor” (p.446). The sole aim of these regimes of training and education for 
Braverman (1974) is the continued dehumanisation of the worker and the alienation of 
workers from autonomy over their own labour: however, this ontological answer to the 
question of reproduction mystifies it social explanation, as one of patriarchal relations of 
exploitation within the family unit. 
 The framing of Braverman’s (1974) analysis around a very particular human 
subject – the productive labourer, subject to the forces of alienation at the gates of the 
factory – reinforces the oversight he makes with regards to the gendered social relations 
of reproduction. Braverman (1974) relied on humanism in order to address the question 
that social reproduction theory had already answered: however, because the reproductive 
labourer does not correspond with the alienated human subject of the capitalist labour 
process, it finds itself (and the unique social relations in which it is mobilised) rendered-
invisible. In this way, the humanist ideology and the largely productivist interpretation of 
labour at the heart of labour process theory work together to support one another: but this 
is at the expense of certain social relations – namely, the social relations of reproduction 
(and the gendered class struggle reflected in these relations) – being bracketed and moved 
to one side.    
 
KNOWLEDGE AND WORK IN ‘POST-MODERN’ CAPITALISM 
 
The ability of Marxist theories of the labour process and of value to explain exploitation 
under capitalism find their sharpest criticism in emerging analyses of the role of 
knowledge within contemporary work and capitalism. According to key Marxist theorists 
like Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2001) and the school of thought they spearheaded 
in the early twenty-first century (see Berardi, 2009; Boutang, 2011; Lazzarato, 2014; 
Virno, 2004), the centrality of knowledge and information within contemporary forms of 
production culminates in a crisis of measurability and fundamentally undermines 
traditional and even Marxist theories of value in explaining the nature of exploitation 
under capitalism. Subsequently, these theorists observe substantial changes to the nature 
of work and the appearance of the contemporary workplace, as productive activity is no 
longer confined to the walls of the traditional factory but finds itself metered out across 
the ‘social factory’, completed everywhere and at all times across a broad range of social 
institutions. Not only have these developments provided capitalism with new tactics in 
exploitation, but these theorists also argue that these developments present new 
opportunities for liberation and revolution. 
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 Within more contemporary contributions to the sociology of work, these ideas 
have found salience in considerations of ‘immaterial labour’ and the increased prevalence 
of information and digital labour within contemporary capitalist production (Brown, 
2014; Farrugia, 2018; Gill & Pratt, 2008; Harvie & De Angelis, 2009; Pitts, 2018; 
Thompson et al., 2015). These interventions speak to an observable shift in the way that 
work is organised in the context of new digital technologies and knowledge-work, “from 
the static hierarchies of industrial modernity to the flexible production networks and 
precarious employment conditions that now exist across the class hierarchy of 
contemporary capitalist societies” (Farrugia, 2018, p.514). Fundamentally, these 
contributions build on the theories of Hardt and Negri (2001), who argued that the 
defining characteristic of contemporary capitalist production is the movement from the 
material to the immaterial and the central position of knowledge and information as the 
raw material of productive activity today. 
 The argument made by these theorists is that this contemporary arrangement of 
capitalist production inaugurates a new era: that of post-modernity. ‘Knowledge’ emerges 
as the key concept through which these authors justify the description of this apparent 
epochal shift. However, criticisms of this theoretical discourse target the ambiguity 
surrounding this concept. What is consistently unclear is the precise set of social relations 
reflected in the concept of ‘knowledge’ and how they constitute a marked break with the 
way that capitalism functioned in its ‘modern’ form (Caffentzis, 2013). Further analysis 
shows that beneath this critical discourse focused upon a break with modernity and its 
limiting assumptions, the concept of ‘knowledge’ itself is in fact a humanist ideological 
one, essentially reproducing the modern and theoretically humanist interpretations of 
labour and alienation found in the Young Marx (1981). In this way, the limitations of this 
discourse find themselves once again reflected in the reproduction of humanist ideological 
tropes. Humanism provides the explanatory framework and the critical edge for this 
discourse in the wake of its sociological and theoretical weaknesses.  
For Hardt and Negri (2001), the contemporary experience of work under 
capitalism is expressive of a completely new paradigm of power within the capitalist mode 
of production: a paradigm they have described as the power of Empire. For Hardt and 
Negri (2001), the Imperial characteristics of contemporary power see capitalist 
domination no longer exercised through separate and unique institutions or apparatuses, 
but instead deployed with fluidity, encompassing all areas of social life indiscriminately 
and consistently. Work itself becomes expressive of this Imperial power, as labour is no 
longer an activity completed within the parameters of a definite labour process (often 
supervised under a particular institutional space such as the factory) but is more fluid, 
completed everywhere and at all times in what Hardt and Negri (2001) describe as the 
contemporary “factory-society” (p.247). For Hardt and Negri (2001), this 
conceptualisation of the new Imperial power of capitalism denotes an epochal shift from 
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modern to post-modern forms of power. This observation of post-modern power has built 
upon the theories developed by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari ([1980] 2007, [1972] 
2013). Differing from critiques of power that limit the observation of its exercise to certain 
institutional structures (for example, that of Foucault [1991]), Deleuze and Guattari 
(2007, 2013) described power as having a much more liquid character, flowing through 
and in-between institutional settings, indistinguishable from one institution to the next. 
For Deleuze and Guattari (2007, 2013), power in post-modernity was defined precisely by 
the evanescence of the dividing lines between once-separate institutional settings, 
presenting a much ‘smoother’ exercise of power:  
 
The factory was a body that contained its internal forces at the level of equilibrium, 
the highest possible in terms of production, the lowest possible in terms of wages; 
but in a society of control, the corporation has replaced the factory, and the 
corporation is a spirit, a gas (Deleuze, 1992, para. 6). 
 
For Hardt and Negri (2001), this post-modern interpretation of power traces itself onto 
contemporary forms of capitalist production, as value-producing activity could no longer 
be observed within the institutional space of the workplace alone but was the product of a 
class struggle that was played out in every institutional and social space across the edifice 
of the capitalist social formation. Where once work was defined by a strict separation 
between the private and public spheres – between the household and the factory as 
separate disciplinary spaces – this power was now exercised uniformly and without visible 
parameters between the various social spaces of the capitalist mode of production: “The 
concept of Empire posits a regime that effectively encompasses the spatial totality, or 
really that rules over the entire ‘civilized’ world. No territorial boundaries limit its reign” 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.XIV). For Hardt and Negri (2001), this liquidity is reflected in the 
characteristics of ‘knowledge’ as the raw material of contemporary production, as it 
transcends the limitations of other material goods, in that it is shareable, communicable 
and indefinite with the ability to cross institutional boundaries. 
For Hardt and Negri (2001) the prominence of knowledge in production is 
sociologically manifest in a number of ways. Firstly, traditional explanations of labour, 
labour-power and value became inadequate in describing the experience of work under 
contemporary capitalism. The Marxist critique of value – dependent upon the observation 
of the way in which labour-power is mobilised through a definite labour process – was an 
inadequate explanatory framework for the description of exploitation in the factory-
society of post-modern capitalism. This point was made primarily through the 
centralisation in contemporary production of what Hardt and Negri (2001) called 
“immaterial labour” (p.289): “That is, labor that produces an immaterial good, such as a 
service, a cultural product, knowledge, or communication” (p.290). Traditional value 
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theories were, according to Hardt and Negri (2001), totally incapable of sufficiently 
measuring this immaterial labour in terms of its value, as immaterial labour routinely 
divorced the link between concrete labour-time and the exchange-value of a given 
commodity. As Hardt and Negri (2001) wrote, 
 
As labor moves outside the factory walls, it is increasingly difficult to maintain the 
fiction of any measure of the working day and thus separate time of production 
from the time of reproduction, or work time from leisure time. There are no time 
clocks to punch on the terrain of biopolitical production; the proletariat produces 
in all its generality everywhere all day long (p.402-403). 
 
This not only forms the basis of their critique of the theory of value, but also provides the 
foundations for their considerations of emancipation: capitalism, faced with this crisis of 
measurability, tends towards a potentially terminal crisis of value, unable to control the 
forces of production that outpace the relations designed to control it: “Labor was measure 
– a measure that was not measurable other than by Power, a measure of exploitation. Now 
labor can become value without measure, as power” (Negri, 2009, p.71, original 
emphasis). 
For Hardt and Negri (2001), immaterial labour was visible in two main 
transformations of work. Firstly, increasing levels of contemporary labour-power were 
involved in the production and manipulation of data and information in the form of 
communication and knowledge production. This was particularly evident in the 
emergence of a contemporary service-sector, based fundamentally upon the manipulation 
and exchange of information and data in the delivery of clerical, administrative and other 
knowledge-based services. As Hardt and Negri (2001) wrote, “the service sectors of the 
economy present a richer model of productive communication. Most services indeed are 
based on the continual exchange of information and knowledges” (p.290). The centrality 
of information and knowledge in production reduces the heterogeneous character of 
concrete labour across different industries: recalling Marx’s (2013) discussion of the 
concrete differences between tailoring and weaving in Capital, Hardt and Negri (2001) 
wrote that “the labor of computerized tailoring and the labor of computerized weaving 
may involve exactly the same concrete practices – that is, manipulation of symbols and 
information” (p.292). This is further enforced by Berardi (2009) who wrote that “the 
digitalization of the labor process has made any labor the same from an ergonomic and 
physical point of view since we all do the same thing: we sit in front of a screen and type 
on a keyboard” (p.75-76). Moreover, the informatisation of contemporary work removes 
the necessity of its concentration and surveillance within a definite institutional space 
such as a factory or office. As workers are bound to their employers by way of simple access 
to computer networks, surveillance and discipline can be exacted remotely and on-
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demand: “Laboring processes can be conducted in a form almost entirely compatible with 
communication networks, for which location and distance have very limited importance. 
Workers can even stay at home and log onto the network” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.295-
296). 
 The second instance of immaterial labour was in the proliferation of affective 
labour based upon the production of emotional satisfaction of human service-users 
through the provision of services, gratification and culture. As Hardt and Negri (2001) 
wrote, “this labor is immaterial, even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its 
products are intangible, a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion” 
(p.292-293). Much like its communicative counterpart, this form of labour does not 
demand strict concentration to a definite labour process but can be completed anywhere 
and perfected in all aspects of the subject’s social life: “The cooperative aspect of 
immaterial labor is not imposed or organized from the outside, as it was in previous forms 
of labor, but rather, cooperation is completely immanent to the laboring activity itself” 
(Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.294, original emphasis). 
 Therefore, the predominant nature of immaterial labour as the expression of the 
centrality of knowledge in contemporary production inaugurates the new era of capitalist 
development and its post-modern appearance. The factory and the office as the traditional 
sites of class struggle in production have given way to a structure of production more 
closely resembling a network (Hardt & Negri, 2001). As Hardt and Negri (2001) wrote, 
“the assembly line has been replaced by the network as the organizational model of 
production, transforming the forms of cooperation and communication within each 
productive site and among productive sites” (p.295, original emphasis). On the one hand, 
this has implicated new forms of social control, class domination and exploitation, 
metered out beyond the boundaries of particular institutional spaces. But on the other 
hand, the networked linkages between workers in this new form of production have 
offered new and potentially revolutionary forms of social cooperation between subjects 
who find themselves inextricably linked through this network (Hardt & Negri, 2001).  
 Not only does this constitute a change in the nature of work, it also constitutes a 
change in the nature of the worker too. The worker whose productive activity starts and 
ends with the labour process within the factory walls is no longer applicable to the image 
of contemporary networked production. This post-modern form of capitalism inaugurates 
a post-modern form of subjectivity, whose every social act contributes to their productive 
output (Hardt & Negri, 2001). As Hardt and Negri (2001) wrote, “just as modernization 
did in a previous era, postmodernization or informatization today marks a new mode of 
becoming human” (p.289). This new human subject is one inextricably linked through the 
networks and information with which they come into contact. The network does not 
simply define their working patterns but constitutes the entire social edifice with which 
this subject is faced: “Interactive and cybernetic machines become a new prosthesis 
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integrated into our bodies and minds and a lens through which to redefine our bodies and 
minds themselves” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.291). In this way, the modern productive 
subject becomes an increasingly inadequate descriptor of the contemporary worker, who 
is constantly productive, constantly connected to the network, in all spheres of life. Whilst 
this new, networked subjectivity is certainly more readily exploitable under contemporary 
capitalism, it also contains within it particular latent characteristics that make it 
potentially revolutionary: “This increased socialization…is a process that no doubt 
benefits capital with increased productivity, but is one that also points beyond the era of 
capital toward a new social mode of production” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.259). 
 ‘Knowledge’, in its expression in the ‘immaterial labour’ of the twenty first century 
has come to underpin the fundamental transformation of the world of work for Hardt and 
Negri (2001) and, importantly, point towards new ways of interpreting capitalist 
exploitation in the workplace. However, questions must be asked regarding the theoretical 
and sociological strength of this vision, particularly given the ambiguity surrounding this 
concept of ‘knowledge.’ In centralising the concept of knowledge, it is not exactly clear 
what social relations of production this new concept reveals that marks it as a different, 
‘post-modern’ form of capitalism. Moreover, the concept of knowledge in fact mystifies a 
number of key social relations of work that betray this apparent break: a mystification 
essential for the functionality of this discourse. These concerns are expressed in critiques 
such as that developed by George Caffentzis (2013). In his critique, Caffentzis (2013) 
identifies three fundamental shortcomings reflective of the centrality of ‘knowledge’ as a 
concept. First, it is not clear what social relations make the exploitation of labour-power 
that is productive of ‘knowledge’, or that which utilises ‘knowledge’ as its raw material, 
different from the exploitation of other types of labour-power (Caffentzis, 2013): a lack of 
clarity that betrays the epochal break on which this discourse is based. Second, the so-
called ‘crisis of value’ that stems from the apparent immeasurability of immaterial labour 
entirely mystifies the social relations of the labour process that have emerged with the 
precise aim of measuring the completion of these immaterial labours (Caffentzis, 2013). 
If anything, affectual labourers in the service industries or workers whose work is 
organised through smart-phone applications have their labour-power subject to 
heightened measurement and scrutiny: “Although the techniques used to control labor-
time and to impose speed-ups differ from the assembly lines, workers…are routinely given 
task-specific contracts with temporal deadlines” (Caffentzis, 2013, p.111). Thirdly, the 
social relations of reproduction are again entirely mystified in the theoretical calculations 
of Hardt and Negri (2001). Whilst they cite the heightened technological character of 
immaterial labour as the reason for its expression in higher wages, Caffentzis (2013) 
points out that this can just as easily be located in the greater investment by capital of the 
reproduction of the worker, not only through their home life but through their schooling 
and training: “This increased training of the contemporary worker…adds additional value 
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to the average labor-time, similar to the constant capital transferred to the product” 
(Caffentzis, 2013, p.113). 
 In this way, the concept of ‘knowledge’ appears to limit the sociology of work 
through the mystification of a number of key social relations of work. Though it does well 
in pointing to the inadequacy of earlier critiques, it reproduces many of these inadequacies 
in its own formulations. Importantly, closer analysis shows how these inadequacies are 
reflected in a persistent humanism that underwrites this concept of ‘knowledge.’  As 
Caffentzis (2013) wrote, “though it looks like the machines are eliminating the humans in 
this period of capitalism…a new ‘humanism’ arises from these antihumanist Marxists 
claiming the renewed indispensable importance of knowledge in humans” (p.111). The 
attachment of ‘knowledge’ to humanist ideological concepts allows for its presentation as 
markedly different from types of production that went before, but also allows for this 
discourse to implicate knowledge as a potentially revolutionary social ingredient. The 
reality, however, upon closer inspection, is that this discourse reproduces – with all its 
limitations – the Marxist-humanist analysis of labour and alienation repeatedly covered 
in this chapter.  
 This begins from the outset, as Hardt and Negri (2001) described how the 
centrality of knowledge in post-modern capitalism differentiates it from those forms of 
industrial production that preceded it. Whilst industrial production relied on the 
exploitation of an alienated activity, Hardt and Negri (2001) argued that the foundations 
of post-modern capitalist production are much less stable because they rely on the 
alienation of knowledge as something that is fundamentally the product of human social 
interaction and cooperation. As Hardt and Negri (2001) wrote, 
 
In effect, the object of exploitation and domination tend not to be specific 
productive activities but the universal capacity to produce, that is, abstract social 
activity and its comprehensive power. This abstract labor is an activity without 
place, and yet it is very powerful. It is the cooperating set of brains and hands, 
minds and bodies; it is both the non-belonging and the creative social diffusion of 
living labor; it is the desire and the striving of the multitude of mobile and flexible 
workers; and at the same time it is intellectual energy and linguistic and 
communicative construction of the multitude of intellectual and affective laborers 
(p.209, emphasis added). 
 
Therefore, knowledge as an important and central component of contemporary 
production finds its value not in its measurability (as in traditional labour theories of 
value) but in the way that it is the constant product of an inherent human cooperativity 
that extends beyond the immediate labour process and the wage-labour relation (Hardt & 
Negri, 2001). This idea is developed further elsewhere in this theoretical discourse, 
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particularly in Franco Berardi’s (2009) text The Soul at Work. Speaking more specifically 
to the workplaces of contemporary capitalism, Berardi (2009) denoted the marked 
difference of the post-modern workplace in its implication of this essential human 
cooperativity in production: 
 
The investment in desire comes into play at work since social production has 
started to incorporate more and more sections of mental activity and of symbolic, 
communicative and affective action. What is involved in the cognitive labor 
process is indeed what belongs more essentially to human beings: productive 
activity is not undertaken in view of the physical transformation of matter but 
communication, the creation of mental states, of feelings, and imagination (p.84, 
emphasis added). 
 
What marks post-modern capitalism (or “semiocapitalism” as Berardi [2009, p.116] 
codifies it) as different from other types of capitalist production is that instead of merely 
putting labour-power to work, “the soul itself is put to work” (Berardi, 2009, p.116): that 
is, the inherent sociality of human workers, manifest in communication and knowledge, 
is what is mobilised, without measure, into the contemporary labour-process. 
 On the one hand, these humanist ideological concepts are important here because 
they pronounce the heightened form of exploitation that is inaugurated in post-modern 
capitalism and stretches beyond the comprehension of the economistic attitudes of the 
value theorists. This humanist ideological vision is important because its stresses the fact 
that work under contemporary capitalism is not the product of a simple mobilisation of 
labour-power through a definite labour-process, but of a severely heightened form of 
alienation, combined with the exercise of Imperial power that takes place in every walk of 
social life (Hardt & Negri, 2001). Under post-modern capitalism “all of nature has become 
capital, or at least has become subject to capital” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.272) as 
“mechanical and industrial technologies have expanded to invest the entire world…[and] 
formal subsumption of the noncapitalist environment has reached its limit” (p.272). 
However, this description of heightened exploitation and of the immeasurability of this 
exploitation works only with this essential humanist foundation, that stresses the fact that 
knowledge as the component of contemporary production is something that 
fundamentally escapes its subsumption under capitalist production, with the crisis of 
value resulting from capitalism’s own attempt to measure that which it did not create. 
Where ‘knowledge’ and the immaterial is formulated as the product of spontaneous 
human relationships in production, its exploitation by capitalism therefore demands a 
heightened human alienation, that stretches across the edifice of human society both in 
the workplace and outside of it. 
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 On the other hand, and more importantly, these humanist concepts are essential 
for Hardt’s and Negri’s (2001) description of the emancipation of workers and their 
pushing of history into a new era. Not only does the concept of knowledge underpin a 
heightened exploitation of contemporary workers: its centrality also inaugurates 
particular social forces within its production process that capitalism itself is unable to 
control. By fostering and setting in motion knowledge as the inherent cooperativity of 
human workers, it sets in motion incredibly powerful forces, in direct contact with the 
means of production, with the control of these forces belonging inherently not to capital, 
but to labour (Hardt & Negri, 2001). Therefore, contemporary capitalism in effect 
produces its own grave-diggers, as in the process of exploitation it constructs and sets in 
motion a form of commonality and human cooperation that exceeds its direct control: “It 
seems to us, in fact, that today we participate in a more radical and profound commonality 
than has ever been experienced in the history of capitalism” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.302). 
 This is manifest par excellence in what Hardt and Negri (2001) described as the 
formation of a ‘general intellect’ within the capitalist mode of production: a concept lifted 
from Marx’s (1974) ‘Fragment on Machines’ in the Grundrisse. The argument is that 
contemporary capitalist production, by virtue of the mobilisation of knowledge within 
technologically and cybernetically enhanced labour processes, produces a general intellect 
among the working class, as workers find themselves inextricably linked together by the 
implication of their inherent cooperative abilities within systems of production (Hardt & 
Negri, 2001). This established general intellect, once workers find their consciousness of 
it, has a potentially revolutionary implication: 
 
General intellect is a collective, social intelligence created by accumulated 
knowledges, techniques, and know-how. The value of labor is thus realized by a 
new universal and concrete labor force through the appropriation and free usage 
of the new productive forces. What Marx saw as the future is our era. This radical 
transformation of labor power and the incorporation of science, communication, 
and language into productive force have redefined the entire phenomenology of 
labor and the entire world horizon of production (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.364). 
 
Echoing the Marx (1974) of the ‘Fragment’ but also the Young Marx (1981) of the 
Manuscripts, Hardt and Negri (2001) here argued that this general intellect, and the 
becoming-conscious of workers of their own transformative power (inherent to their own 
cooperation) will pave the way towards revolutionary action. It is the production of this 
new “multitude” (Hardt & Negri, 2001, p.394) that underpins the crisis of capitalism, as 
it invents something beyond its own control and whose productive activity is beyond 
measurability: “Social subjects are at the same time producers and products of this unitary 
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machine. In this new historical formation it is thus no longer possible to identify a sign, a 
subject, a value, or a practice that is ‘outside’” (p.385).  
 What is clear, however, is that Hardt and Negri (2001), despite their citation of 
technological, cybernetic and post-humanist lexicon, essentially reproduce the Marxist-
humanist theory of labour and alienation. The multitude as the revolutionary culmination 
of humans and machines, bound together by knowledge, is nothing more than the social 
subject willed into action by the alienation of their inherent productive activity. The re-
assertion of the general intellect into production is nothing more than the class-
consciousness of this alienated subject, taking advantage of the systems of production 
responsible for its alienation and turning them on their head. It is in this way that even 
Hardt and Negri (2001) describe their emancipatory project as “humanism after the death 
of man” (p.92): however, though modern Man may have died, his theoretical project 
remains fully intact. This theoretical humanism is problematic because it has been shown 
to reflect severe theoretical shortcomings at the heart of this critique. The reliance on 
humanism by Hardt and Negri (2001) to describe the unique exploitation of 
contemporary capitalism and the unique opportunity for revolution, allows for the 
leaving-out of key social relations that beg questions of the rigorous nature of this concept 
of ‘knowledge’ and its ability to mark a decisive and epochal shift in the capitalist mode of 
production (Caffentzis, 2013). But what is clear, therefore, is that the humanism inherent 
to Hardt’s and Negri’s (2001) critique further obfuscates an inherent theoretical weakness 
at the heart of the discourse in a way that is recurrently familiar within the critical 
sociology of work.  
 
REFUSAL AND HUMANISM IN A LIFE WITHOUT WORK 
 
Whilst Hardt and Negri (2001) saw work appearing everywhere across society, other 
Marxist sociologists were theorising its disappearance. In the mid-to-late twentieth 
century, André Gorz (1983) bid Farewell to the Working Class, as he theorised the 
possibility of the transition into a world without the burden of paid work, buoyed by the 
social and productive developments of post-industrial capitalism. Gorz’s (1983) thesis 
rejected traditional Marxist considerations of alienation, arguing that the working class’ 
experience of work had not produced them as a revolutionary force but as a weakened and 
downtrodden collective incapable of historical resistance against capitalism. Power, Gorz 
(1983) argued, lay only in the ability of the proletarian to discover their subjectivity in the 
world outside of work, by virtue of reclaiming the self-affirming qualities of human labour 
in the act of refusing its expenditure in the heteronomous wage-labour relation. For Gorz 
(1983), revolutionary potential lay not with the working class, but with that class able to 
transcend the boundaries of industrial production and build solidarity and autonomy in 
the spaces outside of the factory walls. 
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 In recent years, the idea of ‘refusing’ work and the imagination of alternative social 
arrangements on the basis of this refusal has enjoyed increased salience within 
contemporary sociological contributions (del Valle Alcala, 2016; Fleming, 2014, 2015; 
Frayne, 2015, 2018; Graeber, 2018; Mudu, 2018; Standing, 2016; Weeks, 2011). David 
Frayne (2015) has built heavily on Gorz’s (1983) ideas of refusal in his empirical 
investigations into the experiences of British workers, observing the social struggle for 
human autonomy in the various strategies of refusing work deployed by today’s workers:  
 
For all the propaganda we hear about work as a source of good health and a way 
to ‘meet potential’, work so often seems to stand in the way of people realising 
what they are capable of in terms of their capacities for creation and co-operation 
(Frayne, 2015, p.215). 
 
Frayne (2015), alongside Fleming (2014, 2015) and Standing (2016) have all integrated 
this idea of refusal of work into their imagination of a fairer and more equal society, 
arguing that the development of social and political arrangements in the space outside of 
work is crucial in the context of contemporary shifts in labour market conditions towards 
greater precariousness, greater informality and rising automation. This notion of refusal 
and its attachment to such forms of sociological imagination, is indebted to the writings 
of Gorz (1983). 
   Gorz’s (1983) thesis was a fundamentally humanist one, based around the 
qualities of self-affirmation and autonomy inherent to the completion of human labour. 
Humanism provided the conceptual underpinning of Gorz’s (1983) emancipatory vision, 
culminating in the establishment of a ‘politics of time’, facilitated through the production 
of a ‘dual society’ based upon the re-configuration of the division of labour in society. 
Despite his valorisation of an end of work as the answer, Gorz’s (1983) emancipatory 
vision relied upon many of the institutions reflective of the social relations of capitalism 
that forbid this abolition. This is particularly evident in Gorz’s (1983) valorisation of the 
state as the cornerstone of societal reconfiguration, and the valorisation of the sphere of 
autonomy as a sphere free of social relations of capital by virtue of its existence outside of 
the wage-labour relation. These oversights are reflected in the humanist ideology at the 
heart of Gorz’s (1983) theory, in which the motor of historical development and social 
change is located in the valorisation of the autonomy and inherent cooperativity of free 
human labour. The abolition of work is observed by Gorz (1983) in the production of a 
society based upon the free and self-fulfilling activity of autonomous human labourers, 
rather than in a fundamental break with particular social relations of capital.    
Gorz set out his critique of work across a number of important texts, including 
Farewell to the Working Class (Gorz, 1983), Paths to Paradise (Gorz, 1985) and 
Capitalism, Socialism, Ecology (Gorz, [1991] 2012). Of fundamental centrality to Gorz’s 
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(2012) consideration of work was the Marxist-humanist concept of labour found most 
prominently in the work of the Young Marx (1981). Gorz’s (2012) critique of work rested 
on the assumption that human labour was the inherently cooperative and historical 
activity through which human beings not only constructed the societies around them but 
also confirmed themselves as individuals and members of that society. As Gorz (2012) 
wrote, 
 
It is, admittedly, undisputable that ‘work’ in the sense of poiesis is a historical-
fundamental need: the need the individual feels to appropriate the surrounding 
world, to impress his or her stamp upon it and, by the objective transformations 
he or she effects upon it, to acquire a sense of him- or herself as an autonomous 
subject possessing practical freedom (p.55). 
 
The cornerstone of Gorz’s (2012) critique, however, ran contrary to other Marxist-
humanist critiques. Whereas many of the discourses of alienation that have been analysed 
in this chapter have seen this alienation as providing the catalyst for human historical 
action and for the re-discovery by the human individual of these qualities of labour, Gorz 
(2012) argued that the experience of alienation felt by the working class in post-industrial 
forms of capitalism was so severe, that the prospect of any historical action emerging from 
it were simply impossible. It was in this way that Gorz (2012) argued that the only 
strategies capable of securing these inherent qualities of labour for the human individual 
must be devised in those spaces that escaped the wage-labour relation and therefore 
undermined traditional socialist strategies of industrial proletarian resistance. 
 For Gorz (2012), the post-industrial organisation of work saw the total alienation 
of workers not only from the products of their work, but from the very act of working itself. 
For Gorz (2012), this catalysed what he called a ‘crisis of work’: “The old notion of work is 
no longer valid, the subject assumes a critical distance not only from the product of his 
work but from that work itself” (p.59). The proliferation of mass unemployment, the 
deployment of machinery and automation across the labour process and the global 
division of labour inherent to this particular stage of capitalist development not only 
signalled a ‘crisis’ of work in the context of its declining availability, but also a crisis insofar 
as work itself was becoming an increasingly unsuitable foundation for historical class 
action. As Gorz (1983) explained, “this is the situation: work now exists outside the 
worker, reified to the extent of becoming an inorganic process. Workers are there and fall 
in with the work that is done. They do not do it themselves” (p.38, original emphasis). 
Gorz (1983) argued that the participation of workers in their work provided absolutely no 
sensuous experiences, no feelings of ‘natural’ resistance or any impetus to act against the 
conditions of life with which they were faced. In this way, the traditional industrial 
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working class became an increasingly inadequate subjective vehicle in which to observe 
social and historical change: 
 
If we accept the principle that ‘employment and work essentially determine the 
horizon of my way of seeing the world,’ who is there who can transform work into 
fulfilling poiesis, who can liberate it in a society where ‘the way of seeing the world’ 
is ‘determined’ by work that is de-materialized and cut off from sensory 
experience? Surely not the immense majority of the wage-earning classes (p.58, 
original emphasis). 
 
If labour is to be the motor of social change and human self-affirmation, it cannot, for 
Gorz (1983) take place on the traditional terrain of the industrial proletariat: that is, in the 
factory or in the office itself. Rather, as Gorz (1983) argued, the proletariat must find its 
revolutionary subjectivity in the act of refusal rather than resistance: “The working class 
must act as a force refusing, along with its class being, to accept the matrix of capitalist 
relations of production of which this being bears the imprint” (p.43). 
 The valorisation of refusal in this way as an emancipatory strategy depended upon 
a distinction, constructed and reproduced by Gorz (2012) between the work completed by 
the worker as part of the wage-labour relation and the work that underpinned human 
society. Gorz (2012) was not advocating a post-activity society: on the contrary, Gorz 
(2012) insisted that social change would occur through the activity of the human subject, 
only separated from its completion within wage-labour settings. In making this 
separation, Gorz (2012) relied on humanist ideological concepts. Gorz (2012) argued that 
in contrast to the highly alienating activity of work as wage-labour, society ought to 
centralise a conception of work that is understood “as the activity by which the human 
being externalizes his being – that is to say, produces it as a being which exists objectively 
outside oneself, as ‘sensuous-practical activity’, as ‘appropriative shaping of one’s own 
objective world’” (p.55). Gorz (2012) defined this type of work as autonomous work or 
“work-for-oneself” (p.57), completed not by the imperatives of survival or material 
satisfaction, but as labour that is immanent to human desire and human self-fulfilment. 
The societal problem was, for Gorz (2012), that work as wage-labour had predominance 
in society, leaving no space for the fruition of this more autonomous form of work. As Gorz 
(2012) wrote,  
 
There is no social space in which ‘true work’ – which, depending upon 
circumstances, I prefer to call ‘work-for-oneself’ or ‘autonomous activity’ – can 
deploy itself in such a way to produce society and set its stamp upon it. It is this 




Emancipation, for Gorz (2012), rested in the construction and centralisation of this space 
for autonomous work. Importantly, for Gorz (1983), autonomous work was not merely 
freely-directed activity or simple leisure. It was, as the Young Marx (1981) argued with 
regards to labour itself, an activity through which the human subject comes to realise, 
recognise and in effect know themselves. As Gorz (1983) writes, autonomous activity 
includes “communication, giving, creating and aesthetic enjoyment, the production and 
reproduction of life, tenderness, the realisation of physical, sensuous and intellectual 
capacities, the creation of non-commodity use-values…in short, the whole range of 
activities that make up the fabric of existence” (p.80-81, emphasis added). For example, 
Gorz (1983) turns against the emerging feminist movements at the time that argued that 
housework, child care and reproductive labour ought to be waged the same as other forms 
of work. Gorz (1983) argues that rather than included in the logic of capital, these activities 
should be valorised precisely due to their distinctly individual and autonomous qualities 
and their inability to be reduced to abstract social labour. These distinctly individual 
activities and the affective and sensuous qualities they generated are the activities of 
human life itself: in seeking to include these amongst other types of work, “the last enclave 
of individual or communal autonomy would disappear; socialisation, ‘commodification’ 
and pre-programming would be extended to the last vestiges of self-determined and self-
regulated life” (Gorz, 1983, p.84). 
 In the realisation of this goal, Gorz (2012) argued for the organisation of socialist 
thought behind what he called a ‘politics of time’ (p.61), based upon the radical re-thinking 
of the societal division of labour and its extension into all areas of social and political life. 
Such a political project would concentrate, according to Gorz (2012), on  
 
The reshaping of the urban and natural environment, cultural politics, education 
and training, and [reshaping] the social services and public amenities in such a 
way as to create more scope for self-managed activities, mutual aid, voluntary co-
operation and production for one’s own use (p.61). 
 
Gorz (1983) argued that forward movement towards this goal lay in the reorganisation of 
the spheres of labour within society: namely an augmentation of the sphere of 
autonomous labour with the shrinking as small as possible the sphere of necessary labour 
synonymous with the experience of wage-labour (what Gorz [1983] calls “heteronomous 
sphere” [p.97] of labour). This conception of a dual society in terms of labour forms the 
basis of Gorz’s (1983) imagination of social transformation, in which the spheres of 
heteronomy and autonomy co-exist, but with the former subservient to the latter. Gorz 
(1983) imagined the organisation of society into these two spheres, with the shrunken 
heteronomous sphere ensuring the “planned production of everything necessary to 
individual and social life, with the maximum efficiency and the least expenditure of effort 
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and resources” (p.97), with the now-larger autonomous sphere focused on the production 
of “non-necessary material and non-material goods and services, outside of the market” 
(p.97), with individuals producing these goods “by themselves or in free association with 
others, and in conformity with their own desires, tastes or fantasies” (p.97). Gorz (1983) 
here imagined the proliferation of “repair and do-it-yourself workshops in blocks of flats” 
(p.87) as well as “libraries, places to make music or movies, ‘free’ radio and television 
stations, open spaces for communication, circulation and exchange” (p.87) which would 
all facilitate the completion of autonomous work on behalf of human individuals and 
would begin to see a social fabric woven around its completion. 
 Therefore, rather than relying on the experience of wage-labour, Gorz (1983) 
argued that emancipation lay in the ability to use the products of capitalist development 
to shrink necessary labour as small as possible, thereby enlarging the opportunities for 
engagement in autonomous activity and for the construction of a society based 
fundamentally upon the free and sensuous activity of human subjects. As Gorz (1983) 
wrote, “the point, then, is not to abolish heteronomous work, but only to use the goods it 
supplies and the way in which they are produced in order to enlarge the sphere of 
autonomy” (p.101). Gorz (1983) cited the development of technology and automation as 
one such development, able to remove the “crippling, exhausting and brutalising” (p.98) 
effects of work from the shoulders of human workers. Fundamentally, Gorz’s (1983) 
critique of work culminated in the necessity of the augmentation and expansion of human 
autonomy outside of the wage-labour relation, permitting the construction and 
development of a human society based on inherent cooperativity and human sociality. 
  However, there are particular theoretical shortcomings evident in Gorz’s (1983) 
theory. This is particularly evident in the theories of emancipation offered by Gorz (1983) 
culminating in the ‘dual society’ and its attendant ‘politics of time.’ Despite his repeated 
insistence upon free human activity as the motor of social progress, it is not clear the 
extent to which it figures in his consideration of the ‘dual society.’ Rather, Gorz (1983) 
finds himself heavily reliant on the valorisation of the state as the political cornerstone of 
this societal re-organisation. As Gorz (1983) wrote on the role of the state in the vision of 
this ‘dual society’, “it alone is capable of protecting society against the domination of giant 
tools; it alone is capable of ensuring that the means of producing necessities are not 
monopolised by a social class for the purposes of domination” (p.115). In this instance, 
social change is not so much the product of class struggle but of central planning by the 
state as the state is centralised as the only political entity capable of maintaining this ‘dual 
society’ based on the subservience of heteronomous work to autonomous work. However, 
Gorz (1983) here produces an argument that betrays a fundamental Marxist scepticism of 
the state as an artefact of the social (that is, class) domination that he warns against. As 
Althusser’s (2014) own analysis of the role of the state in the reproduction of capital has 
demonstrated, the state and the ideological state apparatuses crucial to its functioning 
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have been largely responsible for the enforcement of heteronomous work regimes and 
discipline in the post-industrial era, rather than for their abolition. Moreover, Gorz’s 
(1983) valorisation of a ‘politics of time’ based upon the centralisation of autonomous 
work overlooks the fact that the wage-labour relation alone is not indicative of capitalist 
social relations. The sole reduction of the sphere of wage-labour is not enough to abolish 
the capitalist social relations of work, as these social relations branch beyond the wage-
labour relation into relations of reproduction that exist everywhere outside of the 
workplace. This oversight is exposed in Gorz’s (1983) consideration of the family as “the 
last enclave of individual or communal autonomy” (p.84), rather than “a center of 
conditioning, of consumption and of reserve labor” (Dalla Costa & James, 1975, p.10). The 
social relations of reproduction inherent to the family institution, and the relationship of 
these relations to the reinforcement of the wage-labour relation is here overlooked by Gorz 
(1983) in his valorisation of the ‘autonomous’ spaces outside of waged work. 
 The persistence of humanist ideological tropes throughout Gorz’s (183) critique of 
work, however, allow him to side-step these limitations. By valorising the human 
discovery of autonomy and self-fulfilment inherent to their labour as it is freed from the 
constraints of the wage-labour relation, the mechanics of social change upon which the 
refusal and eventual abolition of work would be facilitated are obfuscated, as the human 
struggle for autonomy becomes the defining act of class activity. The role of class struggle 
is reduced to this humanist mission of self-discovery, which becomes entirely compatible 
with Gorz’s (1983) considerations of refusal. The primacy of this observation of autonomy 
and self-fulfilment precludes the analysis of the social relations incubated in both the state 
and in social institutions beyond those of the workplace responsible for the reproduction 
and enforcement of the very relations of work with which Gorz (1983) seeks to break. Once 
again, theoretical limitations find themselves reflected in the centrality of humanist 




In conclusion, the extent to which sociological discourses of work within the Marxist 
canon have relied upon humanist ideology has here been made clear. Problematically, the 
Marxist sociology of work has found itself repeatedly united not through an analysis of the 
social relations of work under contemporary capitalism, but rather through humanist 
ideology, relying in various ways upon the centralisation and valorisation of the human 
subject in order to function. The concept of labour developed by the Young Marx (1981) – 
the idea that labour is a collective action by which human beings render both their world 
and themselves, intelligible – has proven a crucial ideological construct running 
throughout the accounts here discussed. This is problematic as the failure to break with 
humanism sees Marxism here reproduce the very ideologies responsible for the 
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normalisation or mystification of the capitalist social relations they seek to critique. What 
has been made clear is that there is a specific limitation to the sociology of work that 
prevents even its Marxist contributions – the defining theoretical exercise of which should 
be the break with and deconstruction of humanist ideology – from resisting the ideological 
temptations of humanist concepts. The remainder of this thesis is dedicated to the 
exploration of the extent to which this fundamental limitation still persists in the 
contemporary sociology of work. 
 The Marxist sociological accounts here set out have had a significant influence 
upon the construction of contemporary critiques of work, even those which sit outside of 
the Marxist canon. Problematically, it is these non-Marxist accounts that set the 
intellectual agenda in twenty first century critiques of work. Whilst there are strengths to 
these contemporary accounts, the role of Marxism in the context of these developments 
should be to expose the ideological assumptions that underlie these critiques and frame 
them in such a way as to both acknowledge and avoid the subsumption of these ideological 
formations in the development of sociological analysis. In initiating this task and learning 
the lessons of Marxist development here set out, this thesis begins with a critique of the 
zeitgeist of the sociology of work in the twenty first century: ‘postcapitalism’, automation 
and the post-work imaginary. The twenty first century presents an image of work 
drastically different from that ever imagined even by the authors discussed here. But what 
is made evident is that it remains afflicted by precisely the same ideological malaise. 
Humanism presents a significant and unique problem to the sociology of work: the first 





The Humanist Ideology of the Contemporary 
Post-Work Imaginary 
 
Here the imaginations of our utopian thinkers, apologists for neo-capitalism and reformists 
start churning and promise us the moon (either the disappearance of classes or communism) 
just as soon as automation becomes universal…because automation will put an end, ‘to all 
intents and purposes’, to nearly every intervention by labour-power...and, consequently, to 
the exploitation of labour-power! Let us be serious (Althusser, 2014, p.30). 
 
This chapter confronts the emergence of a contemporary post-work imaginary within the 
sociology of work, demonstrating how its limitations stem fundamentally from a 
persistent and pervasive humanism that consistently underwrites its critique. This 
contemporary post-work imaginary – which argues that the technological development of 
contemporary capitalism provides the historical conditions for the abolition of work and 
the transition into a ‘postcapitalist’ society – presents a fundamentally limited critique of 
work, in which key social relations of work are bracketed or mystified. Whilst the post-
work imaginary operates under the aegis of a radical, transformative and even utopian 
consideration of work, in reality it reproduces the precise productivist tropes from which 
it seeks escape. Rather than breaking with the traditional parameters of work and wage-
labour, the post-work imaginary complements them: a consequence observable in the 
absence of important social relations from its considerations. In its thought about post-
work futures, key social relations in the character and position of machinery and 
technology, the class character of money, wages and income and the social relations of 
capitalism that escape but nonetheless inform the wage-labour relation find themselves 
overlooked. The chapter argues that the roots of this problem are ideological in nature, 
anchored specifically in a pervasive humanism that consistently animates the discourse. 
Analysis shows that the post-work imaginary is essentially a Marxist-humanist analysis of 
‘social labour’ (Althusser, 2003), where emancipation is considered not in the observation 
of class struggle and of social structures, but as the inherent quality of naturally 
cooperative human beings now freed from the obligation of alienating work by the 
possibilities presented by automation. It is in this recourse to humanist ideological 
analysis (often produced through direct contact with the works of the Young Marx) that 
the limitations of the post-work imaginary find their root, for it relegates social relations 
to their position as nothing more than a backdrop to the historical negation by human 
beings of their own alienation. 
The sociologists and theorists of this contemporary post-work imaginary are faced 
with a situation in which the disappearance of work is not simply a utopian vision, but a 
present and dangerous reality. The post-work imaginary appears alongside an emerging 
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crisis of work which has seen global unemployment levels soaring, the mobilisation of 
global populations in search of income and the potential for even greater levels of 
unemployment caused by the development of automation. Moreover, the work that is 
available does not carry the traditional characteristics of stability, formality and regularity 
but is in fact increasingly precarious, characterised by the proliferation of low-waged and 
low-skilled jobs often tendered out on zero-hours contracts. In the face of this reality, 
these sociologists argue that instead of resisting this inevitable wave of unemployment, it 
should be embraced and directed towards emancipatory ends. The contemporary crisis of 
work and the material conditions associated with it present the opportunity for the radical 
re-imagination of work and its centrality within contemporary society. As Nick Srnicek 
and Alex Williams (2013) wrote in their ‘Accelerationist Manifesto’, 
 
Accelerationists want to unleash latent productive forces. In this project, the 
material platform of neoliberalism does not need to be destroyed. It needs to be 
repurposed towards common ends. The existing infrastructure is not a capitalist 
stage to be smashed, but a springboard to launch towards post-capitalism (para. 
18). 
 
The latent productive forces of contemporary capitalism, stored in the vast quantities of 
knowledge and information deployed in contemporary capitalist production and in the 
machines that crystallise this knowledge, provide the precise foundation for the 
contemporary post-work imaginary: “Freedom is highly dependent upon the historical 
conditions of scientific and technological development” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.82). 
 
A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF WORK 
 
At the turn of the twenty first century, Ulrich Beck (2000) described and predicted the 
emergence of a Brave New World of Work: one in which globalisation and advancing 
technological development has created a condition of precariousness and vulnerability 
among the workers of the Western world. As Beck (2000) wrote of this new world of work, 
“for a majority of people, even in the apparently prosperous middle layers, their basic 
existence and lifeworld will be marked by endemic insecurity” (p.3). Everywhere, the 
availability of secure, regular and formal employment opportunities is disappearing, with 
the contemporary employment market dominated by jobs that prioritise ‘flexibility’ and 
‘self-employment.’ Technological advancements are heightening these conditions of 
insecurity, as “rising unemployment can no longer be explained in terms of cyclical 
economic crises; it is due rather to the successes of technologically advanced capitalism” 
(Beck, 2000, p.2). Almost twenty years on from Beck’s (2000) predictions, the world of 
work he envisaged appears to correlate ever-more accurately to the contemporary 
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landscape of work. Contemporary statistics have brought Beck’s (2000) brave new world 
to life, presenting a world of work with increasingly mobile working populations, vast 
unemployment and a heightened experience of precariousness and risk: all inaugurated 
by the productive and technological development of capitalism. 
 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has shown global populations of 
unemployed people to be swelling, with this trend predicted to continue right through 
until the end of the present decade (ILO, 2016). According to the ILO, “In 2015, total 
global unemployment stood at 197.1 million – 27 million higher than the pre-crisis level 
of 2007” (2016, para. 5). Moreover, the ILO (2015) has revealed this swelling 
unemployment to be a dominant factor in the increased migration of global populations, 
with trends indicating high levels of migration from the global South into Western 
economies, almost half of whom migrate into North America and Europe in search of an 
income. However, employment prospects in these ‘advanced capitalist’ economies of the 
West are increasingly dire themselves. In 2015 the British poverty think-tank the Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation (JRF) concluded through its research that more than half of those 
in poverty in Britain were in households in which at least one member of the family was 
employed (MacInnes et al., 2015). In Britain, statistics reveal that 1.7 million workers are 
employed on zero-hours employment contracts (Lewis, 2017), on which workers are not 
guaranteed a set number of hours per week and thus are subject to drastic income changes 
depending often on the demands of the businesses for which they work. This is 
corroborated by statistics released by the Financial Times which demonstrate that 
between 2015 and 2016, the number of workers employed in Britain on zero-hours 
contracts increased by a fifth, with half of those workers aged over 25 (dispelling the myth 
that only students and young people are affected by these contracts) (O’Connor, 2016). In 
the United States, 94% of the net employment growth between 2005 and 2015 has been 
in jobs that offer ‘alternative work arrangements’ (Lewis, 2017). This is exacerbated 
further by developing technologies and encroaching automation. It is estimated that up to 
49% of the world’s activities in work could be automated immediately with technology 
that is currently available (Cole, 2017). Moreover, by 2030, 30% of all jobs in Britain are 
predicted to be at risk of automation and 38% of jobs in the United States (Cole, 2017). 
Even Mark Carney (2016) – Governor of the Bank of England – recognised how “every 
technological revolution mercilessly destroys jobs and livelihoods” (p.8). 
 There have been a number of contemporary sociological interjections into this 
discussion of an emerging crisis of work, particularly from those rooted in the sociology 
of work, employment and industrial relations. Changes in the labour market conditions 
have often been positioned in the context of developing economic trends, collected in 
discussions of the ‘gig economy’ (Schroeder et al., 2019), the ‘platform economy’ (Forde 
et al., 2017) or ‘crowdworking’ (Howcroft & Bergvall-Kåreborn, 2019). Inaugurated within 
these economic shifts have been shifts in the characteristics of work and employment in 
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advanced capitalist economies, including the emergence of more informal working 
arrangements (such as part-time, zero-hours and fixed-term employment) (Borghi et al., 
2016; Bessa & Tomlinson, 2017; Oliver, 2012) and the rise of self-employment (Umney, 
2016; Wall, 2015) among contemporary workers. Alongside this has been the charted 
development of ‘involuntary’ (Kautonen et al., 2010) or ‘false’ (Cruz et al., 2017) self-
employment, where the risks normally shouldered by employers are transferred onto 
individual workers, but these workers do not enjoy the autonomy of the traditionally self-
employed, with their work still controlled by an employer. Though often couched in the 
language of ‘autonomy’, ‘freedom’ or ‘flexibility’, the proliferation of informal working 
arrangements such as these “allow organizations to shift the costs of employment and 
economic risk onto their workers, all the while removing them from important 
employment-bound social security benefits and social insurance programs” (Moisander 
et al., 2018, p.393).  
 “Are we headed for freedom or hell?” This was the question Stanley Aronowitz et 
al. (1998, p.33) posed in their confrontation of these emerging trends in their ‘Post-Work 
Manifesto.’ The disappearance of work was not only compatible only with a workless 
utopia, but also a workless nightmare of endemic poverty and precariousness. This 
question still haunts the considerations of the contemporary post-work imaginary. For 
worklessness is not immediately resolving itself in emancipation but is in fact crystallised 
in statistics such as those discussed above. As Srnicek and Williams (2015) – two of the 
most prominent contributors to this contemporary post-work imaginary – indicate, 
 
There is a growing population of people that are situated outside formal, waged 
work, making do with minimal welfare benefits, informal subsistence work, or by 
illegal means. In all cases, the lives of these people are characterised by poverty, 
precarity and insecurity. Increasingly, there are simply not enough jobs to employ 
everyone (p.103-104). 
 
This is echoed by Paul Mason (2015) – another leading contributor to this post-work 
imaginary – who acknowledges that the disappearance of work has led not only to a highly 
mobile global population moved by the desperate search for income, but also the 
proliferation of the very conditions of life from which these mobile populations have 
attempted to escape: poverty, yawning inequalities and endemic insecurity: “In the cities, 
many will join the world’s slum-dwelling population, which already stands at a billion – 
and increasing numbers will attempt illegal migration to the rich world” (p.257). 
 However, for these theorists of the post-work imaginary, there exist particular 
conditions that make this contemporary crisis of work an anchor of emancipatory action. 
For them, this crisis is indicative not simply of a hopeless situation, but of the early stages 
of a transition into a new historical period known commonly as ‘postcapitalism.’ As Mason 
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(2015) writes, “we lie at a moment of possibility: of a controlled transition beyond the free 
market, beyond carbon, beyond compulsory work” (p.290). The unique characteristic of 
this period of capitalist development is the centrality of information and of highly 
developed machinery in contemporary production. Though it is true that this new form of 
production exists at the epicentre of the contemporary crisis of work, it is also responsible 
for the development of new social forces that continuously escape its grasp. For the 
thinkers of the post-work imaginary, it is in the struggle over these social forces that the 
future will be written. For whilst technological advancement exacerbates global 
inequalities and the proliferation of poverty, it also produces the precise conditions 
through which the transition beyond these things is possible. As Srnicek and Williams 
(2015) write, “rapid automation, expanding surplus populations and the continued 
imposition of austerity all heighten the need to rethink work and prepare for the new 
crises of capitalism” (p.86). The contemporary post-work imaginary pivots on the idea 
that workers can take advantage of developing technologies, automate production and 
thus liberate themselves from the drudgery of work.  
 For Mason (2015), the anchor of the new post-work imaginary is the abundance 
and availability of information in the twenty first century. For Mason (2015), information 
fundamentally alters (and undermines) the mechanics of capitalist production in a way 
that it is unprepared for. According to Mason (2015), “information technology, far from 
creating a new and stable form of capitalism, is dissolving it: corroding market 
mechanisms, eroding property rights and destroying the old relationship between wages, 
work and profit” (p.112). This argument rests on the fact that unlike traditional forms of 
production which were based upon a principle of scarcity and were therefore dictated by 
the laws of supply and demand, contemporary production is anchored in information as 
a raw material that transcends the problem of scarcity (Mason, 2015). With traditional 
‘material’ commodities, their consumption is often limited to one individual consumer at 
a time. The same, however, is not true with information. The ability to ‘copy and paste’ 
information means that information-based commodities have the potential to be enjoyed 
by multiple consumers at the same time without their supply ever diminishing (Mason, 
2015). As Mason (2015) writes, “once you can copy and paste something, it can be 
reproduced for free. It has, in economics-speak, a ‘zero marginal cost’” (p.117). According 
to Mason (2015), the mechanics of capitalist production are set in motion by the laws of 
supply and demand governed by the problem of scarcity. With information-based 
production, this problem is transcended and the anchor of capitalist production is 
therefore in crisis: “Until we had shareable information goods, the basic law of economics 
was that everything was scarce. Supply and demand assumes scarcity. Now certain goods 




 The characteristic ability of information to transcend the problem of scarcity 
means that, according to Mason (2015), the social relations of capitalism encounter a 
severe difficulty in controlling it in the way that they had other resources. In relation to 
resources such as land or fossil fuels, it had been much easier for the capitalist class to 
maintain a monopoly over these resources, due in part to the scarcity of these resources. 
However, it has become increasingly difficult for capitalism to maintain control over 
information in the same way, due to its ability to transcend scarcity and be shareable in 
ways that other more ‘material’ resources could not have been (Mason, 2015). Despite 
attempts made by capitalism to control this new resource – such as the implementation 
of copyright law or the hiding of information behind paywalls for example – Mason (2015) 
uses the proliferation of peer-to-peer and open-access platforms, based fundamentally 
upon information, in order to describe capitalism’s inability to control information as a 
resource. The emergence of websites such as Wikipedia and open-access operating 
systems such as Android, which are based upon the open sharing of information are 
evidence, according to Mason (2015), of the emergence of subversive forms of production 
taking place within the capitalist economy: “Decentralized action by individuals, working 
through cooperative, voluntary forms of organization. It is producing new forms of ‘peer-
to-peer’ economics, in which money is either absent or not the main measure of value” 
(Mason, 2015, p.128). Crucially, these subversive forms of production fundamentally 
challenge the organisation of work under capitalism. The wage-labour relation 
disappears, as the free and open access to information subverts the economic necessity 
and coercion that previously guided the wage-labour relation of traditional capitalism: “It 
is not money the participants are exchanging. They are in effect exchanging gifts” (Mason, 
2015, p.129). It is here that Mason (2015) locates the roots of a postcapitalist transition: 
in subversive forms of production anchored in a fundamental reorganisation of work. 
 The abundance of information not only facilitates cooperative working, but it also 
underpins the forward march of automation. Srnicek and Williams (2015) argue that 
information is the driving force of the contemporary machinery of capitalism: a reality 
which, they argue, has great emancipatory potential. Srnicek and Williams (2015) observe 
the historical development of capitalism in its tendency to continually automate ever-
greater parts of its production process. From the mechanisation of agricultural labour and 
craftwork in the nineteenth century, the displacement of skilled workers in the twentieth 
century by machines and office technologies and the growing automation of mass-
production thereafter signify the developmental stages of capitalist production. Today, the 
presence of information in production defines a new era of capitalist production, with 
automation markedly different from that which went before: 
 
The most recent wave of automation is poised to change this distribution of the 
labour market drastically, as it comes to encompass every aspect of the economy: 
81 
 
data collection (radio-frequency identification, big data); new kinds of production 
(the flexible production of robots, additive manufacturing, automated fast food); 
services (AI customer assistance, care for the elderly); decision-making 
(computational models, software agents); financial allocation (algorithmic 
trading); and especially distribution (the logistics revolution, self-driving cars, 
drone container ships and automated warehouses) (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, 
p.110-111). 
 
Crucially, for Srnicek and Williams (2015), the presence of information means that 
automation in the twenty first century has moved into jobs and employment sectors that 
would have otherwise been impossible to mechanise. Work once thought uniquely human, 
such as care work or work involving cognitive processing, is now, thanks to the abundance 
of information, potentially open to automation. As Srnicek and Williams (2015) write, 
“complex communication technologies are making computers better than humans at 
certain skilled-knowledge tasks, and advances in robotics are rapidly making technology 
better at a wide variety of manual-labour tasks” (p.111). 
 This emerging tendency of capitalist development towards the automation of vast 
swathes of work, combined with the ability of information-machines to produce wealth 
without human labour, presents society with the foundation for the full abolition of work 
(Srnicek & Williams, 2015). Whereas past movements have been founded upon the 
resistance to capitalist development, Srnicek and Williams (2015) argue that “the 
tendencies towards automation and the replacement of human labour should be 
enthusiastically accelerated and targeted as a political project of the left” (p.109). 
According to Srnicek and Williams (2015) the liberation of vast swathes of humans from 
work, combined with the proliferation of information sees capitalism incubate particular 
social forces that are beyond its control: “This is a project that takes an existing capitalist 
tendency and seeks to push it beyond the acceptable parameters of capitalist social 
relations” (p.109). Crucially, embracing automation alone is not sufficient for 
emancipation: rather, the free time that automation would inevitably open up, in order to 
escape the dystopia of perpetual poverty and precariousness, must be reinforced by a 
source of income untied from participation in wage-labour. 
 Srnicek and Williams (2015) complement their demand for automation with a 
demand for the implementation of a universal basic income (UBI). As automation reduces 
the demand for human workers, Srnicek and Williams (2015) argue that free time will 
surely increase, but that “this free time will be of little value if people continue struggling 
to make ends meet” (p.118). The concept of a UBI is premised on the payment to each 
individual, without means-testing, of a basic salary or income, regardless of the 
employment status of that individual (Srnicek & Williams, 2015; see also Standing, 2016). 
According to Srnicek and Williams (2015), it must fulfil three conditions: “It must provide 
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a sufficient amount of income to live on; it must be universal, provided to everyone 
unconditionally; and it must be a supplement to the welfare state rather than a 
replacement of it” (p.119, original emphasis). The fundamental aim of the UBI is not 
simply to provide an income for those liberated from work by machines, but also to 
necessarily alter the social position of work, decentralising it as the fundamental activity 
of societal value (Srnicek & Williams, 2015). The UBI will remove the tendency to value 
people only by virtue of the economic contribution that they make to society, allowing 
people both the time (thanks to automation) and now the resources (money through the 
UBI) to experiment with alternative social arrangements and activities: “It transforms 
precarity and unemployment from a state of insecurity to a state of voluntary flexibility” 
(Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.121). 
 The abundance of information, the automation of the labour process and the 
implementation of a UBI form the ‘material’ bedrock of the post-work imaginary: that is, 
the strategy for physically reducing the amount of work completed by human beings and 
satisfying their needs thereafter. But accompanying these ‘material’ considerations are 
those that Srnicek and Williams (2015) identify as ‘political’ considerations: those which 
underpin not simply the appearance of the labour process, but the socio-political 
positioning of work itself. As Srnicek and Williams (2015) write,  
 
The most difficult hurdles for UBI – and for a post-work society – are not 
economic, but political and cultural: political, because the forces that will mobilise 
against it are immense; and cultural, because work is so deeply ingrained into our 
very identity (p.123). 
 
The discussion of the potential to automate production and thereby move into a post-work 
society has prompted further considerations of the role of work in society and culture 
which is a prominent but often under-discussed element of the contemporary post-work 
imaginary. 
 For example, David Frayne’s (2015) central problematic pivots on the fact that 
even in the midst of such technological possibilities, the compulsion to work remains 
central to people’s lives and to the orientation of society and politics more generally. For 
Frayne (2015), critical social theory has been preoccupied with “trying to figure out why, 
in a time of unprecedented technological possibility, people’s lives [are] still characterised 
by toil and repression” (p.34). For Frayne (2015), the freeing-up of greater amounts of 
time for people through automation can only be successful alongside a cultural struggle 
against the dogma of work and the idea that work should define an individual’s place in 
society and the value of their contribution to it. The value of the post-work imaginary, for 
Frayne (2015), is not just the struggle against the inherent inequalities crystallised by 
contemporary forms of work, but more importantly the struggle against “the celebrated 
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prominence of work in the cultural, ethical and political life of advanced industrial 
societies” (p.14). The ‘material’ elements of the post-work imaginary – full automation 
and the establishment of a UBI – are useful only in so far as they facilitate this cultural 
struggle. 
 This argument is echoed in other similar critical accounts such as those of Peter 
Fleming (2014, 2015, 2017) and David Graeber (2013, 2018). For Fleming (2017), any 
effective post-work imaginary must immediately combat the way in which work itself has 
come to animate the human body, dictating its behaviour in all walks of life: jobs “are 
detached from their basis in productive utility and work becomes the wandering reference 
point for everything else. Not a concrete activity but an abstract and diffuse prism through 
which all of life is myopically evaluated and managed” (p.154). By stressing this material 
detachment, Fleming (2017) does not discount the usefulness of automation and the UBI 
in the achievement of a post-work world, but stresses that their success is dependent upon 
the consideration of work as a cultural and psychological force as well as a material one. 
For Graeber (2013, 2018), this finds its crystallisation in the phenomenon of ‘bullshit 
jobs’: jobs so detached from any material utility that their meaning is unclear or non-
existent. In fact, Graeber (2013) argues that these ‘bullshit jobs’ are the product of an 
ineffective cultural struggle against the dogmatism of work, as developing automation, 
rather than reducing the amount of ‘bullshit jobs’ available, has in fact led to their 
increase:  
 
Rather than allowing a massive reduction of working hours to free the world’s 
population to pursue their own projects, pleasures, visions, and ideas, we have 
seen the ballooning of not even so much of the ‘service’ sector as of the 
administrative sector, up to and including the creation of whole new industries 
like financial services or telemarketing, or the unprecedented expansion of sectors 
like corporate law, academic and health administration, human resources, and 
public relations (para.4). 
 
Set out here are the parameters of the contemporary post-work imaginary. Its material 
pillars appear to be the abundance of free information, the technological development of 
machinery and the establishment of a UBI, designed to replace the expenditure of human 
labour-power entirely within the labour process. It is complemented by a cultural and 
psychological struggle against the dogmatism of work in society and a reorganisation of 
the social principles that prioritise work as the valued human activity. Together, this post-
work imaginary thinks it both possible and necessary to transition into a post-work, 
postcapitalist society where human beings are freed of the responsibilities of production 





THE PROBLEM WITH POST-WORK 
 
There is, however, a problem with the post-work imaginary. Despite its radical outlook 
and its attempt to undermine the socio-economic centrality of work within society, the 
post-work imaginary exhibits a tendency towards the reproduction of the very 
productivist tropes that it seeks to undermine. Rather than radically challenging the 
traditional parameters of work and workers, the post-work imaginary in fact reinforces 
traditional views of work as a manual factory-based activity, simultaneously reinforcing 
masculinised and Eurocentric images of working subjectivity too. It is a troubling 
tendency that Kathi Weeks (2016) recognises in her own critique of the post-work 
imaginary: 
 
Although they may appear to be categories of nonwork, they fail to escape the 
imaginary of productivity or the models of the subject that would deliver it. My 
point is that because these notions of work’s refusal are still under the sway of its 
ethics, the models of nonwork they generate are too locked within the orbit of work 
as we now know it to push us very far beyond its gravity (p.257-258). 
 
In this way, the post-work imaginary does not do enough to confront the shared 
correspondence of its own vision to that of power itself: the precise power responsible for 
the enforcement of work’s position within capitalist society. The post-work imaginary has 
been dogged from the beginning by the fact that it constantly had to tread the line between 
freedom and hell in advocating an abolition of work. What’s increasingly clear is that the 
post-work imaginary does not adequately articulate the precise separation between itself 
and power, a shortcoming that sees it reinforcing the norms from which it seeks escape.  
 One of the first points of tension is the post-work imaginary’s treatment of 
automation and technology. A prevailing critique of this post-work imaginary among a 
number of sociologists is that there exists a tendency within this post-work imaginary to 
forget the class character of technology, machinery and information and treat it as a 
neutral resource as opposed to a product of definite and unequal social relations (Pitts, 
2017; Spencer, 2016; Thompson & Briken, 2017). It is not true to say that the class 
character of machinery and technology is totally ignored by the theorists of the post-work 
imaginary. For example, Srnicek and Williams (2015) argue that one of the fundamental 
failures of the Soviet Union was its lack of appreciation for the class character of the 
capitalist productive machinery that it attempted to repurpose for the construction of a 
communist society: “The ambitious plan to conquer the capitalist means of production 
ran aground on the reality that power relationships are embedded within technologies, 
which cannot therefore be infinitely bent towards purposes that oppose their very 
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functioning” (p.151). However, when it comes to the imagination of social futures based 
upon the emancipatory potential of productive technologies, this tendency emerges and 
the post-work thinkers forget their own lessons. Whilst there is a critical analysis of 
‘traditionally’ capitalist technologies such as machinery, ‘new’ technologies such as data 
and information are treated as though they extend beyond the grasp of capitalist social 
relations and therefore provide a firm basis for social emancipation. For example, Mason 
(2015) discusses data and information in the context of “a revolution in the way we 
process, store and communicate information…[that] has started to corrode the traditional 
property relations of capitalism” (p.142). For a number of critics, such a position relies on 
a particular ignorance of the unequal social relations bound up in these new technologies. 
For example, Spencer (2016) writes that “the authors fail to recognize how digital 
technologies are themselves products of unequal power – they are not neutral as such, but 
rather created, harnessed and reproduced under conditions where power resides with 
capital, not labour” (p.145). Pitts (2017) further develops this critique, arguing that the 
fetishism of information and data in this way sees productive technology stripped of its 
class character and reduced to a set of quantitative economic exchanges: “Postcapitalists 
like Mason would have us believe value relates not to abstract social forms, but quantities 
of inputs and outputs. Indeed, their politics of the future depends upon it” (p.333).  
Tellingly, this is the precise criticism that Althusser (2014) made in his own confrontation 
of post-work thinkers in the mid-to-late twentieth century: “While the capitalist mode of 
production does indeed produce objects of social utility, it produces them only under the 
aegis of very specific relations of production…that simultaneously make them relations of 
exploitation” (p.30-31, original emphasis). Emerging here are the consequences of 
ideology upon the post-work imaginary (which will be explicated in due course), as key 
social relations of work are mystified for the benefit of a particular analytical direction. 
 This mystification is dangerous because it sees the post-work imaginary reproduce 
the productivist tropes from which it seeks a desperate escape. Despite Srnicek’s and 
Williams’ (2013) insistence that “there can be no return to Fordism…premised on the 
production paradigm of the orderly factory environment” (para.17), the stomping ground 
of the “white (male) workers” (para.17), it is precisely these parameters of productivism 
that the post-work imaginary reproduces and reinforces. Its disproportionate 
concentration on the forces of production “bears out a disavowed productivist temptation 
towards the factory” (Pitts, 2017, p.333) in the post-work imaginary. Here again, in the 
thinking of technology in relation to potential post-work futures, the relationship of class 
struggle to the appearance and deployment of machinery disappears and the post-work 
imaginary reproduces a productivist image of work as a set of value-producing material 
operations, with the social relations and other material operations that exist outside of 
this definition (but nonetheless contribute to its appearance) completely obfuscated from 




The post-work literature is productivist insofar as it sees ‘work’ as the central 
relation of capitalist society and not as the antagonistic relations of property, 
ownership and subsistence that logically and historically precede a society in 
which most people are compelled to sell their labour to live, nor the specific kind 
of results assumed by the products of that labour in the market. In so doing it 
remains locked within a capitalist understanding of what is productive and what 
is not, despite professions otherwise (p.4). 
 
Paradoxically, the post-work imaginary at once criticises contemporary capitalism for 
concretely deciding what is and is not productive (prioritising wage-labour activities over 
other activities of social utility such as poetry, art and care for example) and then, in the 
same movement, unwittingly emphasises that it is the productive forces of capitalism, in 
particular information and automation, that are the sole location of productive activity. It 
celebrates activity outside of work but overlooks its own reproduction of capitalist 
productivist ideology by fetishizing the forces of production as the most important site of 
productive activity. In this way, the post-work imaginary overlooks its own reinforcement 
of capitalist ideology: “Despite different politics, our present-day post-work dreamers 
desire much the same flat-white future as the so-called ‘productivity ninjas’ that spring 
from the Silicon Valley subculture of pop-optimism and personal optimisation” (Pitts & 
Dinerstein, 2017, p.7).  
 A feminist analysis further amplifies this point. The post-work imaginary does not 
have a great deal to say about the social relations of the family and the dialectical 
relationship between these and the workplace. Rather, patriarchal capitalist social 
relations are simply assumed to be cleared away with the abolition of work. For example, 
Srnicek and Williams (2015) write that the UBI is “a fundamentally feminist proposal” 
(p.122) because “its disregard for the gendered division of labour overcomes the biases of 
the traditional welfare state predicated upon a male breadwinner” (p.122). They continue, 
arguing that the provision of this income will enable “experimentation with different 
forms of family and community structure that are no longer bound to the model of the 
privatised nuclear family” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.122). However, Srnicek and 
Williams (2015) here overlook the fact that, though work and the family are certainly 
related, they each contain unique social relations that demand individual critique. By 
eradicating this difference, the post-work imaginary unwittingly reinforces the very 
ideology beneath which the feminist analysis of reproductive labour has historically been 
suppressed both by patriarchal capitalism but also by leftist critiques that did not 
adequately critique this ideology. The post-work imaginary here overlooks the central 
feminist argument that reproduction under capitalism cannot simply be ‘included’ in an 
analysis of work but demands a unique critique in the context of the wage-labour relation.  
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 Weeks (2011) has drawn greater attention to this oversight, particularly in relation 
to key demands of the post-work imaginary such as automation and the UBI. For if a UBI 
is to be, as Srnicek and Williams (2015) argue, a ‘fundamentally feminist proposal’, then 
it cannot begin the question of ‘work’ but must begin with the question of reproduction. 
In her text The Problem with Work, Weeks (2011) argues that reproduction is not only 
missing from dominant post-work imaginaries but provides an altogether more useful 
starting-point for thinking about post-work society. Weeks (2011) shows that dominant 
post-work imaginaries struggle in their objective to trouble the ideological and cultural 
centrality of work in society, primarily because they reproduce these ideological notions 
by upholding the false separation between the relations inside work and those outside of 
it. A feminist consideration of reproduction, however, does a much better job at this, 
because it problematises this false division and forces attention towards the actual source 
of work’s cultural domination: namely its social relations, that extend beyond the factory 
walls. For Weeks (2011), this is the value of feminist campaigns in the mid-to-late 
twentieth century, such as the Wages for Housework Movement: 
 
By naming part of what happens in the family as work, the demand for wages 
confounds the division between work as a site of coercion and regimentation and 
the family as a freely invented site of authentic and purely voluntary relations 
(p.129). 
 
In drawing attention to the fact that the family and reproduction more generally is 
regulated by unique social relations, dominant pillars of the post-work imaginary such as 
the UBI suddenly become ineffective, as the problem with reproduction is not simply that 
it is unwaged but the fact that change to the relationship between capital and labour alone 
is insufficient in ending capitalist exploitation (Weeks, 2011). This argument comes to a 
head in Weeks’ (2016) other writings, in which the route to a post-work imaginary is 
argued to begin not with a cultural struggle against the imposition of work, but with a 
fundamental re-centring of the struggle against gender and gendered ideology. 
 Moreover, and staying with the concept of a UBI, it is not clear to what extent a 
UBI is radically incompatible with the aims and ends of a developing capitalist society. 
For example, in an analysis of UBI experimentation in Finland, Bruenig et al. (2017) 
argued that the UBI did not so much decouple income from work and alleviate the 
pressures of insecurity from the shoulders of workers but was in fact mobilised as a way 
of reducing state benefits even further and used as a disciplinary tool to continue to 
incentivise people into work. Moreover, it was in fact a convenient subsidy for low-paying 
employers, who felt justified in further withholding particular workplace benefits and in 
continuing to strangle wages (Bruenig et al., 2017). In this example, “what started as the 
dream proposal of left-leaning wonks everywhere had, once filtered through the political 
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process, mutated into the UBI-as-workhouse nightmare” (Bruenig et al. 2017, para.19). 
Others have echoed this, arguing that “the most viable forms of basic income would 
universalize precarious labor and extend the sphere of the market – just as the gurus of 
Silicon Valley hope” (Zamora, 2017, para.9). The UBI is not so much an adequate response 
to crisis but an indicator of its arrival. “It’s what botanists would call a ‘bioindicator’: it 
indexes neoliberalism’s progress. Support for basic incomes proliferates where neoliberal 
reforms have been the most devastating” (Zamora, 2017, para.8).  
 Building on this, it is important to trouble the notions of ‘precarity’ and 
precariousness that so often follow these discussions. For those like Guy Standing (2016), 
precariousness is the defining characteristic of the contemporary crisis of work, the 
reduction of which is centralised as one of the key aims of automation and the UBI. 
Standing (2016) uses precariousness as a way of defining the existence of an entirely new 
class in society. The ‘precariat,’ according to Standing (2016) is “a growing mass of people 
– potentially all of us outside the elite, anchored in their wealth and detachment from 
society – in situations that can only be described as alienated, anomic, anxious and prone 
to anger” (p.28). However, as Alberti et al. (2018) write, the description of class on the 
basis of precariousness alone precludes particular social relations and ideologies that 
ultimately define and describe class experience: “Class, however, is about more than 
classification. The relationship between labour and capital is a dynamic one: the 
imperatives of capital accumulation lead to new and constantly evolving demands on 
workers and governments” (p.449). In this way, precariousness is not a particularly 
helpful pivot of analysis because “there is no one group for whom precarity is a unique 
hallmark; precarity is instead theorized as inherent to all labour-capital relationships, to 
varying degrees” (Alberti et al., 2018, p.449). 
 This last point on ‘varying degrees’ of precariousness is important to stress as well, 
because the notion of precariousness as a new or unique phenomenon also precludes 
gendered and racialised voices for whom this condition has been the norm rather than the 
exception. In relying on precariousness as the defining characteristic of the crisis of work, 
it reproduces a particular Eurocentrism, focused on an immediate change in 
circumstances to an otherwise stable social norm. In other words, precariousness 
describes an aberration from the stable, secure and formal forms of employment that were 
predominant in Europe during the twentieth century. But this is precisely the point: these 
stable forms of employment were a European phenomenon not a global one and relied 
implicitly on the precariousness of other, much larger populations, such as women and 
those in the colonies. Contrary to the assertions of the post-work imaginary, “if we look at 
capitalism in a wider historical and geographical scope, it is precarity that is the norm and 
not Fordist economic organization” (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008, p.54). 
Neilson’s and Rossiter’s (2008) argument precedes much of the literature 
discussed in relation to the post-work imaginary, but its argument is nonetheless 
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applicable to the problematisation of its discourse. Neilson and Rossiter (2008) 
acknowledge a disproportionate presence of the concept of precariousness and precarity 
in the development of Western social science, emerging particularly in the early twenty 
first century, in which it is valorised as the defining concept of contemporary 
considerations of work and subjectivity within sociological analyses. As Neilson and 
Rossiter (2008) write in relation to this emerging discourse, “at base was an attempt to 
identify or imagine precarious, contingent or flexible workers as a new kind of political 
subject, replete with their own forms of collective organization and modes of expression” 
(p.52). The problem with this discourse is that the concept of precariousness is not 
centralised in the same way in sociological critiques developed outside of North America 
and Western Europe, as ‘precariousness’ does not present itself as a discernible and 
unique characteristic of work in other parts of the world (Neilson & Rossiter, 2008). 
Neilson and Rossiter (2008) argue that this is because ‘precariousness’ is a fundamentally 
Western phenomenon that describes a deviation from a brief period of stability in the 
history of Western capitalism, whilst precariousness never came and went for the rest of 
the world: rather, it was described simply as work. As the post-1945 welfare state 
disintegrated in Western Europe, the concept of precariousness and of post-Fordism came 
into fruition in Western social science. But these terms are more descriptive of the inward-
looking nature of Western social science as opposed to the sociology of work itself (Neilson 
& Rossiter, 2008). The post-work imaginary is founded in precisely the same Western 
intellectual movement, routinely locating the contemporary crisis of work in the decline 
of the welfare state, the emergence of neoliberalism and the shift to post-Fordist or post-
industrial economic eras: “The 1970s created a major shift within these general 
conditions, away from secure employment and unwieldy industrial behemoths and 
towards flexible labour and lean business models” (Srnicek, 2016, p.34). 
This is problematic because it demonstrates that the post-work imaginary, even 
in attempting to decentralise traditional considerations of work, continues to reinforce 
them. It is an exclusionary consideration of work that overlooks racialised and gendered 
forms of work, instead concentrating on work as a mutual, albeit antagonistic, 
relationship between worker and employer. The post-work imaginary’s critique of 
capitalism – a mode of production they define as “the relationship between proletariat 
and employers, with waged work mediating between them” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, 
p.92) – is levelled on the basis of a very particular, closed and modern conceptualisation 
of work imbued with the very ideological characteristics of the concept from which they 
themselves are trying to break. In the context of Neilson’s and Rossiter’s (2008) 
argument, the post-work imaginary here fails to problematise the precise ideologies that 
normalise dominant considerations of ‘work’ in the first place and the social relations they 
reflect: “The dominant theorization of post-Fordism leaves no room for the construction 
of new forms of political subjectivity or the invention of new institutional forms” (p.58). 
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Through these various examples, it is evident the extent to which the analysis of 
the contemporary post-work imaginary suffers considerable limitations due primarily to 
its repeated mystification of key social relations of work. Class antagonisms in all their 
racialised and gendered forms and the reflections of these antagonisms in specific social 
relations of work are repeatedly missing. The consequences of these missing points of 
analysis are dangerous: on the one hand, the post-work imaginary reproduces the very 
images of traditional work and workers that it continually professes to break with; but 
also, the post-work imaginary also fails to adequately create distance between itself and 
contemporary capitalism, unconvincingly pointing towards freedom in the face of a 
potential hell. The question with which the sociology of work is faced, therefore, is the 
question of where, precisely, this theoretical weakness of the post-work imaginary stems 
from. What will be made clear is that the epicentre of this repeated mystification of social 
relations is ideological in character, rooted in the formulation of a problematic based not 
upon the analysis of the social relations of work, but upon the historical struggle of Man 
against alienation. 
 
HUMANISM AND THE POST-WORK IMAGINARY 
 
Developing this analysis, this chapter argues that the theoretical weakness of the 
contemporary post-work imaginary so far examined stems from its contact with and 
interpretation of Marx’s political economy: specifically, the humanist works of the Young 
Marx (1981). The contemporary post-work imaginary is founded fundamentally in a 
Marxist-humanist interpretation of labour, lifted from Marx’s (1981) Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. The argument is that the abundance of information, 
combined with the free time opened up for workers by automation, has seen (and will see) 
workers re-discover the original truth of the ‘natural’ sociality of their labour. The 
argument continues that information, automation and the cooperative working platforms 
that open up out of them are nothing less than a social expression of unalienated labour, 
of essentially cooperative human characteristics put to work. Information and automation 
are valorised within the post-work imaginary, precisely due to their propensity to capture 
and deploy human labour as a socially cooperative activity outside of capitalism. In the 
post-work imaginary, “nothing has changed about our humanity. It’s just that our human 
desire to make friends, build relationships based on mutual trust and obligation, fulfilling 
emotional and psychological needs, has spilled over into economic life” (Mason, 2015, 
p.130). Crucially, this humanist ideological interpretation of labour mystifies the social 
relations within the post-work imaginary, as these social relations increasingly occupy 
only a complementary role in relation to the main historical event taking place in the 
consideration of ‘postcapitalism’: namely, the historical overcoming by the human subject 
of its alienated condition.  
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 Within popular social scientific discourses, authors such as Mason (2015), Srnicek 
and Williams (2015) and others such as Aaron Bastani (2019) have been the leading voices 
in forwarding this argument. These authors rely heavily on humanist ideology in order to 
frame their thinking about the relationship between work and technology, which will be 
developed more fully throughout the course of this chapter. Despite the polemical 
character of these contributions, there is evidence to suggest that these contributions have 
been formative in a trend of thinking that is increasingly popular within more academic 
contributions to the sociology of work and employment. David Spencer (2018) cites these 
accounts approvingly in the context of the sociology of work, arguing that they are 
indicative of how “the loss of work has captivated the attention of writers across the 
intellectual and political spectrum and how this idea has fed different visions of the future 
in which automation serves to curtail the volume of work” (p.2). Increasingly, this post-
work imaginary has been formative in the development of a sociological imagination 
about the future of work and the future of human subjectivity in the context of these 
changes (Celentano, 2019; Chessell, 2018; Means, 2017; Snape et al., 2017). In response 
to this prevailing post-work imaginary, a number of critiques have also emerged, 
including particularly important contributions from the perspective of labour process 
theory (Thompson & Briken, 2017) and social reproduction theory (Dinerstein & Pitts, 
2018). It is to this critical response that this chapter adds, arguing that theoretical 
problems with the post-work imaginary identified in these accounts are rooted in the 
persistence of humanist ideological tropes throughout its formulations. 
 This is not the first argument to suggest that the theoretical weakness of the post-
work imaginary stems from its interaction with Marx’s work. Pitts’ (2017) critique of the 
post-work imaginary argues that this theoretical weakness pivots on its interaction with 
Marx’s (1974) ‘Fragment on Machines’ in the Grundrisse: a theoretical malaise that Pitts 
(2017) defines as ‘Fragment-thinking’ (p.328). Here, this chapter argues that 
understanding the theoretical weakness of the post-work imaginary must include the 
analysis of its interaction not only with the ‘Fragment’, but with the Manuscripts and with 
Marx’s (1981) early works. This is because the problems of the post-work imaginary are 
not simply problems of interpretation, but problems of ideology. The theorists of the post-
work imaginary have not simply mis-interpreted key Marxist concepts: rather, it is 
increasingly clear that they have adopted an entire theoretical framework that prevents a 
fuller understanding of the social relations of work, the character of which is ideologically 
humanist. The clues as to the adoption of this philosophy by the post-work imaginary lies 
in its direct and indirect contact with the humanist ideological works of the Young Marx 
(1981).  
 The interaction with Marx’s work is clearly influential upon the theorists of the 
contemporary post-work imaginary. Srnicek and Williams (2013) describe him as “the 
paradigmatic accelerationist thinker” (para.11) who understood that the development of 
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the forces of production under capitalism “were not to be reversed but accelerated beyond 
the constraints the capitalist value form” (para.11). For Mason (2015), Marx was the first 
to imagine “an economy in which the main role of machines was to produce, and the main 
role of people was to supervise them” (p.134), adding that “he was clear that in such an 
economy the main productive force would be information” (p.134). Marx is an important 
figure in the post-work imaginary not simply because he justifies the undertaking of a 
critique of work but because he appears compatible with the strategies and analysis of this 
discourse: namely, the embracing of capitalism’s own technological development as the 
basis for economic transition into a ‘postcapitalist’ era. 
It has generally been accepted that the main point of interaction between this 
contemporary post-work imaginary and Marx, has been with a particular section of Marx’s 
(1974) Grundrisse: commonly known as the ‘Fragment on Machines.’ In this passage, 
Marx (1974) described how automation and the greater introduction of machinery into 
the labour process was a manifestation of the centrality of knowledge and information in 
production. Whereas other manual tools required the human application of knowledge in 
order to function (the pick-axe required the miner; the typewriter demanded the typist; 
the vacuum-cleaner demanded the housewife or cleaner), machines had the propensity to 
store this knowledge, with human workers simply occupying a supervisory role (Marx, 
1974). For Marx (1974), automation was indicative of the way in which knowledge could 
be reinvested into the labour process as fixed capital in a way that was impossible with 
other tools in the labour process. Moreover, given the propensity of machines to liberate 
human beings from the labour process, Marx (1974) argued that this knowledge was 
increasingly incubated in a ‘general intellect’ across the workers which, once reinvested 
into production in the form of fixed capital, had a potentially revolutionary consequence, 
freeing human workers from wage-labour, expanding free time for all, whilst still ensuring 
the needs of society are met (Marx, 1974). The importance of this passage was first 
stressed by Negri (1991) in Marx Beyond Marx, influencing a generation of European 
Marxists such as Paulo Virno, Franco Berardi and Yann Moulier-Boutang. The 
contemporary post-work imaginary develops out of the legacy of this strand of Marxist 
thought. As Pitts (2017) writes, “postcapitalism, accelerationism, fully automated luxury 
communism: all owe their roots to the Fragment” (p.326). There is a clear compatibility 
between the ‘Fragment’ and the contemporary post-work imaginary, with Mason (2015) 
describing its content as “possibly the most revolutionary idea Marx ever had” (p.138).  
For some, the problems of the post-work imaginary start and end with its 
interaction with this ‘Fragment.’ In his own critique of the post-work imaginary, Pitts 
(2017) argues that the theoretical weakness of the post-work imaginary stems from its 
misunderstanding of the Marxist concept of the value-form. For the theorists of the post-
work imaginary, value is treated not as an abstract form but as a quantifiable entity, 
corresponding to a set of inputs and outputs within the capitalist production process 
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(Pitts, 2017). The theory of ‘crisis’ on which the postcapitalist discourse is predicated is 
one that develops out of an apparent ‘crisis of value’ within contemporary production, due 
primarily to the abundance of information as the raw material of contemporary 
production and its ability to be ‘copied and pasted’ indefinitely. This, combined with the 
simultaneous liberation of human beings from the labour process due to automation, 
divorces the link between labour-time and exchange value, therefore sparking the crisis of 
capitalism that catalyses the shift into a ‘postcapitalist’ era (Pitts, 2017). However, Pitts 
(2017) argues that the interpretation of this as a ‘Marxist’ theory of value is fundamentally 
mistaken. On the one hand, for all their emphasis on the principle of ‘immaterial labour’ 
such as the production of information, the theorists of the post-work imaginary are far too 
material in their analysis (Pitts, 2017). Their critique of work and production “like most 
conventional value theory…emphasize[s] labour’s concrete expenditure over its 
abstraction” (Pitts, 2017, p.333). A Marxist labour theory of value, on the other hand, 
stresses the importance not of value but of value-form, which is not to describe concrete 
labour alone, “but…its commensuration in commodity exchange” (Pitts, 2017, p.333): a 
process which implicates, in the first instance, the social relations of production as well 
as its forces. This leads Pitts (2017) to his second criticism, which is that the theorists of 
the post-work imaginary, in the same breath, are not material enough due to the 
bracketing of these social relations of production from their analysis: “Fragment-thinking 
is nowhere near materialist enough, eliding the persistence of the social relations 
concealed and implied in changes in the immediate content of work” (p.334).  
For Pitts (2017), this is the epicentre of the theoretical weakness of the post-work 
imaginary. For all its reliance on Marx, it is a discourse that isn’t Marxist enough, basing 
its entire functionality and logic on a mis-reading of Marx’s concept of value-form. This 
mis-reading precludes particular social relations from view, underpinning its continuous 
reproduction of the very productivist image of work from which it seeks to break (Pitts, 
2017). However, if there is one lesson to be learned from Althusser’s (1996) critique of 
those who mis-read Marx, it is that the nature of these mis-interpretations is always 
ideological. The theoretical weakness of the post-work imaginary is not rooted in mis-
interpretation alone: rather, these mis-interpretations are always signifiers of a deeper 
ideological malaise, of a deeper problematic that frames the discourse in its entirety. 
Through deeper analysis, conducted through the prism of ideology, it can be shown that 
the preclusion by the post-work imaginary of these social relations of work is the product 
of a persistent and pervasive humanist ideological base that sits at the core of its analysis. 
In order to understand this more fully, it is important to interrogate the relationship of 
the post-work imaginary to another of Marx’s texts: not only the Grundrisse, but the 
Manuscripts of 1844. 
In an article for the New Statesman, Mason (2018) set about explaining ‘The 
Meaning of Marxism Today’, in a detour through the work of Raya Dunayevskaya: a 
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vanguard of Marxist-humanist philosophy and secretary to Leon Trotsky. Mason (2018) 
writes that her work “provides the link between classic Marxism and the only form in 
which it can be relevant today. ‘Marxism,’ she would insist, ‘is radical humanism’” (p.27, 
emphasis added). In this remarkable article, Mason (2018), as one of the foremost 
contributors to the postcapitalist discourse and its attendant post-work imaginary, refers 
directly to Marx’s (1981) Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, locating in them 
“an idea lost to Marxism” (p.29); the idea that “the real goal of human history is individual 
freedom and self-realisation” (p.29). Mason (2018) here combines, in explicit terms, his 
reading of the ‘Fragment on Machines’ in the Grundrisse with the Young Marx of the 
Manuscripts, to set out the ‘truly’ Marxist notion on which the vision of postcapitalism 
must rest: “Freed from work by the advance of automation, Marx had foreseen how 
humanity would use its leisure time: for the ‘free development of the individual’, not some 
collectivist utopia” (Mason, 2018, p.29). 
The apparent compatibility between Marxist-humanism and this contemporary 
post-work imaginary is quite surprising given the post-human considerations of data, 
information, machines and cyborgs and the interconnection of these agents in networks 
of production that is so often central to ‘postcapitalist’ thinking. It is also surprising given 
the explicit attempts that it makes to distance itself from universal considerations of 
humanity and its related social constructions (such as race, sexuality, ability and gender). 
It is a discourse that develops out of the ‘anti-humanism’ of Antonio Negri (2017) who 
describes this project as “the refusal of all essentialist modes of individuation, the firm 
negation of the identity of the subject” (p.2), with the revolutionary actor by no means a 
‘Man’ but an “assemblage of singularities [that] have the power to enable language to 
function, or rather to be able to trigger and transmit creation” (p.2). Indeed, Srnicek and 
Williams (2015) are firm in their assertion that “there is no authentic human essence to 
be realised, no harmonious unity to be returned to, no unalienated humanity obscured by 
false mediations, no organic wholeness to be achieved” (p.82). However, what is 
increasingly apparent is that Mason’s (2018) article is not an aberration or exception from 
an otherwise consistently anti-humanist discourse. Rather, the compatibility between 
these Marxist-humanist arguments and the post-work imaginary points to a deeper and 
more consistent ideological problem that effects the whole discourse.  
The reason that there is such compatibility is because the post-work imaginary 
turns on what is a fundamentally humanist ideological conception of labour that is found 
first not in the Grundrisse, but in the Manuscripts so celebrated by Mason (2018). In 
particular, it turns on the concept of ‘social labour’ lifted from the political economy of the 
Young Marx (1981), which stresses the existence of inherently cooperative characteristics 
in both human beings and their labour, with this cooperation denoting their 
exceptionalism from other animals. As discussed in Chapter One of this thesis, labour was 
argued by the Young Marx (1981) to be the social expression par excellence of the inherent 
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cooperative tendency of the human species, with capitalist organisations of labour relying 
fundamentally on the alienation of the human species from this natural tendency, wherein 
their labour was put to use in the production of capital for private hands. It is an argument 
readily available on the pages of Marx’s (1981) Manuscripts: for example, he wrote of 
“communism…as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man; 
communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e. human) 
being” (p.90, original emphasis). Importantly, Marx (1981) made an equivalence between 
‘social’ and ‘human’ beings, arguing that the social characteristics of human labour are 
inherent to its species-being: in other words that human labour is a ‘naturally’ social 
(cooperative) enterprise, which is alienated under capitalism but set free in the transition 
towards communism. 
This ideological consideration of labour is problematic because nowhere in its 
formulations do the social relations of work appear. However, as an ideological problem 
it is more severe than merely a mis-reading or mis-interpretation: rather, this problem 
affects this discourse’s entire framing of the problem of work from the outset. Before it 
even arrives at the automated labour process described by Marx (1974) in the Grundrisse, 
its very posing of the question of ‘what is the problem with work?’ is framed from its 
conception by its ideological roots in this Marxist-humanist concept of labour. Therefore, 
it is not simply that the social relations of work become mystified, but they are simply 
rendered unimportant, providing nothing more than considerable externalities to the 
main historical event taking place in the observation of ‘work’: that is, the alienation by 
capitalism of ‘Man’ from his essential species-activity and the struggle of the worker to 
overcome this alienation. In this way, humanism isn’t just the vehicle through which the 
conclusions of the post-work imaginary are carried: rather, humanism provides the post-
work imaginary with its entire problematic, its complete set of postulates with which to 
proceed (Althusser, 1996) and it is precisely this ideological operation that forecloses the 
production of sociological theory and precludes the social relations of work. Thus, Mason’s 
(2018) article, celebrating the ‘lost idea’ of humanism in Marx, is by no means an 
aberration but is a comfortable and in no way contradictory expression of the “silent 
anthropology” (Althusser, 2015b, p.315) already present in the post-work imaginary. 
Crucially, this must be the starting-point from which the post-work imaginary’s 
interaction with the ‘Fragment’ is analysed. It is this humanist ideological approach to the 
concept of labour that foregrounds its theoretical weakness that reproduces its 
“Fragment-thinking” (Pitts, 2017, p.328) and its related shortcomings. Indeed, this 
ideological problematic is plainly observable. Take for example this oft-cited passage from 
Marx’s (1974) ‘Fragment’: 
 
The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social 
knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, 
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the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the 
general intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the 
powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form of 
knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process 
(p.706, emphasis added). 
 
What is of importance here is Marx’s (1974) description of the ‘social’ character of 
knowledge and information in its deployment in the capitalist labour process and its 
subsequent incubation in the ‘general intellect.’ A Marxist reading of the ‘social’ character 
of knowledge would argue that to describe this character is to describe its form in relation 
to the capitalist mode of production. The characteristics of knowledge or information are 
defined not by inherent characteristics but by “the material conditions of their 
production” (Marx & Engels, 1998, p.37), crystallised in a given mode of production 
(found in the combination between the forces and relations of production). However, it is 
clear to see how the functioning of the contemporary post-work imaginary depends upon 
a more humanist reading of the word ‘social’, found in the political economy of the Young 
Marx (1981) and of the concept of ‘social labour’ already discussed. Crucially, the 
emancipatory potential of the ‘social’ character of knowledge is located precisely in the 
spontaneously and inherently cooperative forms of labour that it inspires among a group 
of individuals now freed from the responsibilities of production by automation. 
 This is particularly evident in Mason’s (2015) considerations of postcapitalism 
and of the post-work imaginary. Mason (2015) places a great deal of importance upon 
Marx’s (1974) concept of ‘general intellect’ “which appears nowhere else – before or after 
– in his entire writings” (Mason, 2015, p.136) as, for Mason (2015) it is the precise vehicle 
in which the historical transition into ‘postcapitalism’ is made.  Crucially, the ‘general 
intellect’ is the primary expression of the ‘social’ nature of knowledge and information in 
contemporary production: “In an economy where machines do most of the work, where 
human labour is really about supervising, mending and designing the machines, the 
nature of the knowledge locked inside the machines must, [Marx] writes, be ‘social’” 
(Mason, 2015, p.134). However, the meaning behind this word ‘social’ and the realities 
that it describes only make sense in the context of a humanist framing and bear 
remarkable similarity to the concept of ‘social labour’ found in the Young Marx (1981). For 
Mason (2015), information becomes social to the extent to which it is produced and 
exercised by human individuals freed of the obligations of production by automation. The 
social character of knowledge is produced precisely by human beings who, thanks to the 
development of automation, are freed of the responsibilities of production and are 




Non-market forms of production and exchange exploit the basic human tendency 
to collaborate – to exchange gifts of intangible value – which has always existed 
but in the margins of economic life. This is more than simply a rebalancing 
between public goods and private goods: it is a whole new and revolutionary thing. 
The proliferation of these non-market economic activities is making it possible for 
a cooperative, socially just society to emerge (p.143, emphasis added). 
 
This is what Mason (2015) is referring to when he refers to the ‘social’ characteristics of 
information and indeed, this is how he interprets Marx’s (1974) meaning of the word too. 
Information is ‘social’ insofar as it incentivises these non-market forms of exchange that 
are predicated on this ‘basic human tendency’ to co-operate with one another. Describing 
peer-to-peer platforms such as Wikipedia, Mason (2015) describes how “it is not money 
the participants are exchanging. They are in effect exchanging gifts. And as 
anthropologists have long realized, the gift is only the physical symbol of something more 
intangible: call it goodwill, or happiness” (p.129).  
 In this way, information and automation are vehicles of emancipation in the first 
instance not because they create a crisis of value (this is added later), but because they 
combat the historical alienation of the human subject under capitalism and encourage the 
participation of human beings in socially co-operative labour as the very expression of 
their humanity. However, such ideological considerations entirely mystify the social 
relations of work from view because they are not important to the story being told or the 
problematic that is here addressed. For example the role of class struggle in determining 
the position of machinery within the labour process is not here included; the social 
relations of the labour process (the relations of production) are here invisible, as 
production is treated simply as a set of inputs and outputs that facilitate a particular social 
reaction; it treats the outside of work – the realm in which this ‘basic human tendency’ is 
fostered – as a politically neutral site, outside of capital, without its own social relations 
on which production depends (namely, the relations of reproduction). All of these things 
are hidden behind a formulation of production which turns on the basic ideological 
premise that labour is an essentially human activity merely unlocked by the forces of 
production, rather than one defined entirely by a given mode of production. 
 This humanist ideological problem is evident not only in the economic dimension 
of the post-work imaginary, but also in its politics too. Srnicek and Williams (2015) 
describe the political project that underpins the post-work imaginary as the defence of a 
so-called ‘left modernity’ (p.70). This fits with the accelerationist commitment to embrace 
the development of capitalism by arguing that instead of resisting modernity as a 
reflection of capitalism, the politics of the post-work imaginary must be predicated on a 
reclamation of the principles of modernity for itself: “Suggesting that history can progress 
through deliberate human action, it is the nature of this progress that competing 
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definitions of modernity have struggled over” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.72). Carefully, 
humanism is brought out into the ‘broad daylight’ of critique (Althusser, 2003, p.261), as 
Srnicek and Williams (2015) do not celebrate the universal humanism that is brought 
along with modernity but instead describe this ‘left modernity’ as “a humanism that is not 
defined in advance. This is a project of self-realisation, but one without a pre-established 
endpoint” (p.82). This is a tactic used by Srnicek and Williams (2015) to allow for their 
inclusions of the multitude in their theory, as a fluid, de-gendered and cybernetically 
augmented mass as opposed to the modern capitalist conception of Man. 
 However, the image of Man does not disappear from the stage but lurks again in 
the theoretical background. This is clear in the explication of the aims of ‘left modernity’ 
as a political project. In tandem with the economic conditions of postcapitalism, Srnicek 
and Williams (2015) describe this ‘postcapitalism’ and the post-work imaginary – as the 
manifestations of the principles of ‘left modernity’ – as the conclusion of a “process of 
revision and construction” (p.82-83) completed by human individuals, through which 
“humanity can come to know itself” (p.82-83). Here, again, the central political 
problematic of ‘postcapitalism’ is observed in the historical struggle of human beings 
against their alienation and their presentation of an alienated self that is demanded of 
them by capitalism. Thus, accelerationism and ‘postcapitalism’ are desirable insofar as 
they fit with the political problematic of this ‘left modernity’: that is, the struggle (through 
socially cooperative forms of labour) against this condition of alienation. As Srnicek and 
Williams (2015) write: 
 
The development, deepening and expansion of knowledge enable us to imagine 
and achieve capacities that are otherwise unattainable. As we acquire technical 
knowledge of our built environment and scientific knowledge of the natural world, 
and come to understand the fluid tendencies of the social world, we gain greater 
powers to act (p.81). 
 
According to Srnicek and Williams (2015), left modernity will be the product of a renewed 
“social reasoning” (p.81), completed by a collective of individuals freed from the 
obligations of work by technological development. Tellingly, the roots of this social 
reasoning are somewhat unexplored, left simply as an assumed outcome of the inherent 
cooperation of this newly liberated human collective. This is evident in key passages, such 
as that in which they describe this emerging project as based upon “increasing the capacity 
of humanity to act according to whatever its desires might become” (Srnicek & Williams, 
2015, p.83). In much the same way as the humanist concept of ‘social labour,’ Srnicek’s 
and Williams’ (2015) notion of left modernity and the post-work imaginary that rests on 
it are considered to be products of the inherent cooperative quality of the human species, 
which is freed up and deployed by virtue of the human liberation from alienating work. 
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Despite their protestations to the contrary and their care in declaring that “there is no 
authentic human essence” (Srnicek & Williams, 2015, p.83), it is apparent that their vision 
of emancipation rests upon an ideological image of the human subject and human labour. 
 Again, this post-work imaginary forecloses the view of particular social relations. 
In much the same way as in Mason’s (2015) critique, class struggle is all but invisible, both 
in the analysis of information and technology (treated as a static process of inputs and 
outputs) but also in the analysis of emancipation, as emancipation is observed not in the 
struggle of the proletariat but in the self-realisation of the human individual. Despite their 
citation of key feminist concepts – in particular Donna Haraway’s (1991) concept of the 
‘cyborg’ – in their project of reclaiming modernity, Srnicek’s and Williams’ (2015) analysis 
tends to downplay the implications of the feminist critique of modernity that follows the 
image of the cyborg: Haraway (1991) does not use the cyborg to celebrate automation and 
embrace modernity in its wake, but uses it to demonstrate that ‘modernity’ and all its 
attendant notions (gender and work in particular, but also the very notion of ‘automation’ 
as the becoming-mechanical of that which was organic before) have only ever been 
important to the capitalist imaginary and are in fact antithetical to emancipatory thought. 
Relatedly, despite its proposed radicality, this image of the post-work imaginary – by 
virtue of the social relations mystified in it – fails to escape the traditional (and severely 
gendered) notion of work it seeks to critique. Whilst left modernity and its post-work 
imaginary has as its objective the radical re-imagination of self, it is powered by the freeing 
of time by automation and the provision of money through a UBI: “Time and money 
therefore represent key components of freedom in any substantive sense” (Srnicek & 
Williams, 2015, p.80). Such a view does not break with the predominant view of capitalist 
‘economics’, but stays strictly within its boundaries, accepting its economic parameters, 
still imagining economics within the closed ideological parameters of supply and demand 
and not adequately questioning the class character of money itself. “One form of wage 
labour may correct the abuses of another,” so Marx (1974) wrote in the Grundrisse, “but 
no form of wage labour can correct the abuse of wage labour itself” (p.123). 
 Relatedly, this humanist problem finds its expression in those texts more focused 
on the unsettling of the cultural dominance of work in contemporary society too. For 
example, Frayne (2015) argues that the contemporary post-work imaginary must rest on 
what he calls a ‘politics of time’ (p.217) – lifted from Frayne’s (2015) contact with André 
Gorz’s (2012) work – which turns on a very similar formula to the other additions to this 
post-work discourse: namely, that the technological development of capitalism opens up 
an emancipatory opportunity in the use of free time. As Frayne (2015) writes, “in view of 
the social constraints on working less, the question we must ask is whether and how 
society can be organised so that everybody can benefit from the time saved by capitalism’s 
productive development” (p.217, original emphasis). Though Frayne’s (2015) text centres 
on his interviews with workers in Britain who have developed various strategies for 
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resisting work, he is careful to avoid an individualistic interpretation of resistance: that is, 
resistance to work as something which the individual must take up alone. Rather, Frayne 
(2015) insists that “where to go next is not an individual but a social choice” (p.217, 
emphasis added). 
 Here again the word ‘social’ appears as the descriptor of the parameters of 
emancipatory action. But again, in deploying the word ‘social’, Frayne (2015) is not 
referring to the social relations of work as found in a capitalist society. For example, 
Frayne (2015) expresses interest in considerations of a UBI as it solves “the puzzle of how 
to reduce working-hours without low-paid workers experiencing a loss of income” (p.225), 
seemingly leaving the social relations of work (only in the context of which is the notion 
of an ‘income’ important) and, by extension, the productivist image of traditional work 
itself in-tact. Rather, for Frayne (2015) the success of the post-work imaginary is located 
in the ‘social’ “process of collective exploration and open debate” (p.222) that would 
‘naturally’ occur among a society freed of the burden of paid employment. As Frayne 
(2015) writes, 
 
The guiding ideal of social development would be the extent to which people were 
free to pursue and develop a range of interests and capacities. With more time to 
ourselves, we would have more time to work for ourselves, and hence would no 
longer depend on the economic sphere to cater to our every need (p.221).  
 
Frayne (2015) appeals explicitly to Gorz’s (2012) notion of autonomy as “work-for-
oneself” (p.57), which Gorz (2012) describes as the work “of self-realization by the creation 
of ‘non-alienated objects’” (p.57). For Frayne (2015), the contemporary post-work 
imaginary is to be located not in the structural adjustment of capitalist social relations, 
but in the expansion of the human propensity for this self-realisation and the construction 
of a social edifice based upon it: “The hope is that an increasing amount of free-time will 
allow people to forge new relations of co-operation, communication and exchange, and 
thereby become participants in the construction of their own futures” (p.222). It is not 
that these are undesirable conclusions: on the contrary, they form the imaginary of any 
communist project. But the problem is that the repeated humanist framing of these 
conclusions consistently precludes the social relations on which such desirable ends 
would be based, locating them in the spontaneous cooperation of the human species, 
rather than in a concrete political project. 
 This humanist ideological pattern continues to be repeated through numerous 
other popular examples. Carl Cederström and Peter Fleming (2012) argue that the post-
work imaginary must be an exercise entirely of self-actualization, of subjective resistance 
against the hyper-alienation of contemporary work. Their analysis of work is observed less 
in the social relations it inaugurates, instead observed in the tendency of the human 
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individual to be alienated from life itself (Cederström & Fleming, 2012). Their conclusion 
tends to overlook the relationship between these anomic feelings and their expression in 
concrete relations of work, instead suggesting a “symbolic suicide” (Cederström & 
Fleming, 2012, p.66), where the target is not capitalism but the form of alienated 
subjectivity contemporary individuals have come to embody. Emancipation is here not an 
outcome of class struggle, but possible only in the self-actualizing struggle against this 
alienated condition: “Unlearning life, then, is what the symbolic suicide attempts to 
achieve, to wipe out ourselves in a way that re-creates a new vista” (Cederström & Fleming, 
2012, p.67). It emerges again in Standing’s (2016) theory of the Precariat. Though the 
cornerstone of the precariousness that defines this new class of contemporary workers is 
the disappearance of work, Standing (2016) asserts that this same disappearance is the 
precise condition of emancipation too. The social relations implicated in emancipation are 
not analysed but merely signified, with Standing (2016) arguing that emancipation will be 
revealed through the social activity of a newly liberated humanity: 
 
This leads back to the nature of freedom. It is not an ability to do what we want, 
even allowing for the caveat that it should do no harm to others. Freedom comes 
from being part of a community in which to realise freedom in the exercise of it. It 
is revealed through actions, not something granted from on high or divined in 
stone tablets (p.195, original emphasis). 
 
Politics and political action are conveniently considered as the after-effect of initial 
liberation, incubated in the inherent creativity and cooperation of the liberated individual. 
Social relations, once more, are mystified from view, as externalities to be decided after 
the fact. 
 Here evident, across these numerous examples, is the extent to which the post-
work imaginary is defined by a fundamentally humanist problematic. The post-work 
imaginary is an emancipatory project based upon the extent to which the conditions of 
contemporary political economy facilitate the freedom of the human individual from 
work, incentivising their engagement in ‘naturally’ or inherently cooperative interaction 
with one another. The roots of this ideological enterprise rest in the contact of this 
discourse with the early political-economic works of the Young Marx (1981), from which 
it has lifted its humanist ideological conception of labour and its ‘social’ characteristics. It 
is this fundamental ideological underpinning that forecloses sociological theory by 
consequence of the repeated preclusion of the social relations of work from its 
considerations. Emancipation is considered ‘social’ not because it is reflected in the social 
relations of work but because it is reflected in this inherent cooperative quality of the 
human species and their labour. This humanism accounts for the fundamental theoretical 
weakness of the post-work imaginary and the problems incubated within it can be traced 
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back to this core ideological problem. Despite the clear influence of Marx and Marxism 
upon this discourse, the key theoretical principles that make it a rigorous form of analysis 
(the stressing of the primacy of social relations and of the class struggles reflected in these 
relations) is consistently bracketed and set aside by the post-work imaginary, in favour of 
an analysis that argues that advancements in capitalist production will finally liberate 
humanity from work and thereby catalyse a new form of society based on their inherent 




This chapter has shown how the contemporary post-work imaginary presents only a 
limited critique of work and that the roots of this limitation are located in a problem of 
persistent and pervasive humanist ideology. Despite the attractive and compelling vision 
of the future set out by the theorists of the post-work imaginary, its analysis consistently 
brackets and mystifies social relations from view. Its vision, that the development of the 
productive forces of capitalism and the consequent automation of greater parts of the 
labour process can liberate humanity from work, unwittingly overlooks particular social 
relations and the class struggles reflected in these relations. Consequently, the post-work 
imaginary has been shown to reproduce and reinforce the very productivist tropes it seeks 
to escape, complementing traditional views of work and of workers which have always 
reflected capitalist domination rather than ‘postcapitalist’ liberation. 
 The chapter has rooted this theoretical weakness of the post-work imaginary in a 
very particular ideological operation: linked primarily to its dependence upon a humanist 
ideological concept of labour found in the works of the Young Marx (1981). This has been 
shown to be more than simply a problem of interpretation but fundamentally a problem 
of ideology, a problem that has set the very epistemological parameters of the post-work 
imaginary. The analysis of the post-work imaginary has proceeded from an initial 
humanist framing of its problematic, that the problem with contemporary work is its 
tendency to alienate individuals from the inherently cooperative character of their labour, 
and that the advancement of information and automation in contemporary capitalism 
expresses a capacity to negate this alienation by encouraging these cooperative 
characteristics of human labour. Consequently, the social relations of work are mystified 
in the post-work imaginary precisely because they are unimportant to the observation of 
this central historical event. The transition to ‘postcapitalism’ and therefore to a future 
society without work, is not observed in the development of class struggle and of the social 
relations reflected in this struggle but is observed fundamentally in the ‘natural’ human 
struggle against alienation that is now facilitated by the contemporary conditions of life. 
The social relations of work are therefore not simply missing but more dangerously, 
treated only as indicative externalities of a more central humanist event. 
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 One of the most evident characteristics of the limitations of this discourse is its 
propensity to operate within and reinforce very traditional notions of work. The humanist 
ideological roots of the contemporary post-work imaginary are compatible with an image 
of work as a waged and productive activity that takes place within defined institutional 
parameters. In the next chapter, this thesis looks towards Marxist-feminist theory and the 
centrality of its critique of such traditional notions of work. What is clear from this 
analysis of feminist theory is that the break with traditional considerations of work such 
as these implicates a simultaneous deconstruction of humanism as an ideology. The post-
work imaginary lacks this critical aptitude and is limited because of it. Therefore, the 
following chapter argues that feminism, and Marxist-feminism in particular, offers a more 





Humanism, Ideology and Feminist Critiques 
of Reproductive Labour 
 
This chapter analyses feminist sociological responses to shifts in the organisation of 
reproductive labour in the twenty first century, demonstrating the extent to which 
emerging humanist ideological tendencies pose a threat to the explanatory potential of 
feminist sociology. The twenty first century has seen global labour markets play an 
increasingly influential role in the way that reproductive labour under capitalism is 
organised, as the figure of the housewife – whose reproductive labour was largely 
concentrated within the industrial family unit – gives way to more globalised figurations 
of the reproductive labourer, organised in emerging industries such as domestic labour, 
sex work, tissue donation and surrogacy. These reproductive shifts implicate synonymous 
shifts in the social relations of reproduction under capitalism, visible in their expression 
in new global patterns of work, migration and imperialism, reflective of new global 
inequalities, new forms of gendered violence and, ultimately, new configurations of class 
struggle. However, these new social changes risk mystification beneath an emerging 
humanist ideological discourse that has risen to meet and analyse these new orientations 
of reproductive labour, relying on humanism as a way of distinguishing contemporary 
forms of reproductive labour from those which preceded it. This emerging humanist 
tendency cites specific and heightened expressions of human harm and human alienation 
as a way of conducting this analysis: however, this ideological tendency reproduces 
particular theoretical oversights and limitations against which feminist theory has 
consistently warned in the context of reproductive labour. The conclusion reached by this 
chapter is that the sociological analysis of these contemporary forms of reproductive 
labour demands that the critique of humanist ideology found in the Marxist-feminism of 
the mid-to-late twentieth century be revisited for today. In the approving analysis of 
Melinda Cooper’s and Catherine Waldby’s (2014) theory of ‘clinical labour’ at the end of 
this chapter, the thesis provides an insight into how this is possible and how this 
recapitulation of the critique of humanist ideology can help to produce knowledge of the 
changing conditions of reproduction in the bioeconomy. 
 Theoretically, the definition and deconstruction of humanist ideology has been a 
crucial exercise in the production of Marxist-feminist critique. The Marxist-feminism of 
the mid-to-late twentieth century, in revealing for the first time the dialectical relationship 
between the productive labour of the factory and the reproductive labour of the household, 
found in the deconstruction of humanist ideology the precise theoretical operation 
through which this revelation was possible. The capitalist reproductive relations of the 
household were shown to be hidden beneath “anthropological sophistries” (Firestone, 
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1979, p.17), which excluded reproductive labour from considerations of work by excusing 
it as the fulfilment of ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ duties as opposed to a form of work in its own 
right, organised according to the constellation of power and class within the capitalist 
mode of production. However, in the wake of these contemporary forms of reproductive 
labour and their organisation in the twenty first century, these sophistries re-emerge in 
the form of a renewed humanist ideological tendency which attempts to re-establish the 
dividing line between ‘work’ and ‘non-work’ – necessarily exploded by Marxist-feminism 
– in order to pronounce the specific human harms implicated by these emerging 
reproductive ‘industries.’ The theoretical defence against this emerging tendency 
demands a re-visitation of the principles of Marxist-feminism, particularly its critique of 
humanist ideology. Firstly, it is important to analyse these principles in more detail in an 
exploration of the Marxist-feminist theoretical approach.  
 
MARXIST-FEMINISM, REPRODUCTION AND IDEOLOGY 
 
To speak of the social relations of work under capitalism, one must speak too of the 
relations that govern the reproduction of work. To describe what takes place when the 
worker and the capitalist meet, it is not enough to describe the relations that govern the 
division of labour within the factory walls, of the absorption of surplus-value at the close 
of the labour process or the payment of wages. Because these social relations are not 
relations of the workplace alone: on the contrary, they demand reproduction within spaces 
and amongst actors who fall outside of this traditional productive arena. To describe the 
reproductive relations contained herein is the only way to fully describe the social 
relations of production and of capitalism more generally. This has been the dominant 
argument made in Marxist-feminist approaches to work: as Tithi Bhattacharya (2017) 
describes it, 
 
It is an approach that is not content to accept what seems like a visible, finished 
entity – in this case, our worker at the gates of her workplace – but interrogates 
the complex network of social processes and human relations that produces the 
conditions of existence for that entity (p.2). 
 
Whilst traditional Marxist theory understood exploitation through the political economy 
of the wage-labour relation (as expressed, for example, in the labour theory of value), 
Marxist-feminism has argued that viewing exploitation through the prism of wage-labour 
and labour-power alone mystifies the exploitation necessary for the very reproduction of 
this labour-power. Analysis of the wage-labour relation says little about the exploitation 
of women in the household, about racialized experiences of capitalism and colonialism, or 
about the emerging forms of slave- and informal labour underpinning the globalised 
106 
 
economy. Marxist-feminism has therefore centralised new questions within the sociology 
of work, about “what constitutes work, who is the working class, and what is the nature of 
class struggle” (Federici, [2008] 2012, p.95). 
 Emerging from the 1970s onwards, a vanguard of Marxist-feminist theorists (see 
Dalla Costa & James, 1975; Federici, 2012; Firestone, 1979; James, 2012; Mies, 1986; 
Vogel, [1983] 2014) were responsible for the introduction of this theory of reproduction 
into Marxist theoretical discourse. Arguably, Étienne Balibar’s ([1964] 2015) contribution 
to Reading Capital introduces a rigorous and detailed consideration of reproduction into 
Marxist philosophy. However, even the analysis of reproduction forwarded by Balibar 
(2015) falls short of an analysis of the reproduction of those social relations ideologically 
excluded from the realm of ‘production’ proper. It was, rather, this vanguard of Marxist-
feminists who opened up reproduction and sexuality “historically…pointing out that 
reproduction can be understood ‘in the last instance’ not only in an economic way, but in 
a way that takes into account the entire conditions for the ‘perpetuation of the worker’” 
(Power, 2017, p.227, original emphasis). 
 Crucially, Marxist-feminism looks to Marx to argue that the explication of the 
capitalist social formation ought not simply ‘include’ the relations of reproductive labour: 
rather, it must begin with them. In his Origin of the Family, Friedrich Engels ([1888] 
1988) cited Marx in arguing that the relations of the modern family – based around the 
male breadwinner and the female housewife – contained “in miniature all the 
contradictions which later extend throughout society and its state” (p.121-122, original 
emphasis). Firestone (1979) took this further and wrote that, “Marx was on to something 
more profound than he knew when he observed that the family contained within itself in 
embryo all the antagonisms that later develop on a wide scale within society and the state” 
(p.20, emphasis added). In this way, Marxist-feminism essentially reads – in the 
Althusserian (2015a, 2015b; see also Power, 2017) sense of the term – the critique of 
reproductive social relations in Marx’s political economy. Marxism, so it is argued, 
contains the necessary concepts through which it is possible to explicate the whole of the 
capitalist social formation from the starting point of reproduction. As Dalla Costa and 
James (1975) wrote, “if you don’t know how women are exploited, you can never really 
know how men are” (p.35). 
 The wage-labour relation details how surplus-value is generated and absorbed 
through the commodification of labour as labour-power and its mobilisation through the 
wage-labour relation: normally observed within particular productive settings such as the 
factory or the office. However, what is missing from this analysis is precisely the process 
by which labour-power as a commodity is reproduced for sale each and every day. In order 
for the worker to arrive at the gates of the factory each day, there is a vast amount of 
unpaid work that goes into the preparation and reproduction of that worker on a regular 
basis: namely, the reproductive labour or ‘housework’ (Federici, [1975] 2012, p.15) 
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disproportionately completed by women. As Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Selma James 
(1975) wrote, 
 
The ability to labor resides only in a human being whose life is consumed in the 
process of producing. First it must be nine months in the womb, must be fed, 
clothed and trained; then when it works its bed must be made, its floors swept, its 
lunchbox prepared, its sexuality not gratified but quietened, its dinner ready when 
it gets home, even if this is eight in the morning from the night shift. This is how 
labor power is produced and reproduced when it is daily consumed in the factory 
or the office. To describe its basic production and re-production is to describe 
women’s work (p.11, original emphasis). 
 
From this perspective, Marxist-feminism makes necessary the adaptation of Marxist 
concepts upon which its critique of work and capitalism have for so long relied. For 
instance, the labour theory of value no longer holds as a prism through which to view 
either exploitation or the labour process inherent to capitalist production. The labour 
theory of value – in concentrating on the capture of surplus-value from the exploitation 
of labour-power – mystifies the role of reproduction in this equation and therefore is 
inadequate in providing a full view of exploitation under capitalism. As Federici (2012) 
wrote, 
 
The wage gives the impression of a fair deal: you work and you get paid, hence you 
and your boss each get what’s owed; while in reality the wage, rather than paying 
you for the work you do, hides all the unpaid work that goes into profit (p.16). 
 
The traditional consideration of work as an exploitative relationship between worker and 
employer no longer holds: “When capital pays husbands they get two workers, not one” 
(James, [1972] 2012, p.66). Moreover, the factory and the office can no longer maintain 
their place as the primary sites of exploitation under capitalism. Reproduction makes 
necessary the inclusion of the family and the community as crucial locations within 
capitalist accumulation processes: “The community is the other half of capitalist 
organization, the other area of hidden capitalist exploitation, the other, hidden, source of 
surplus labor” (Dalla Costa & James, 1975, p.11, original emphasis). 
 Marxist-feminist theories of reproduction fundamentally change the Marxist 
critique of work and the observation of its historical development. Through the lens of 
production alone, capitalism ‘creates’ its workers primarily through the privatisation of 
the means of production, thereby making necessary the workers’ sale of their labour-
power in return for access to necessities. However, Marxist-feminism exposes the 
inadequacy of this consideration through production alone, arguing that this primitive 
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accumulation of wage-labourers is at all times complemented by a primitive accumulation 
of reproductive labourers too: a process that Maria Mies (1986) described as 
“housewifization” (p.74). In this way, the concept of reproduction forces the 
reconfiguration of Marxist considerations of imperialism as the dominant explanation of 
how capitalism expands and reproduces itself. Just as Rosa Luxemburg ([1913] 2003) 
argued that imperialism was symptomatic of capitalism’s need for constant spatial 
expansion in order to survive and reproduce itself, the concept of reproduction as 
provided by Marxist-feminism argues that this movement is matched by a continued 
expansion of patriarchal social relations as capitalism necessarily ‘creates’ reproductive 
labourers alongside the wage-labourers of its factories. As Mies (1986) writes, “the 
‘freedom’ of the proletarian to sell his labour power is based on the non-freedom of the 
housewife. Proletarianization of men is based on the housewifization of women” (p.110). 
 The concept of reproduction also makes necessary the reconfiguration of Marxist 
considerations of class and class struggle. Work is of interest to Marxism because it is a 
meeting place between the bearers of the bourgeois and proletarian classes and the 
workplace itself becomes a visible arena of class struggle in many ways. However, in 
expanding the notion of ‘work’ beyond the factory floor alone, the concept of reproduction 
shifts the site of class struggle into the household too. Class alone is no longer an adequate 
description of the inherent antagonism that continues to flare at the base of the capitalist 
mode of production: rather, Marxist-feminism makes necessary the addition of gender to 
this dialectic. ‘Class struggle’ is therefore argued to not simply be present in the 
relationship between bourgeois and proletarian, but between man and woman: the former 
with access to capital (through the wage) and the latter disciplined into their reproductive 
role in order to access this capital. Women are not simply struggling against capitalism, 
they are also struggling against patriarchy and the male sex and, in the case of women in 
the global South, also fighting on a third front against white supremacy and colonialism. 
The addition of gender and race complicates the consideration of class struggle and 
renders inadequate traditional historical analyses of class struggle in the factory alone: 
 
It is absurd to compare the struggle of women for wages for housework to the 
struggle of male workers in the factory for more wages. In struggling for more 
wages, the waged worker challenges his social role but remains within it. When we 
struggle for wages for housework we struggle unambiguously and directly against 
our social role (Federici, 2012, p.19). 
 
When considered through the lens of work and production alone, this struggle is mystified 
entirely. There is no place for housewives in the traditional class struggle of the proletariat. 
As James (2012) writes, “unions don’t know we exist” (p.66) and according to others, as 
Federici (2012) famously penned, “we are seen as nagging bitches, not as workers in 
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struggle” (p.16). Therefore, it is not simply that women as workers should be ‘included’ in 
the traditional class struggle: rather, class struggle itself is only comprehensible from the 
feminist perspective. As Federici (2012) wrote, 
 
When we say that housework is a moment of capitalist production we clarify our 
specific function in the capitalist division of labor and the specific forms that our 
revolt against it must take. Ultimately, when we say that we produce capital, we 
say that we can and want to destroy it, rather than engage in a losing battle to 
move from one form and degree of exploitation to another (p.32). 
 
In this way, Marxist-feminism produces a unique concept and a unique position in 
relation to social science. It at once challenges traditional Marxist critiques of capitalism, 
arguing that they are inadequate and mystify the unique exploitation of women and 
mystify the role of reproduction. However, this critique also distances itself from the more 
liberal feminist critiques of work such as those by Betty Friedan ([1962] 1992) and Arlie 
Hochschild (1997, [1986] 2003) for whom the struggle of women was visible in their 
greater involvement in traditionally male employment sectors. After all, as Dalla Costa 
and James (1975) wrote, “slavery to an assembly line is not liberation from slavery to a 
kitchen sink” (Dalla Costa & James, 1975, p.35). 
 Crucially, the development of Marxist-feminist theory in this way – its exposure 
of the social relations that exist between production and reproduction – involved a break 
with ideology: in particular, with humanist ideology. The precise ideological concept 
beneath which the social relations of reproduction are mystified is that of humanism, 
through which these social relations are bracketed and set aside, with reproductive work 
explained away by its consideration as a ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ activity rather than an 
expression of gendered social relations. As Federici (2012) wrote, in this way reproductive 
work is “ideologically sold to us as the ‘other’ of work: a space of freedom in which we can 
presumably be our true selves” (Federici, 2012, p.23). More radically, Marxist-feminism 
breaks with the whole ideological representation of reproduction as a manifestation of the 
biological characteristics or the very nature of the female body, instead exposing it as the 
social manifestation of a particular and historical gendered class struggle. In this way, it 
is possible to speak of the theoretical anti-humanism of the Marxist-feminist critique. 
 The social relations of work and reproduction – the relations of capitalism – come 
into being accompanied by particular knowledges of the body, of sexuality and of gender. 
In other words, the precise social relations that inaugurate the family unit and its pairing 
with the industrial worker, were at all times reflected within ideologies that reproduced 
and perpetuated discourse in relation to the human body and its ‘biological’ capacities. 
This was, for example, the key argument made by Foucault ([1976] 1998) in Volume One 




The society that emerged in the nineteenth century – bourgeois, capitalist, or 
industrial society, call it what you will – did not confront sex with a fundamental 
refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire machinery 
for producing true discourses concerning it. Not only did it speak of sex and 
compel everyone to do so; it also set out to formulate the uniform truth of sex 
(p.69). 
 
This ‘uniform truth’ of sexuality is the basis for the ideologies that have concealed the 
social relations of reproduction from view. The gendered division of labour and the 
dialectical social relationship between production and reproduction is concealed beneath 
notions that production and reproduction are in fact not founded in social relations at all 
but correspond to the ‘natural’ characteristics of particular gendered bodies. As Federici 
(2012) wrote of gendered considerations of wage-labour, “there is no doubt concerning its 
meaning; you work, not because you like it, or because it comes naturally to you, but 
because it is the only condition under which you are allowed to live” (p.16). However, with 
reproductive labour this is not deemed to be the case, as the motivations behind 
reproduction are deemed to be physiological (corresponding to natural urges/necessities) 
as opposed to socio-economic. 
 Ideologically, humanism has been crucially important for the interpellation of 
women into their gendered social roles. For example, Simone de Beauvoir ([1949] 2011) 
demonstrated how the social positioning of women was directly justified by modern 
humanism, where the capacity for reason in men translated into their capacity for the 
mastery over nature: a capacity with which women struggled due to the inherent 
irrationality of their own reproductive nature. As de Beauvoir (2011) wrote, “[Man] grasps 
his body as a direct and normal link with the world that he believes he apprehends in all 
objectivity, whereas he considers woman’s body an obstacle, a prison, burdened by 
everything that particularizes it” (p.5). This inherent ‘struggle’ against the nature of 
reproduction within the female body provided the recurring ideological theme with which 
female subjectivity was repeatedly interpellated. According to a number of feminist 
histories of medicine (see Corea, 1988; Martin [1987] 2001; Scutt, 1990), modern medical 
discourses have been developed alongside a continued accumulation of knowledge 
regarding the female body and its perceived irrationality in relation to its male 
counterpart. As Finkelstein (1990) wrote “the woman who extended herself beyond 
customary social roles was, in some sense, ill and needing medical treatment” (p.13). 
These medical discourses, and the construction of narratives surrounding supposedly 
reproductive illnesses of the mind and body in women contributed to the construction of 
a double-edged discourse: solidifying a particular image of ‘Woman’ and at the same time 
solidifying the image of ‘Man’ in reference to this ‘other.’ Sexual promiscuity, moral 
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deficiency or independent thought on the part of women was seen “as a form of hysteria 
or illness directly related to the womb” (Finkelstein, 1990, p.14) relating back once again 
to the weakness of women to transcend the immediate physiological urges of their bodies, 
thus forbidding their ascent to the status of being fully human (and therefore justifying 
their lower social position). 
 From a Marxist-feminist perspective, these gendered discourses do not float freely 
in the modern era but are intimately tied to the development of the capitalist mode of 
production. As Federici (2004) argued in her text Caliban and the Witch, there is an 
observable and important correlation between the development of the humanist 
fascination with the body (and the discourses of knowledge that accompanied this 
fascination) and the process of primitive accumulation that accompanied the emergence 
of capitalist social relations. In the seventeenth century, humanist philosophy was taking 
shape in the form of a Cartesian struggle between the ‘forces of Reason’ (“parsimony, 
prudence, sense of responsibility, self-control” [Federici, 2004, p.134]) and ‘the low 
instincts of the Body’ (“lewdness, idleness, systematic dissipation of one’s vital energies” 
[Federici, 2004, p.134]). Crucially, this philosophical struggle was reflected in the social 
transformation taking place at the time: a transformation that gave rise to the social 
relations of production and reproduction integral to the emergence of capitalism. As 
Federici (2004) wrote, 
 
The battle which the 17th-century discourse on the person imagines unfolding in 
the microcosm of the individual has arguably a foundation in the reality of the 
time. It is an aspect of that broader process of social reformation, whereby, in the 
‘Age of Reason’, the rising bourgeoisie attempted to remold the subordinate 
classes in conformity with the needs of developing capitalist society (p.135). 
 
According to Federici (2004) this emerging humanist philosophy was reflected in a 
developing gendered division of labour between men and women. The stripping of women 
of their rights over land, tools and other means of subsistence was justified on the basis 
that men, freed of reproductive obligations, were more capable of reason (and therefore 
closer to the human world than that of the animal kingdom) than women who were 
actively held back by the instincts of their bodies and its reproductive system (Federici, 
2004). Indeed, the female body is here constructed “as uncontrolled, dangerous, savage 
‘nature’” (Mies, 1986, p.90), with “control over the natural world, control over human 
nature being the first, most indispensable step” (Federici, 2004, p.140) towards bourgeois 
control over a newly formed class society. In this way, the “new anthropological paradigm” 
(Federici, 2004, p.134) of the seventeenth century provided the precise ideological 
concepts through which to facilitate and justify the social revolution taking place at the 
time, in which the institution of the modern family found its beginnings. 
112 
 
 Humanism was also the ideology through which not only economic violence but 
physical repression was exercised over women as the bourgeoise attempted to discipline 
these newly formed reproductive labourers into their familial positions (Federici, 2004). 
Just as Marx (2013) described how the making of the industrial working class was 
preceded by the “enforced transformation into vagabonds and paupers” (p.514) of those 
who resisted the new regime, Federici (2004) detailed the ways in which unproductive 
sexuality became criminalised by this emerging social order: new forms of moralism 
penalised nakedness and sexuality and decried manual labour as an unnatural occupation 
for women, with those who defied such moral ideologies ostracised as “sexually aggressive 
shrews or even as ‘whores’ and ‘witches’” (p.96). This violence comes to a head with the 
European witch hunts which, through this lens, cannot be viewed simply as the product 
of an ill-educated society coming to grips with new-found knowledges but as an integral 
and systematic campaign of violence that was the crucial midwife of the incoming 
capitalist society, dependent fundamentally on the establishment of social control over 
the means of reproduction (Federici, 2004). As Federici (2004) wrote, “it was in the 
course of this vast process of social engineering that a new concept of the body and a new 
policy toward it began to be shaped” (p.137), with violence as its central pivot “for blood 
and torture were necessary to ‘breed an animal’ capable of regular, homogeneous, and 
uniform behavior, indelibly marked with the memory of the new rules” (p.144). 
 Marxist-feminism has argued that this history of the primitive accumulation of 
women, of which their violent persecution, torture and criminalisation was all a part, must 
necessarily be viewed in the context of the emergence of the modern family. Just as Marx 
(2013) writes of wage-labour in Capital, following this process of primitive accumulation 
the need for direct force disappears and the relations of reproduction are experienced as 
‘natural’ (p.516). It is precisely here where ideology serves its purpose (Althusser, 2008). 
At the end of this process of primitive accumulation, the relationships in the modern 
family are not experienced as forced set of social relations but, on the contrary, appear to 
approach both men and women as expressions of a natural order: “The image of a worker 
freely alienating his labor, or confronting his body as capital to be delivered to the highest 
bidder, refers to a working class already molded by the capitalist work-discipline” 
(Federici, 2004, p.135). 
 Crucially, the same ideological constructions that facilitate the naturalisation of 
the social relations of the modern family, bleed into the gendering of work itself. A 
correlation emerges between the socio-political position of the work of men who are able 
to transcend the immediate physiological demands of their bodies and the work of women 
whose class position is defined precisely by the assumed inability of this process of 




The housewife’s situation as a pre-capitalist mode of labor and consequently this 
‘femininity’ imposed upon her, makes her see the world, the others and the entire 
organization of work as something which is obscure, essentially unknown and 
unknowable; not lived; perceived only as a shadow behind the shoulders of the 
husband who goes out each day and meets this something (p.37-38). 
 
This argument is further confirmed by other Marxist-feminist critiques of work and 
reproduction. For example, Firestone (1979) demonstrated the effect of this ideology in 
relation to women’s experience of the Second World War, in which women were called to 
fill the jobs in manufacturing and manual labour left vacant by the men who had left to 
fight. Firestone (1979) argued that this transcendence of the household was akin to a 
transcendence of bodily limitations, as these women “were temporarily granted human, 
as opposed to female status” (p.33). In the same movement, it is this same ideological 
construction that contributes to the cheapening of reproductive labour. The work of 
women is considered an animalistic and impulsive form of work whose powerlessness 
derives precisely from its ties to the physiological needs of the human organism. This 
gendered view of the division of labour has been crucial for the development of capitalism. 
Because whilst men’s work is considered in the form of a political act that must be 
encouraged through the payment of a wage, women’s work, pictured as a natural 
resource, therefore requires no such encouragement or payment, and can be taken 
advantage of at will and free of charge: as “a natural resource, freely available like air and 
water” (Mies, 1986, p.110). It is for this reason that capitalism can justify the withholding 
of wages from those who complete reproductive labour. If reproductive labour is 
considered as an ever-present activity that might otherwise be wasted if not taken 
advantage of and organised properly, then the requirement to pay for such labour is 
deemed unnecessary.  
Therefore, the definition of ideology – particularly humanist ideology – is crucial 
to the construction of the Marxist-feminist critique. Humanism is a pivotal ideological 
tool that has facilitated the original formation of capitalist social structures, the primitive 
accumulation of women into their positions within these structures and the maintenance 
of the sexual division of labour necessary for the accumulation strategies of capitalist 
production. Thus, the Marxist-feminist movements – such as the demand for Wages for 
Housework in the 1970s – are theoretical movements that precisely sought to cut through 
these ideological deployments: by defining them. Without this clear ideological critique 
in mind, the Wages for Housework movement confronts feminism as merely a “critical 
ploy” (Weeks, 2011, p.128) designed only to make impossible demands of capitalism in 
order to demonstrate its inadequacy. However, the struggle for Wages for Housework was 
more than this and is representative of a class struggle both in theory and in practice, 
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valuable in its exposure and definition of an ideological construction which underpins the 
contemporary oppression of women. As Federici (2012) wrote,  
 
It is the demand by which our nature ends and our struggle begins because just 
to want wages for housework means to refuse that work as the expression of our 
nature, and therefore to refuse precisely the female role that capital has invented 
for us (p.18, original emphasis). 
 
Thus, Marxist-feminism has not merely constructed a critique of capitalism through the 
inclusion of reproduction within considerations of exploitation. Rather, it is also 
responsible for a fundamentally feminist critique of ideology and specifically of humanist 
ideology, analysing its role in the facilitation of the exploitation of women in modern 
capitalism. This ideological critique that has emerged out of Marxist-feminism will be 
crucial in the examination of capitalist exploitation of reproductive labour, particularly in 
the context of twenty first century developments that confront the feminist sociology of 
work as new or heightened in the present day.  
 
REPRODUCTIVE LABOUR IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 
 
The Marxist-feminist theory so far dealt with emerged largely in the twentieth century, 
faced with a very particular orientation of reproductive labour: localised within the 
industrial family unit and expressed predominantly through the role of the Fordist 
housewife as the dialectical complement to the industrial male breadwinner. In the twenty 
first century, feminist theory is met with an emerging tendency that sees reproductive 
labour organised in different ways. The family unit remains as an important social 
manifestation of these reproductive relations: however, there is an observed migration of 
these relations, particularly in advanced capitalist economies, out of the traditional family 
unit and on to global labour markets. As Mies (1986) wrote, in anticipation of such shifts, 
  
Man-the-breadwinner, though still the main ideological figure behind the new 
policies, is empirically disappearing from the stage. Not only does rising 
unemployment of men make their role of breadwinner a precarious one, but 
marriage for women is also no longer an economic guarantee of their lifelong 
livelihood (p.16). 
 
Fundamentally, the principal role of reproductive labour remains the same: namely, the 
reproduction of labour-power. However, the reproductive relations that govern this are 
not confined to the family or the community in the same ways as in the twentieth century. 
Increasingly, globalised labour markets emerge as the contemporary social expression of 
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reproductive labour, as new ‘industries’ in domestic labour, sex work, tissue donation and 
surrogacy see the reproduction of labour-power – and the gendered class struggle 
inherently reflected therein – no longer confined only to the family unit. As Melinda 
Cooper and Catherine Waldby (2014) argue, “domestic tasks, sexual services, care 
provision, and…the process of biological reproduction itself have migrated out of the 
private space of the family into the labor market and are now central to post-industrial 
accumulation strategies” (p.5).  
According to Nancy Fraser (2017), an inherent contradiction lies at the centre of 
this reproductive shift, as alterations to capitalism’s accumulation strategies have meant 
that capitalism is increasingly unable to secure and exploit the reproductive labour 
necessary for its own survival. As Fraser (2017) writes, “this new regime is now promoting 
state and corporate disinvestment from social welfare while recruiting women into the 
paid workforce. Thus, it is externalizing care work onto families and communities while 
diminishing their capacity to perform it” (p.32). Fraser (2017) recognises a shift in 
gendered familial ideology, away from the industrial family of the male breadwinner, 
towards an egalitarian valorisation of “the two-earner family” (p.35). Due to the reduction 
of wages and the rise in precarious and informal working conditions that have appeared 
heightened in advanced capitalist economies, increasing numbers of women are brought 
into the paid workforce, leaving behind particular “care deficits” (Hochschild, 1995, 
p.336) which need to be filled. The result, as Fraser (2017) argues, 
 
Is a new, dualized organization of social reproduction, commodified for those who 
can pay for it and privatized for those who cannot, as some in the second category 
provide care work in return for (low) wages for those in the first (p.32, original 
emphasis). 
 
This new, dualized organisation of social reproduction makes necessary a feminist 
sociology dedicated to the interrogation of the complexities of class, gender and race 
within this global order and the investigation of the relationship between these 
complexities and the contemporary experience of reproductive labour. 
 At the turn of the twenty first century, there is an evident proliferation of literature 
dedicated to the analysis of this phenomenon in the context of housework and domestic 
services (see Anderson, 2000; Cox, 2006; Ehrenreich & Hochschild, 2002; Gregson & 
Lowe, 1994; Lutz, 2011; Parreñas, 2001). Contemporary statistics reveal that sixteen per 
cent of households in California employ domestic workers such as nannies, maids and 
housekeepers (Waheed et al., 2016). As Guarnizo and Rodriguez (2017) describe, “over 
half of these households (54%) hire housecleaners, while one fourth of them (27%) hire 
homecare helpers and one fifth (19%) seek help with childcare” (p.4). Viewed through the 
lens of housework, these shifts in the organisation of reproductive labour are seen here to 
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have a profound impact upon the provision of care within the household. As a result, 
wealthier families within the advanced capitalist economies of North America, Australia 
and Western Europe become increasingly reliant upon the provision of domestic services 
by other women workers, more often than not from the global South. The proliferation of 
jobs in the Western world as nannies and maids has seen the increased migration of 
women from the global South into these families, filling the care gaps left behind for very 
low wages. Hochschild (2002) has described this in terms of an “emotional imperialism” 
(p.27): 
 
Women choose to migrate for domestic work. But they choose it because economic 
pressures all but coerce them to. That yawning gap between rich and poor 
countries is itself a form of coercion, pushing Third World mothers to seek work 
in the First for lack of options closer to home (p.27). 
 
As Gutierrez-Rodriguez (2014) argues, these developments see reproductive labour 
become bound together with questions regarding migration and the nation state in ways 
that appear quite peculiar to this particular historical orientation of capitalism: “In private 
households employing a migrant care and/or domestic worker, we encounter the 
immediate effects of migration policies. In this context, the dividing line between citizen 
and migrant structures the mode of encounter between employers and domestic workers” 
(p.195). Racialised ideologies ensure loose regulations regarding the protection and 
monitoring of these migrants as workers (Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 2014), with gendered 
ideologies facilitating and justifying the relationship between workers and employers: 
domestic work is seen by employers as “a family necessity rather than an economic 
transaction” (Guarnizo & Rodriguez, 2017, p.11) resulting in “closer, more intimate 
employer-employee relations that in turn lead to flexibility in the workload assigned and 
laxer labor relations” (p.11). 
 The conditions of contemporary capitalism have also agitated new sociological 
discussions regarding sex work (Brewis & Linstead, 2000; Hardy et al., 2010; Mac & 
Smith, 2018; Sanders et al., 2009). Though sex work is by no means a new phenomenon, 
globalisation, developing technologies and new strategies of primitive accumulation make 
sex work of renewed interest to contemporary sociology: “The industrialization of the sex 
trade and its globalization are fundamental factors which make the contemporary sex 
industry different from previous times” (Kingston & Sanders, 2010, p.3). Fact sheets 
compiled by the English Collective of Prostitutes (2017) demonstrate that there are 72,800 
sex workers in the UK, 88 per cent of whom are women. There is a definite link between 
participation in sex work and the austerity-based politics of the UK Government, as 
squeezes upon welfare services and the contraction of stable employment in a number of 
sectors (particularly education and healthcare) are often cited by British sex workers as 
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reasons for participating in sex work (English Collective of Prostitutes, 2017). Moreover, 
research by Nicola Mai (2009) has looked more closely at the involvement of migrant 
workers in the UK sex work industry. Mai’s (2009) research reveals that economic 
insecurity and strict immigration laws contribute more highly to migrant involvement in 
the UK sex work industry, as opposed to trafficking or coerced involvement which is 
comparatively low. Mai’s (2009) interviews with sex workers reveal how, echoing 
Ehrenreich and Hochschild (2002), migration policies emerge at the forefront of new 
campaigns of primitive accumulation on the part of capitalism, forcing the involvement of 
expanding numbers of women from Eastern Europe and the global South in Western 
capitalist labour markets: “In most cases the UK was chosen as the preferred migration 
destination because of the possibility of finding work and earning better wages” (Mai, 
2009, p.20-21). 
With developing technologies and globalisation, medical developments and the 
proliferation of tissue economies (Waldby & Mitchell, 2006) based upon the trade in 
bodily tissues such as stem cells and oocytes have become of increasing interest to 
contemporary sociology. Discussion of the ‘bioeconomy’ has become increasingly central 
for contemporary feminist sociologists, referring to an increasing global market for 
services in human tissue donation – in particular, the donation of organs (Crowley-
Matoka & Hamdy, 2016), umbilical cord blood (Brown, 2013; Waldby, 2006) and oocytes 
(Waldby, 2008) – and also gestational services such as surrogacy (Lewis, 2019; Pande, 
2010a, 2010b).  As Cooper’s and Waldby’s (2014) research reveals, emerging markets in 
tissue donation – primarily made up of women who donate umbilical cord blood (from 
which stem cells are harvested) and oocytes (used for stem cells but also for in vitro 
fertilisation [IVF] and surrogacy procedures) – are participated in by women from 
Eastern Europe and the global South, with women and families in North America and 
Western Europe representing the primary ‘buyers’ of this service. As Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) write, a “significant proportion of oocyte vendors are young eastern European 
women trying to navigate the insecurities of transitional postsocialist economies where 
formal labor options have retreated and national labor markets have dramatically 
restructured” (p.64). Whilst the links between emerging medical industries and 
reproductive labour are not new (see Corea, 1988; Martin, 2001), it is expressive of wider 
trends in capitalist labour markets, characteristically centred on developing technologies, 
increased precariousness and the migration of people, capital and tissue (Cooper & 
Waldby, 2014).  
 These sociological trends are matched in emerging surrogacy industries. Whilst 
surrogacy is tightly regulated in North America, Western Europe and Australia, loose 
regulations in countries like India and the Philippines have made countries such as these 
into hubs for the medical tourism of wealthier families looking to take advantage of this 
loose regulation and low medical costs (Singh, 2014). Available British statistics 
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demonstrate “that births in approximately 26% of orders made in the year to October 2011 
took place overseas, contrasting with 13% in 2010, 4% in 2009, 2% in 2008 and 0% in 
1995” (Crawshaw et al., 2012, p.271), with Amrita Pande’s (2009) research revealing that 
surrogates in India can be expected to be paid only between $3-5000; much cheaper than 
the average $30-50,000 paid to US surrogates (Global Surrogacy, 2016). As Pande’s 
(2010a, 2010b) research shows, Indian surrogates are paid to engage in gestational 
surrogacy, in which they act as the ‘host’ for the fertilisation of donated reproductive tissue 
from a prospective parenting couple. Pande’s (2010a, 2010b) research repeats a similar 
pattern, demonstrating how economic necessity most often underpins the women’s 
involvement in surrogacy and how these emerging medical industries make possible the 
primitive accumulation of Indian reproductive labourers into capitalist labour markets.  
 What is evident in this landscape of contemporary reproduction that today 
confronts feminist sociology is a new orientation of gendered class relations which are 
reflected in emerging inequalities between global women, new patterns of migration and 
imperialism and new divisions of labour between men and women as well as between 
women themselves. The reproduction of labour-power underpins these emerging social 
realities and their manifestation in these contemporary reproductive ‘industries.’ 
Confronting feminist sociology is therefore a different orientation of capitalist relations of 
reproduction, the analysis of which holds clues as to the nature of gendered exploitation 
in the twenty first century and how it demands an alternative social strategy in 
comparison to its traditional industrial organisation within the family unit. However, the 
theoretical approach taken towards these new social realities is of particular importance. 
Problematically, there is an emerging tendency within social scientific analyses of this re-
orientation of reproductive labour which takes a theoretically humanist approach to this 
analysis. Whilst pointing towards particular gendered social harms implicated by this new 
political economy of reproduction, the explanatory framework that it offers for producing 
concrete knowledge of these emerging realities is particularly limited, by virtue of its roots 
in humanist ideological concepts.  
 
EMOTION, ALIENATION AND CONTEMPORARY REPRODUCTION 
 
In the context of these emerging political economic developments in contemporary 
reproduction, a theoretically humanist analysis of capitalism has emerged which observes 
its critique in the propensity of contemporary capitalism to centralise new strategies of 
human alienation in order to bring these new reproductive industries to pass. According 
to this approach, these new relations of reproduction are distinct from those of the 
household and the family that preceded them, by virtue of the unique and significantly 
heightened forms of human harm and alienation that they inaugurate. Unlike the 
reproductive labour of the family, so this critique goes, the manifestation of reproductive 
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labour on global labour markets commodifies human feeling, human contact and essential 
human values as services to be bought and sold. ‘Love’, ‘care’, ‘motherhood’ and ‘sexuality’ 
all take shape as commodities in this emerging market of reproductive services, alienated 
from the women to whom these values belong and deployed cynically by contemporary 
capitalism as a source of profit. For these authors, these new forms of reproductive labour 
are to be guarded against and resisted as evidence of an encroaching commodification of 
the female body. As Hochschild (1983) wrote, “it may not be too much to suggest that we 
are witnessing a call for the conservation of ‘inner resources,’ a call to save another 
wilderness from corporate use and keep it ‘forever wild’” (p.22). 
 By virtue of this discourse’s setting-out from a humanist problematic, it finds it 
particularly difficult to think production and reproduction together. The key insight of 
Marxist-feminism has been that the social relations of production under capitalism are at 
all times a reflection of the relations of reproduction and that one cannot be viewed 
without the other. However, in this humanist argument, there is an evident resurrection 
of a normative division between ‘work’ proper and the relations that escape this definition. 
This normative separation becomes crucial in pronouncing the characteristics of human 
alienation under capitalism but makes for a limited analysis as the social relations of 
reproduction find themselves inevitably mystified. In this humanist analysis, there is no 
critique of the ways in which contemporary forms of sex work or domestic labour 
implicate a particular gendered class struggle which is then reflected in capitalist 
production more generally: rather, contemporary forms of reproductive labour are 
separated out from other types of ‘work’, as uniquely harmful expressions of human 
alienation that require particular strategies of resistance. 
 Within contemporary contributions to feminist sociology, this humanist 
problematic finds itself most readily expressed in the emergence of new concepts,  in 
particular the concepts of ‘emotional’ (Hochschild, 1983; Veldstra, 2018), ‘affective’ 
(Oksala, 2016; Whitney, 2018) or ‘intimate’ labour (Burke, 2016; Boris & Parreñas, 2010; 
Satz, 2010; Zelizer, 2005). ‘Intimacy’ and ‘emotion’ have become increasingly popular 
frames of reference through which the exploitation of reproductive labour is thought 
about in the context of a burgeoning market economy (Attwood et al., 2017). 
Contemporary capitalism and the emerging ‘reproductive’ industries it has made 
available, risk undermining the protection from the market that reproductive labour had 
previously enjoyed (in the private household), opening it up to commodification in ways 
that are uniquely dangerous. This unique danger stems from the fact that, unlike the 
activities of the wage-labourer, these reproductive labours correlate to distinct and 
specifically “human values” (Satz, 2010, p.3) which, under contemporary capitalism, find 
themselves mobilised in the provision of a host of new reproductive services. The 
relationship between intimacy and labour was introduced conceptually by Arlie 
Hochschild (1983) with the concept of ‘emotional labour’ (p.7), arguing that what 
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contemporary service-industries ‘sell’ is in fact the emotional labour of its workers, 
crystallised in the maintenance of an emotionally genuine relationship between the 
worker and their customer in the delivery of a service. In recent years, this has been 
updated and expanded, particularly in notable contributions such as that of Eileen Boris 
and Rhacel Parreñas (2010) and their theory of ‘intimate labour.’ The concept of intimate 
labour “brings together the often-separated categories of care work, domestic work and 
sex work, calling attention to the labour involved in tending to the intimate needs of 
individuals inside and outside their home” (Lee & Parreñas, 2016, p.285, original 
emphasis). However, these concepts offer a definitively humanist framing of how 
reproductive labour is exploited (by emphasising the existence of pre-existing emotional 
or intimate human characteristics from which the reproductive labourer is alienated in 
the course of their work) and this section argues that this humanist framing of 
reproductive labour develops problematically, into a tendency which sees the gendered 
class relations of reproductive labour obscured or bracketed. In order to demonstrate this, 
this section will critically analyse some of the leading contributions to this emerging 
discourse. 
 This argument was central to Hochschild’s (1983) critique in The Managed Heart. 
For Hochschild (1983), contemporary capitalism was defined by its centralisation of what 
she called ‘emotional labour’ (p.7) in its organisation of production. Hochschild (1983) 
described ‘emotional labour’ as “the management of feeling to create a publicly observable 
facial and bodily display” (p.7), arguing that contemporary capitalism was less concerned 
with the production of material products, but instead was increasingly more invested in 
reproducing feelings of gratitude, happiness and satisfaction within an augmenting base 
of consumers more interested in services than commodities. Using the example of flight 
attendants – whom Hochschild (1983) used in the empirical studies conducted in her text 
– Hochschild (1983) described how through the centrality of emotional labour within 
contemporary production, “the emotional style of offering the service is part of the 
service itself” (p.5-6, original emphasis) in a way that is not prevalent in earlier, more 
industrial forms of production (the worker’s emotional attitude towards a material 
commodity does not have any bearing on the appearance of that commodity following its 
production). Synonymous with this new form of production was, essentially, a new form 
of alienation. Rather than separating the worker from merely the products of their labour, 
this new regime of capitalist production depended upon the separation of workers from 
distinctively human emotional capacities. In reference to Marx’s (2013) observations of 
wallpaper production in industrial capitalism, Hochschild (1983) described this new form 
of alienation: 
 
The work done by the boy in the wallpaper factory called for a coordination of 
mind and arm, mind and finger, mind and shoulder. We refer to it simply as 
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physical labor. The flight attendant does physical labor when she pushes heavy 
metal carts through the aisles, and she does mental work when she prepares for 
and actually organizes emergency landings and evacuations. But in the course of 
doing this physical and mental labor, she is also doing something more, something 
I define as emotional labor…This kind of labor calls for a coordination of mind 
and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a source of self that we honor as deep and 
integral to our individuality (p.6-7, original emphasis). 
 
In this way, “the worker can become estranged or alienated from an aspect of self – either 
the body or the margins of the soul – that is used to do the work” (Hochschild, 1983, p.7, 
original emphasis). Hochschild (1983) problematised contemporary capitalism because 
the regimes of production that it was centralising were dependent upon the alienation and 
commodification of human qualities more deeply set and distinctive than the simple 
manipulation of tools required by manual forms of production. Human emotions and 
human relationships, once protected from commodification, now found themselves 
deployed in the service of capital accumulation, often to the detriment of the workers from 
whom these qualities were alienated (Hochschild, 1983). As Hochschild (1983) argued,  
 
The company lays claim not simply to her physical motions – how she handles 
food trays – but to her emotional actions and the way they show in the ease of a 
smile. The workers I talked to often spoke of their smiles as being on them but not 
of them (p.7-8, original emphasis). 
 
Through this argument, Hochschild (1983) problematised contemporary capitalism on 
the basis of its propensity to alienate and commodify basic and inherent human values – 
expressed primarily through human relationships and human emotions – and set these 
values to work in the pursuit of profit. The result, so Hochschild (1983) argued, is the 
production of a society in which human emotion is transformed from a genuine expression 
of social cohesion to simply a product of an expanding service industry. This analysis of 
alienation constructed by Hochschild (1983) has been reflected in contemporary social 
scientific analyses of reproductive labour. The observation of this alienation provides the 
analytical pivot of these emerging reproductive services, which are problematised in the 
extent to which they demand an alienation of distinctively human emotional capacities. 
 This condition of alienation is evident, for example, in the employment of nannies, 
maids and other domestic workers. Anderson (2002) argues that the working patterns 
that emerge in the relationship between a domestic labourer and their employing family 
are much different from those of an ordinary wage-labour relationship. What is demanded 
from the domestic labourer in the cleaning of homes, the raising of children or the care of 
other family members is a particular form of emotional labour that simulates a ‘genuine’ 
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familial or emotional connection that is reflected in the work that is carried out. For 
example, Anderson (2002) describes the way in which domestic labourers are effectively 
inducted into the family and are expected to develop familial emotional bonds with those 
family members, in order that these bonds are reflected in the quality of care delivered. 
Problematically, for Anderson (2002), the emotional bond that the domestic labourer 
forms with their employing family is a fundamentally alienated one, which results in a 
disproportionate benefit for the employing family, providing them with an opportunity to 
exploit greater amounts of emotional labour dependent upon their needs. As Anderson 
(2002) writes, 
 
Although being a part of the family does not entitle the worker to unconditional 
love or support, it does entitle the employer to encroach on the worker’s off-duty 
hours for ‘favours’. In fact, many employers will invoke either a contractual or a 
family relationship under different circumstances, depending on what is most 
convenient (p.112). 
 
For Anderson (2002), the emotional relationship forged by the domestic labourer with 
their employing family is exploited as a way of designing working patterns to the benefit 
of the employing family, played on to demand longer working hours and more imposing 
forms of care work, but which is not reciprocated with a similar emotional response from 
the employing family and is simply paid for through a wage: “As far as the employer is 
concerned, money expresses the full extent of her obligation to the worker” (Anderson, 
2002, p.112). What therefore emerges within middle-class families in North America and 
Western Europe is an economy of alienated emotional labour, wherein the capacities for 
care and compassion that exist within particular (often poorer) women are alienated and 
exploited to the benefit of (often richer) families. As Anderson (2002) writes of the 
domestic labourer, “her caring engenders no mutual obligations, no entry into a 
community, and no real human relationship – just money” (p.112): a situation which 
“denies the worker’s humanity and the very depth of her feelings” (p.112). 
 In this instance, these examples of contemporary reproductive labour are 
considered exceptional in the extent to which they demand a form of emotional alienation 
more severe than normal types of work. This is true not only of examples of domestic 
labour, but is particularly acute in considerations of sex work. In the wake of heightened 
calls for the decriminalisation of sex work in Europe, social critics such as Kat Banyard 
(2016) argue that calls for decriminalisation and for sex work to be treated as ‘work’, 
ignore the particular and uniquely severe forms of alienation that are central to the 
relationship between sex workers, their clients and their ‘employers.’ For Banyard (2016), 
sex work is different from other types of work precisely because of the intense and 
heightened forms of alienation – and the reflection of this alienation in sexual and 
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gendered violence – that are inaugurated by the conditions of this industry. By drawing 
attention to this, Banyard (2016) hopes to expose the “chilling absurdity of claiming that 
what’s taking place on porn sets and in brothels can be suitably framed as an innocuous 
consumer transaction” (chapter 2, para.18). Through her interviews with sex workers, 
Banyard (2016) describes the experience of women in the sex industry by highlighting the 
ways in which women are in some way separated from their sexuality as it becomes 
commodified and made available for sale. For example, one interviewee, ‘Tanja’, describes 
her experience as a sex worker, saying “it was like my sexuality didn’t belong to me. It was 
something men could take if they wanted” (Banyard, 2016, chapter 2, para.24). ‘Crystal’, 
another former sex worker interviewed by Banyard (2016), says that “I still feel like I lost 
a part of myself back there – and there’s no getting her back” (chapter 2, para.51). Banyard 
(2016) draws attention to these accounts of loss and separation as a way of articulating 
the unique harms, reflected in a form of emotional alienation, that force the thinking of 
sex work as separate and distinct from other forms of work. For Banyard (2016), the sex 
trade codifies this alienation by ‘commodifying consent’, removing women’s autonomy 
over their own sexuality by alienating it from their control and making it available to be 
bought and sold: 
 
If while having sex with someone you feel repulsed by them touching you, afraid 
of what they might do, degraded and humiliated by the sexual acts, hurt by the 
hateful words they’re whispering in your ear, sore because he’s the fifth man 
you’ve had sex with today, exhausted from it all, traumatised, abused – the fact 
that you’ll get a bit of cash at the end does not change this fact. There is no invisible 
hand in the prostitution market that magically disappears the lived experience of 
sexual abuse (chapter 2, para.20). 
 
In relation to sex work, this analysis is also echoed in the context of pornography and types 
of sex work that differ from prostitution (for example the production of adult material 
such as magazines, films and online broadcasts). For sociologists such as Gail Dines 
(2010), contemporary society is one increasingly saturated with what she identifies as 
“porn ideology” (p.100), which not only describes the proliferation of increased popularity 
of pornographic images in society but, more importantly, the infection of human 
approaches to sex and sexuality by the ideas and values reinforced by these pornographic 
images. The greater involvement of women in sex industries is, for Dines (2010), a 
reflection of the fact that in contemporary society, approaches to sex and sexuality have 
been reified in an alienated condition, where sex is routinely pictured as something to 





Why, then, are girls and women agreeing to have sex under emotionally shallow 
and at times physically dangerous circumstances?...In this hypersexualized 
culture, we are socializing girls into seeing themselves as legitimate sex objects 
who are deserving of sexual use (and abuse) (p.117). 
 
For Dines (2010), the reflection of alienated sexuality in human society is particularly 
damaging insofar as it reproduces dangerous attitudes towards sex not only in men (who 
come to see women as objects to whom the act of sex is applied) but also in women too 
(who come to accept that sex is not something in which they engage, but are simply 
involved). This reproduces a passive attitude towards the figuration of sex and sexuality 
in human relationships, undermining social values such as intimacy but also, more 
dangerously, legal considerations of consent (Dines, 2010). Therefore, for these authors, 
the consideration of these forms of sex work within the paradigm of ‘work’ overlook the 
fact that the mobilisation of sex and sexuality within service provision implicates a 
heightened form of human emotional alienation that is reflected in severe societal dangers 
and particular types of gendered violence. 
 This humanist approach is also evident in confrontations with tissue donation and 
surrogacy. Summarising popular critical responses to emerging markets in tissue 
donation and surrogacy, Donna Dickenson (2007) argues that what motivates concerns 
in relation to these emerging markets is the prospect of the commodification and 
marketisation of not only the human body, but of the cells that belong to it. In particular, 
the way in which tissue donation separates particular cells and bodily entities away from 
the body, or the way in which surrogacy ascribes value to only certain parts of the body 
(primarily the womb and its gestational capabilities), is problematised insofar as it 
reproduces a particular form of subjective alienation, in which the bodily capabilities that 
underpin the human capacity for care become alienated from the precise human subject 
and its social setting, in the sole context of which these capabilities find their importance: 
“A large part of what disturbs people about commodification of the body appears to be the 
way in which it transforms us into objects of property-holding rather than active human 
subjects” (Dickenson, 2007, p.4). For Dickenson (2007), these concerns regarding the 
alienation of bodily corporeality and distinct human capacities are reflected in the political 
economy of surrogacy and tissue donation as “the recipient couple views the transaction 
as purely monetary, while the donor mother is encouraged to think she is giving the 
greatest gift of all, the gift of life” (p.22). Again, Dickenson (2007) here demonstrates how 
the concerns regarding this contemporary expression of reproductive labour are reflected 
in an observation of a heightened emotional alienation that is unparalleled in other types 
of work.  
 The accounts here described are evidence of an emerging theoretical approach to 
contemporary manifestations of reproductive labour under capitalism, which observe 
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their analysis in the heightened and markedly severe forms of human alienation that are 
implicated in these developments. The quarrel with these accounts is not with the 
particular social and indeed disproportionately gendered harms that this theoretical 
approach signifies. It is clear that the contemporary constellation of reproductive relations 
under capitalism implicate markedly different and, in many cases, more severe instances 
of disproportionately gendered harm, violence and exploitation, culminating in a unique 
experience of the effects of patriarchal capitalist power by women. However, what is 
evident from the Marxist-feminist approach first set out at the beginning of this chapter 
is that the comprehension of this unique experience and its implications pivots on an 
initial understanding of the particular social relations that underpin this experience and 
the gendered class struggles reflected in these relations. It is clear that these contemporary 
markets in reproductive services centralise a different class relationship from that of the 
industrial family, implicating a gendered social division of reproductive labour that 
implicates not only men and women, but women and other women across transnational 
reproductive networks. However, in this humanist theoretical approach, the concrete 
knowledge of these social realities – and their expression in gendered violence – is in fact 
foreclosed by this theoretically humanist approach by virtue of its grounding in a 
problematic of human alienation and the reflection of this grounding in particular 
theoretical weaknesses. 
 For example, in order for this humanist ideological analysis to function, it relies 
upon the unwitting but nonetheless problematic resurrection of a normative boundary 
between ‘work’ and ‘non-work.’ In observing its analysis in the heightened emotional 
alienation of contemporary reproductive workers, the proponents of this ideological 
tendency necessarily construct a normative consideration of emotion and of work itself in 
order to provide themselves with a point of distinction between genuine emotion and its 
alienated form. This is evident, for example, in Anderson’s (2002) critique of domestic 
labour. For Anderson (2002) the heightened alienation of domestic labour is reflected in 
the degradation of the worker’s genuine emotional and familial relationships with their 
own families. As Anderson (2002) writes, 
 
They often feel ill at ease in their home countries, where things have changed in 
their absence, and where they may feel that they no longer belong. When their 
families meet them at the airport, these women commonly do not recognize their 
own kin. They talk of the embarrassment of having sex with husbands who have 
become virtual strangers, and of reuniting with children who doubt their mother’s 
love (p.110). 
 
This is also evident in Banyard’s (2016) critique of sex work. Banyard (2016) 
problematises the calls for the decriminalisation of sex work and its treatment as a form 
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of ‘work’ like any other, arguing that such decriminalisation would simply open sex 
workers up to the precariousness and informality that currently plagues contemporary 
employment markets: 
 
Basic workplace health and safety rules don’t even apply to most women in 
Germany’s legal brothels. Why? Because for them to apply an individual has to be 
an employee. And it is up to individual brothels whether or not they employ 
women or simply host them as ‘independent contractors’ (chapter 2, para.5). 
 
The theoretical approach taken by these authors sees them unwittingly reproduce a 
separation between ‘work’ and ‘non-work’, with the dialectical social relationship that 
exists between them overlooked. For Anderson (2002), the familial space outside of work 
is normatively constructed as a space of ‘genuine’ emotion and human relationships, 
which allows for the description of the process of alienation that underpins domestic 
labour. However, this approach betrays the fundamental lesson of feminist critiques of 
reproduction, which argue that behind the apparently ‘genuine’ emotional relationships 
that exist within society are always particular social relations pertaining to historical 
forms of production and reproduction. For Banyard (2016), the correlation between the 
proliferation of the sex industry, the exercise of gendered violence and the conditions of 
informality of the contemporary labour market is a missed opportunity for critique, with 
this brief sociological critique of contemporary employment markets utilised as nothing 
more than a critical foregrounding to her resistance towards the decriminalisation of sex 
work based upon the heightened alienation that it centralises. In both of these instances, 
the theoretical humanism of these analyses resolves itself in the production of particular 
ideological limitations in which the social relations of production and reproduction are 
missed and overlooked in favour of an analysis of human emotional alienation. 
Relatedly, the reinforcement of this normative separation often sees the 
proponents of this discourse uncritically or unwittingly celebrate wage-labour itself as an 
ideal or a ‘norm’, leaving the relationship that its shares with the gendered violence they 
have just analysed unthought. Again, in relation to domestic labour, Anderson (2002) 
argues in favour of the ‘professionalisation’ of domestic labour, writing that 
professionalisation serves as “a means of giving respect to domestic workers as workers, 
as well as of managing the personal relationships that develop from care work” (p.113). 
However, the idea that the wage-labour market is desirable to the extent that it respects 
the workers under its charge is a misnomer which, though helpful to Anderson’s (2002) 
argument, betrays the feminist critique of production and reproduction: a critique that 
demonstrates that part of the reason that reproductive labour is exploited is because the 
wage-labour relation withholds respect and economic justice from its participants. 
Moreover, the reach of patriarchal capitalist social relations is also left unthought by 
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Anderson (2002) as it does not follow that the professionalisation of certain forms of 
reproductive labour would lead to a more egalitarian gendered division of labour across 
society: as Federici (2012) wrote, “the overalls did not give us any more power than the 
apron – quite often even less, because now we had to wear both and had even less time 
and energy to struggle against them” (p.22). 
 Banyard’s (2016) argument travels in the other direction, arguing that sex work 
should not be decriminalised and called ‘work’ but in fact should be more strictly 
regulated. However, Banyard (2016) makes this argument not because she recognises the 
reflection of gendered exploitation in the wage-labour relation itself (which makes the 
demand for professionalisation on its own, short-sighted); rather, Banyard (2016) 
unwittingly constructs an argument that defends wage-labour as a normative construct, 
arguing that the inclusion of sex within definitions of ‘work’ risks degrading the nature of 
work itself and the protections that ‘ordinary’ workers (particularly women) currently 
enjoy. This argument comes through in Banyard’s (2016) juxtaposition of the work of sex 
with other ‘ordinary’ forms of work: 
 
So if ‘sex work is work’, then presumably if an airline company requires all its 
female flight attendants to offer male passengers blow-jobs, as well as drinks and 
snacks, that’s all right? What about City firms stipulating that female employees 
must have sex with male clients as part of their corporate entertaining duties? 
OK?...I guess if this is ordinary work then at worst the requested task is merely 
outside her job description? (chapter 2, para.12). 
 
Again, Banyard’s (2016) analysis points towards a critical social point, only to turn away 
from it in the last instance. Instead of making the argument that the contemporary 
appearance of sex work and the particular forms of gendered violence and exploitation 
that it exhibits are in fact reflected in the apparently innocuous acts of gendered 
exploitation that exist within ‘ordinary’ workplaces, the humanism of Banyard’s (2016) 
argument forces the stopping-short of this critical point. In order to pronounce the 
heightened alienation of sex work and formulate this into a critical resistance to its 
decriminalisation, Banyard (2016) effectively forces the protection and celebration of the 
wage-labour relation as a form of untainted employment: an analysis that necessarily 
mystifies the existence of interpenetrative social relations between production and 
reproduction. 
 As well as resolving itself in this false distinction between work and non-work, the 
humanist ideological approach also reproduces a theoretical limitation that has long 
dogged dominant critiques of capitalism: that is the exclusion of particular gendered 
actors from analyses of class struggle and social change. The objective of twentieth century 
movements such as the Wages for Housework Movement was to position women first 
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theoretically and then concretely as class actors with a distinct social stake in the 
development of capitalism and a unique position in their ability to change this social 
situation. It was on this basis that the observation of housewives as ‘workers’ was justified. 
However, within this emerging ideological critique in relation to contemporary 
reproductive markets, this tends to be forgotten and removes the particular class agency 
and unique class positions that workers in these industries occupy. For Banyard (2016) 
the framing of sex work as ‘work’ and of the women involved in it as ‘workers’ dresses what 
is essentially sexual abuse, up in a “media-friendly moniker” (chapter 2, para.66). 
However, this argument misses the fact that calling sex work ‘work’ – in the same way that 
the Wages for Housework Movement defined housework as ‘work’ – is not a campaign to 
justify or simply seek compensation for the abuses suffered in these forms of reproductive 
labour: rather, it is to identify their position within the matrix of productive and 
reproductive relations essential to capitalist production, “to make a broader point about 
how the wage relation operates within capitalism” (Power, 2017, p.224-225) and thereby 
attribute its participants a particular class position. This position, rather than labelling 
them as passive victims of gendered exploitation actually empowers them as social agents 
with a particular and unique capability to struggle against these conditions of exploitation. 
This is entirely overlooked in Banyard’s (2016) account, because this class position is 
incomprehensible: a lack of comprehension that is foregrounded by the mystification of 
particular social relations. For Banyard (2016), sex workers cannot occupy a particular 
gendered class position, because their work is considered as cut off from the relations of 
production in capitalist society: as an extreme example of alienation in an underground 
economy rather than reflective of a deeper social situation. 
 In these ways, the humanist ideological approach to contemporary forms of 
reproductive labour is problematic and theoretically limited. By observing the critique of 
reproductive labour through the prism of human alienation, the proponents of this 
approach point towards the emergence of new gendered social harms, but provide little 
concrete knowledge of the precise social conditions that underpin these harms and the 
potential routes out of these harms. The humanist ideological framework of this approach 
reproduces many of the theoretical obstacles first necessarily deconstructed by Marxist-
feminist theory, relying on normative ideas of human emotion and human relationships 
as a way of articulating contemporary alienation and gendered exploitation, unwittingly 
reproducing the precise ideological mystifications beneath which gendered exploitation 
has typically been hidden. Moreover, rather than empowering women as agents of class 
struggle and social change in the context of these contemporary developments, the 
proponents of this analysis tend to remove the political agency of women as workers by 
interpreting their position as one of victimhood without conceivable escape, rather than 
as a position reflective of a particular gendered class constellation, the terms of which are 
always subject to social change. In this way, this emerging humanist ideological analysis 
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prevents a fuller understanding of the nature of contemporary reproductive labour, whilst 
also obscuring the knowledge of socio-political strategies through which to combat the 
gendered exploitation implicated in these new arrangements.  
 
TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF ‘CLINICAL LABOUR’ 
 
The theoretically humanist approach to the contemporary landscape of reproductive 
relations under capitalism has shown itself to be particularly limited. It finds itself unable 
to think production and reproduction in tandem with one another, falsely separating the 
two spheres apart from one another in order to secure the functionality of its own analysis 
of human alienation. The ideological effect of humanism in this way is not surprising, 
given that – as the Marxist-feminists of the mid-to-late twentieth century have already 
shown – this was its precise function when deployed by capitalism itself. This theoretical 
humanism has pointed towards examples of gendered violence and exploitation but has 
been significantly limited in its ability to demonstrate the ways in which these instances 
of violence and exploitation are socially anchored, not in a process of alienation, but in the 
matrix of interpenetrative relations of production and reproduction that underpin the 
capitalist social formation. 
 It is therefore apparent that the production of a feminist sociological analysis of 
contemporary forms of reproductive labour demands an alternative theoretical approach. 
This chapter argues that such an approach exists in the re-visitation of the critical 
theoretical principles of Marxist-feminism, paying particular attention to its critique of 
ideology. The originality of Marxist-feminist approaches to work and reproduction has 
been in demonstrating that production and reproduction, though they contain unique 
social relations, do not exist in isolation from one another: rather, they inform one 
another, with the social appearance of ‘work’ necessarily dependent upon the constellation 
of reproductive relations within a given social setting. In the twentieth century, the 
industrial workplace and its appearance – the length of the working-day, the shift patterns 
and the division of labour itself – corresponded to the orientation of reproductive 
relations within the family home which, themselves, were reflective of a gendered class 
struggle. It is in producing a similar view of the nature of contemporary reproductive 
labour that it will be possible to explain the social character of gendered exploitation, as 
an expression of gendered class struggle rather than a manifestation of human alienation. 
For this, the chapter turns to the Marxist-feminist analysis of Cooper and Waldby (2014) 
in their critical analysis of Clinical Labour. 
 Cooper’s and Waldby’s (2014) analyses focus on what they call ‘clinical labour’ 
(p.7), which is the reproductive labour primarily associated with contemporary 
biomedical industries in fertility: the donation, gestation and reproduction of cells, tissues 
and even human beings themselves. As Cooper and Waldby (2014) specify, “the life 
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science industries rely on an extensive yet unacknowledged labor force whose service 
consists on the visceral experience of experimental drug consumption, hormonal 
transformation, more or less invasive biomedical procedures, ejaculation, tissue 
extraction, and gestation” (p.7). Though they have a specific form of reproductive labour 
in mind, ‘clinical labour’ itself is a conceptual device deployed by Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) to describe the complex interplay between the relations of production and 
reproduction that underpin contemporary capitalism’s strategies of accumulation. For 
Cooper and Waldby (2014), the appearance of the capitalist mode of production in the 
twenty first century can only be comprehended through its reproductive relations, of 
which clinical labour is but the most contemporary example. As Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) write of clinical labour, “far from representing an exceptional or extreme 
manifestation of the underground economy, is emblematic of the conditions of twenty-
first-century labor” (p.17). 
 Crucially, the argument that Cooper and Waldby (2014) make is that the 
appearance of capitalist production in the twenty first century is fundamentally 
underpinned by a renegotiation of the reproductive limits of the body. Twenty first 
century trends in the employment market that demonstrate tendencies towards 
outsourcing, the increased migration of labour-power and the mobilisation of labour-
power through precarious and individualised employment contracts, for Cooper and 
Waldby (2014) do not find their roots in the greater advancement of the forces of 
production (machines and technologies that facilitate the greater flexibility of labour-
power) but in a gendered struggle over the productive and reproductive limitations of the 
human body which, though certainly made possible by the availability of reproductive 
technologies, is driven in the first instance by gendered class struggle. As Cooper and 
Waldby (2014) write, 
 
The outsourcing of labor and the rise of new forms of clinical labor are not merely 
parallel historical developments but rather are deeply imbricated one with the 
other, and they act as the leading edge of late twentieth-century neoliberal 
experimentation with new forms of accumulation (p.19). 
 
For Cooper and Waldby (2014), the political economic innovation of contemporary 
capitalism that makes labour-power easily exploitable within post-Fordist economic 
constellations, finds its roots fundamentally in the renegotiation of reproductive relations 
in the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries.  
 The argument here put forward is fundamentally and theoretically different from 
that of the humanists discussed in the previous section. For the proponents of the 
humanist discourse of alienation, contemporary forms of reproduction – including these 
manifestations of clinical labour – are the result of a particular process of human 
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emotional alienation that is facilitated by the contemporary make-up of capitalist social 
relations. However, Cooper’s and Waldby’s (2014) analysis is more socially grounded, 
arguing that the answers as to the social location of clinical labour – and the gendered 
forms of exploitation that it inaugurates – are located not in processes of human 
alienation but in the social interpenetration between relations of production and 
reproduction under capitalism which, as will be shown, not only implicate new particular 
exploitations of labour-power but new regimes of the primitive accumulation and 
exploitation of reproductive labour and reproductive labourers: relations which are 
always reflective of a particular class struggle. 
 Revisiting Federici’s (2004) Marxist-feminist analysis of primitive accumulation, 
Federici (2004) demonstrated how the interrogation and establishment of knowledges 
regarding the productive and reproductive potential of the female body was absolutely 
central to the establishment of emerging regimes of capitalist production. In this way, as 
Federici (2004) argued, gendered class struggle was waged at the level of the body, as the 
enclosure of land and the privatisation of the means of production that would underpin 
capitalist production, was simultaneously complemented by an enclosure and study of the 
body itself as a vital pillar on which notions of productivity and value would themselves 
be based. As Federici (2004) wrote, “we can see, in other words, that the human body and 
not the steam engine, and not even the clock, was the first machine developed by 
capitalism” (p.146). It is important to extrapolate precisely what Federici (2004) means 
here. Federici’s (2004) argument is not the humanist one: that the development of 
capitalism in these early stages was dependent upon the identification, alienation and 
eventual exploitation of reproductive capacities that existed ‘innately’ within the female 
body. Rather, it was in the gendered class struggle over control over the body that the 
female body itself comes to have any sort of reproductive capacity at all (Federici, 2004). 
In other words, to speak of any reproductive capacity existing within the female body is to 
speak of measures of ‘capacity’, ‘reproduction’ and ‘potential’ which only have meaning in 
the context of capitalist production and its measure of value. The body itself and its 
capacities are, in this way, the product of gendered class struggle, as the bourgeoisie 
necessarily sought to produce knowledge of the productive capacities of labour-power and 
the requirements for its reproduction, on which it would base the entire of its political 
economic approach: “The body, then, came to the foreground of social policies because it 
appeared not only as a beast inert to the stimuli of work, but also as the container of labor-
power, a means of production, the primary work-machine” (Federici, 2004, p.137-138). 
 In analysing the contemporary character of clinical labour, Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) argue that what they observe is the re-deployment of this strategy in the late 
twentieth and early twenty first centuries. The availability of medical technologies has 
made possible, for Cooper and Waldby (2014), an opportunity for the bourgeoisie to 
further interrogate the productive and reproductive potential of the human (female) body, 
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upon which to base new regimes of production and value creation. As Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) argue, “we contend that the renegotiation of bodily limits and productive 
possibilities has become the core business of bioeconomic innovation (p.107, original 
emphasis). Primarily, this strategy of reproductive primitive accumulation – through 
which the productive and reproductive capacities of the body are renegotiated – takes 
place within contemporary discourses and practices of biomedicine and the biomedical 
industries: the collation and study of reproductive tissues, the production of cell lines, the 
development of experimental medicines and the medicalisation of child birth (Cooper & 
Waldby, 2014). Crucially, for Cooper and Waldby (2014), the clinical labour that 
underpins this biomedical innovation is by no means a manifestation of human alienation 
but a contemporary reflection of gendered class struggle at the level of the body itself. 
 For Cooper and Waldby (2014) it is this process of primitive accumulation – and 
not heightened forms of alienation – that explains the breakdown of the industrial sexual 
division of labour between the male breadwinner and female housewife. For Cooper and 
Waldby (2014) the ‘commercialisation’ of particular reproductive labours and the opening 
up of reproductive markets reflects a re-mapping of gendered class relations in capitalist 
society, in which the class division between the male breadwinner and female housewife 
is no longer the dominant expression of gendered antagonism. As Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) argue, 
  
We can say that the vertical disintegration of national production and the large 
corporation associated with post-Fordism, the shift to horizontal outsourcing, was 
accompanied by the vertical disintegration of the Fordist household and the 
development of new kinds of contractual mechanisms to secure both biological 
and social reproductive capacity from outside the family unit proper (p.61, original 
emphasis). 
 
The re-mapping of gendered class relations in this way facilitates the development by 
capitalism of new strategies of reproductive primitive accumulation upon which to base 
developing strategies of capital accumulation more generally. Fundamentally, it is in this 
re-orientation of gendered class struggle – and not in the heightened alienation of human 
values – that these emerging reproductive ‘industries’ find their root. As Cooper and 
Waldby (2014) write, “the Californian oocyte and surrogacy markets of the 1980s gain 
their momentum in part from the social energies unleashed by dismantling of this 
particular gender order, the Fordist household of public male breadwinner and private 
female housewife” (p.60-61).  
 Crucially, this re-mapping of gendered class antagonism finds itself reflected 
within the emerging relations of capitalist production and reproduction that are 
observable in the developing biomedical industries. For example, this re-mapping of class 
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antagonism is reflected in the individualisation and ‘neoliberalisation’ (Waldby & Cooper, 
2008, p.57) of reproduction. In contrast to its organisation within the industrial family 
unit, these emerging biomedical industries necessitated an individualisation of 
reproductive labour where the donors of reproductive tissue were interpellated into a 
position of having individual and contractual responsibility over the production and 
delivery of biological materials. As Cooper and Waldby (2014) write, “the woman takes on 
an entrepreneurial economic role, but in this case, her collateral is her own body. In order 
to realize its value, she enters into the…contract as the proprietor of her own reproductive 
capacity” (p.84). In this way, the renegotiation of the reproductive capacities of the body 
forms the basis on which employment relations themselves come to be reformulated and 
deployed. The individualistic employment contracts that transfer risk onto the worker, 
find their roots not in technology or advancements in the forces of production, but 
crucially in the fundamental renegotiation of productive capacity at the beginning of this 
wave of capitalist primitive accumulation:  
 
The constitution of a proprietal self – able to rationally calculate the deployment 
of his or her body’s productivity, its risks and benefits, and enter into a contract – 
is a corollary of a global market for biological services in the self, a moment in the 
ordering of particular embodied processes as fungible entities, tradeable between 
strangers (Cooper & Waldby, 2014, p.85). 
 
Relatedly, this re-orientation of gendered class relations is reflected in the contemporary 
tendencies towards globalisation, migration and outsourcing. As well as allowing for 
capitalism to move beyond the industrial family in search of reproductive labour, its  
contemporary establishment in emerging employment markets facilitates the location of 
reproductive labour in sectors and areas where its exploitation is much cheaper: 
“Households in Europe are increasingly formed through transnational relations, and 
reproductivity at all levels is more and more likely to involve the labor of women from 
outside the family proper” (Cooper & Waldby, 2014, p.76). Cooper and Waldby (2014) 
describe the development of networks in biomedical reproduction that implicate white 
and primarily Western clients as the primary ‘consumers’ of reproductive labour, with 
women from poorer Eastern European countries or from countries in the global South (in 
particular, India) tending to provide the ‘service.’ In this way, the gendered class relations 
implicated in developing forms of primitive accumulation further break their industrial 
mould, as biomedical reproduction bears witness to “emerging class relations between 
women, as well-paid professional women employ other women to provide care” (Cooper 
& Waldby, 2014, p.106). Moreover, the development of capitalist relations of reproduction 
in this way map on to old networks of production and reproduction implicated in the 
development of race and empire, as capitalism repurposes the structures of global 
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exploitation previously constructed to develop new sources of reproductive labour: “In 
each case, women isolate and transact the desirable aspects of their fertility according to 
a map of regional and global economic power relations, which itself maps on to older 
histories of race and empire” (Cooper & Waldby, 2014, p.88). 
 Moreover, the renegotiation of reproductive capacities also resolves itself in 
important reorientations of capitalist property relations. The importance ascribed to 
‘cognitive labour’ and the apparent power of cognition within contemporary capitalist 
production, again, does not emerge by virtue of the development of the forces of 
production under capitalism. For Cooper and Waldby (2014), this power is developed out 
of the further interrogation of capitalism as to the reproductive capabilities of the human 
body. It forms the basis of the re-establishment of a new gendered division of labour 
between the clinical labour of the donor and the cognitive labour of the scientist or doctor. 
As Cooper and Waldby (2014) write, “the organization of intellectual property in the life 
sciences recognizes the cognitive labor of the scientist and the clinician, but not the 
constitutive nature of the biological material or the collaboration of the donor” (p.100). In 
this way, as Cooper and Waldby (2014) argue, the power of cognitive labour is of 
importance only to contemporary capitalism, as it becomes the precise mechanic through 
which it establishes and reifies relations of intellectual property utilised to exploit clinical 
labourers and deployed in the production of surplus-value. As Waldby (2002) writes, this 
division of labour is synonymous with “the process of technical innovation that enables 
the patenting of cell lines, genes and transgenic organisms as inventions, securing their 
status as intellectual property and possible sources of profit for their investors” (p.310). 
 In this analysis of clinical labour, it is increasingly clear that the complexities of 
reproductive labour in the twenty first century cannot be arrived at though a theoretically 
humanist approach. Cooper’s and Waldby’s (2014) analyses have shown that the 
appearance of contemporary reproductive relations – manifest in new divisions of labour, 
new property relations and in newly deployed networks of migration and empire – can in 
no way be traced to relations of human alienation. Rather, these realities are 
comprehensible only in the context of a particular gendered class struggle at the heart of 
contemporary capitalism and the reflection of this struggle in the primitive accumulation 
of reproductive labourers through the interrogation and renegotiation of the reproductive 
capacities of the body. Humanist ideology not only forces a theoretical foreclosure, 
obscuring these social relations of production and reproduction (and the class struggles 
reflected in these relations) from view in theory. What is also evident is that, in the same 
way as it did during the early primitive accumulation of women as reproductive labourers, 
humanism re-emerges as the precise ideological concept through which contemporary 




 In the same way that the class position of women and the political economic 
positioning of their reproductive labour has been obfuscated behind the notion that 
reproductive labour was an expression of ‘natural’ or ‘biological’ tendencies, in the context 
of clinical labour these themes have re-emerged primarily through ideological 
deployments of ‘altruism’ and ‘gift-giving.’ These ideologies, though they are presented in 
the form of bioethical concerns regarding the safeguarding of workers and consumers 
within biomedical industries, their effect is actually, primarily, a political-economic one, 
which materialises to facilitate the separation of the reproductive labourer from the 
product of their labour: “The intent of some current [bioethical] guidelines seems to be…to 
cut off any further claims by the donor and any continuing obligations for the clinician, 
researcher or biotechnology corporation in receipt of the gift” (Dickenson, 2007, p.18). In 
this way, as Cooper and Waldby (2014) argue, “whether it is framed in a liberal or a human 
rights register, we contend that bioethics as discourse and practice is internal to the 
political economy of the life sciences” (p.14). 
 Prominent within the biomedical industries is the deployment of humanist 
ideology in the context of discourses of ‘gift’ giving or the ‘gift relation.’ Routinely, the 
exploitation of reproductive labour and its mobilisation within structures of capitalist 
reproduction are mystified beneath ideological arguments that insist that the gestation, 
donation and reproduction of human tissues as clinical labour is not engaged in by women 
for the receipt of money, but transcends this and is an expression of their inherent 
altruism and propensity for care: donated in the form of a ‘gift.’ It is by virtue of the donor’s 
wish to ‘give the gift of life’ by donating their tissue towards medical research or 
transplant, or by donating oocytes or even becoming a surrogate that clinical labour is 
thought to come to pass: a social expression of inherent human values as opposed to a 
form of labour mobilised through particular relations of production and reproduction. 
The roots of this ideology are manifest in examples of social anthropology, particularly 
that of Richard Titmuss (1973), who argued that the emerging biomedical industries and 
the ‘donation’ of biological materials inherent to their functioning posed an opportunity 
for the establishment of social bonds on the basis of altruism and inherent human 
cooperation. As Waldby (2002) writes, 
 
For Titmuss, giving blood as an act of altruistic donation establishes social ties of 
indebtedness between fellow citizens, and creates the condition for the 
maintenance of community between strangers. Selling blood, on the other hand, 
creates instrumental, non-binding commodity relations between producers and 
consumers (p.309, original emphasis). 
 
However, when this ideology is reflected into contemporary political economy, it does not 
result in the emergence of an altruistic model of exchange, but rather a fundamentally 
136 
 
exploitative one which is shielded beneath these economic mystifications of human 
altruism and cooperation. As Cooper and Waldby (2014) write, “the labor involved in this 
collaboration goes largely unrecognized, valued as a gift of natural, reproductive surplus 
rather than a process of embodied production” (p.101).  
 From the perspective of political economy, this ideology serves a number of 
functions. For example, it is used as a means of undermining the bargaining power of 
clinical labourers by reflecting their struggle for higher wages, better compensation or 
more suitable working conditions as an act of selfishness or greed (Cooper & Waldby, 
2014). As Cooper and Waldby (2014) explain, “women who attempt to bargain on their 
own behalf are considered not psychologically appropriate to the task and may be 
excluded on those grounds” (p.56). Crucially, these ideologies of the ‘gift’ complement the 
traditional patriarchal capitalist ideologies that have constructed women as ‘naturally’ 
generous, caring and altruistic – ideologies that have been deployed as a means of 
securing reproductive labour for as cheaply as possible – as “remuneration detracts from 
the idealized cultural image of women/mothers as selfless, nurturant, and altruistic” 
(Ragoné, 1999, p.71-72). 
 In this way, humanism emerges as the precise ideology beneath which 
reproductive labour is located and cheapened by contemporary capitalism. In the same 
way that Mies (1986) identified the ways in which gendered humanist ideologies 
manufactured the notion that reproductive labour was a resource that was always-already 
present within human societies, as “a natural resource, freely available like air and water” 
(p.110), humanism serves a similar purpose in the context of clinical labour as it allows 
for the reduction of reproductive tissues to a position of omnipresence in human society, 
where value is produced in the transformation of this resource. Necessarily, as Cooper 
and Waldby (2014) argue, the profitability of human tissues is located upon an ideological 
enterprise which argues that “the bodily contribution of tissue providers and human 
research subjects appears as an already available biological resource, as res nullius, matter 
in the public domain” (p.9). The position of the reproductive labourer is here mystified 
within capitalist political economy once again and the source of value is – within capitalist 
political economy – located in the transformation of this res nullius, rather than in its 
reproduction from the outset by women. 
 Moreover, and relatedly, this humanist ideology therefore also serves to mystify 
contemporary class relationships and smoothen out the class antagonisms between the 
global actors brought into contact through the relations of reproduction under capitalism. 
If biological materials are an always-already present and publicly available resource to be 
taken advantage of then this, in combination with ideologies of the ‘gift’, presents 
contemporary reproductive labour not as an industry based inherently on exploitation, 
but as the culmination of rational networks of distribution, simply bringing the economic 
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agents of supply and demand into contact with one another. As Cooper and Waldby (2014) 
write, 
 
This…is generated by the marketing rhetorics used by brokerage companies, 
saturated with references to ‘the gift of life’ and the maternal generosity of 
potential surrogates and oocyte providers. By imagining the transaction as a gift 
relation, the parties can experience the exchange in less starkly commercial and 
adversarial terms than those stated in the contract. Without this softening 
language, the spectacle of the oocyte vendor as the efficient negotiator of her 
reproductive capital threatens to contaminate the maternal generosity that has 
formed part of her market appeal (p.58). 
 
This is particularly evident in the context of India’s surrogacy industry. The political 
economy of race and gender that facilitates the establishment and running of surrogacy 
clinics in the global South for a much lower cost, is mystified by humanist and gendered 
ideologies that seek to construct surrogacy as based upon a natural and ever-present form 
of labour, which these clinics merely organise. As documentaries such as Google Baby 
(politoTV, 2012) demonstrate, surrogacy clinics in India rely upon the deployment of 
these ideologies as a marketing strategy, valorising feminine qualities of motherhood and 
nurturance as a way of attracting potential parents from overseas to take advantage of the 
benefits of drastically lower medical costs. But humanism is also used to appropriately 
position poor women as surrogates too, medicalising their bodies but also devaluing them 
as part of the surrogacy contract. Pande’s (2010a, 2010b) research into India’s emerging 
gestational surrogacy industry demonstrates how alongside an emerging ‘trade’ in 
surrogacy in India, with women almost always involved in surrogacy for monetary 
reasons, is the deployment of a gendered ideology in which these women are made to 
consider their bodies as ‘vessels’ or rented space over which they have no ownership. 
Pande (2010a) talks about how the surrogacy clinics have become disciplinary spaces in 
which surrogates are conditioned into this view of themselves. As ‘Khanderia’ – a member 
of the medical staff at one of the clinics in which Pande’s (2010b) study takes place – 
explains to the surrogates in the clinic, “you have to do nothing. It’s not your baby. You 
are just providing it a home in your womb for nine months because it doesn’t have a house 
of its own” (p.308). 
 Through this analysis of reproductive labour, Cooper and Waldby (2014) have 
demonstrated how contemporary forms of reproductive labour are not expressions of 
alienated human relations but a distinctly social manifestation of gendered class struggle 
and its reflection within particular relations of production and reproduction. Not only is 
humanism a particularly unhelpful theoretical device in shedding light on the social 
composition of contemporary reproduction – foregoing an analysis of class for one of 
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human alienation – but Cooper and Waldby (2014) have also shown humanism to be the 
precise ideological mystification beneath which contemporary forms of gendered 
exploitation are mystified. In this way, humanism does not permit a better understanding 
of uniquely gendered violence within contemporary forms of reproduction: rather, it 
forecloses the analysis of these realities by mystifying their social character. In re-visiting 
the principles of Marxist-feminism and its critique of reproduction, Cooper and Waldby 
(2014) have here been more successful in producing a sociological analysis of 
contemporary reproduction and at the same time have demonstrated the ways in which 




This chapter has therefore demonstrated how an adequate understanding of 
contemporary forms of reproductive labour must necessarily be rooted in an exposure and 
explication of the social mechanics of contemporary reproduction and of its reflection at 
all times of particular gendered class struggles. The chapter has demonstrated that this 
was the precise strength of Marxist-feminist critiques of reproduction that emerged in the 
mid-to-late twentieth century. They dismantled the notion that housework and 
reproduction more generally were nothing more than expressions of an ‘innate’ or 
‘inherent’ capacity for care, nurturance or sexuality, by rooting these notions within 
concrete social relations, demonstrating the ways in which these forms of reproduction 
directly translated into the appearance and functionality of capitalist production proper. 
Moreover, the position of women in the household was shown by the Marxist-feminist to 
be the product of an historical class struggle, the product of a long and violent history of 
primitive accumulation of which the industrial family was but the most contemporary 
expression. 
 In the context of contemporary forms of reproductive labour and the emergence 
of reproductive ‘industries’ in domestic labour, sex work, tissue donation and surrogacy, 
this lesson first taught by the Marxist-feminists appears to have been overlooked. This re-
orientation of reproductive relations has increasingly been interpreted through a 
humanist ideological lens, with its unique characteristics and the particular forms of 
gendered social harm that it inaugurates observed in contemporary capitalism’s tendency 
towards the greater alienation of human capacities: an alienation with disproportionate 
impact upon women. However, this humanist ideological reaction has been shown to in 
fact foreclose a fuller understanding of the social mechanics of this gendered harm, 
reproducing ideological obstacles that prevent the production of sociological analysis. In 
light of this, the chapter has demonstrated how a re-visiting of the principles of Marxist-
feminism, and the analysis of contemporary reproduction from the starting-point of 
questions of class and social relations has produced a more helpful sociological critique of 
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contemporary reproduction, providing an understanding of the social grounding of 
gendered violence, but also producing an understanding of the social grounding of those 
actors most appropriately poised to change these conditions. 
 In moving to the next chapter, it is evident that this ideological problematic finds 
itself reproduced in critical responses to the ‘Anthropocene’ and to emerging challenges 
in relation to climate change and ecological disaster. The realities of this present historical 
moment prompt a humanist ideological reaction, which identifies a lack of responsibility 
and adequate human action in the face of these ecological realities in an alienation of the 
human subject from its labour, upheld and reinforced by modern discourse. What is clear, 
however, is that this ideological argument mystifies the social relationship that exists 
between capitalism, work and the planet and how the realities of ecological catastrophe 
are not the result of alienated labour but of strategies of accumulation that have 
continually relied on revolutionising ways of working and on a forceful adaptation of the 




‘Making’ History: Labour and the Humanism 
of the Anthropocene 
 
This chapter tracks and exposes the ideological limitations that have emerged in 
contemporary social scientific considerations of labour in the context of ‘the 
Anthropocene.’ The chapter focuses its analysis on developments within the social 
sciences that have risen in response to recent discoveries in the field of geology – namely, 
the ‘discovery’ of humanity’s geological agency and the reflection of this agency in the geo-
historical epoch of ‘the Anthropocene’ – which have taken these discoveries as an 
opportunity to revisit predominant theoretical approaches to social scientific concepts. 
The chapter argues that the figuration of labour within this social scientific approach is 
reflected in the emergence of a renewed theoretical humanism, in which the 
Anthropocene is problematised as a geo-historical expression of the historical power of 
human labour. This renewed theoretical humanism reproduces a now-familiar humanist 
problematic at the core of social scientific approaches to the Anthropocene: namely, a 
critical analysis of the geo-historical alienation of human labour. This analysis of 
alienated labour is reflected in a critique of modernity, where the sustained separation 
between human and natural histories is argued to have manifested itself in two centuries 
of alienated human labour: the products of which are the conditions of planetary 
instability that today face humanity. However, this theoretically humanist approach has 
an ideological effect, mystifying the social relationship that exists between capitalist 
relations of (re)production and these contemporary conditions of climatological 
imbalance. The argument made by this chapter is that this humanist approach to the 
problem of labour and the observation of its geo-historical alienation, forecloses its 
sociological application, preventing a fuller understanding of the relationship between the 
social relations of human society and contemporary planetary conditions.  
 The Anthropocene discourse is diverse and multi-disciplinary, covering 
contributions to the fields of geology, chemistry and biology as well as politics, sociology, 
ethics and economics under one conceptual umbrella. The term ‘Anthropocene’ itself 
originates from research conducted by Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer (2000) – an 
atmospheric chemist and biologist respectively – in a short article for the Global Change 
Newsletter of the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP). In the article, 
Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) presented evidence for the Earth’s entering into of a new 
geological era, which has been shaped fundamentally by the human species as a natural 
force. Whilst other eras have been marked by volcanic eruptions, glacial movements or 
extreme cooling, the human species itself, through its activity upon the Earth, is argued to 
have joined this list of natural forces in ushering in the next stage of Earth’s geological 
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history (Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000). Crutzen and Stoermer (2000) argued that the 
Holocene epoch, a period spanning the last ten to twelve thousand years and characterised 
by stable global temperatures capable of sustaining life, has ended and that the 
contemporary geological era is that of the human: the Anthropocene. 
 For Crutzen and Stoermer (2000), the start of the Anthropocene coincided with 
the beginning of the Industrial Revolution in Britain, with particular attention paid to the 
invention by James Watt of the steam engine towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
Other natural scientific analyses of the Anthropocene that followed (see McNeill & 
Engelke, 2014; Steffen et al., 2011; Zalasiewicz et al., 2008) have debated between 
themselves the ‘actual’ start date, with some defending the initial one agreed by Crutzen 
and Stoermer (2000) and others placing greater emphasis on the so-called ‘great 
acceleration’ in both human population and human consumption patterns in the middle 
of the twentieth century. Regardless of the start date, these natural scientists find 
consensus in the need to classify the current geo-historical moment as one indelibly 
shaped by human action: 
 
We learn that 30-50% of the land surface has been transformed by human action; 
more nitrogen is now fixed synthetically and applied as fertilizers in agriculture 
than fixed naturally in all terrestrial ecosystems; the escape into the atmosphere 
of NO [nitric oxide] from fossil fuel and biomass combustion likewise is larger 
than the natural inputs, giving rise to photochemical ozone (‘smog’) formation in 
extensive regions of the world; more than half of all accessible fresh water is used 
by mankind; human activity has increased the species extinction rate by thousand 
to ten thousand fold in the tropical rain forests and several climatically important 
‘green house’ gases have substantially increased in the atmosphere: CO2 [carbon 
dioxide] by more than 30% and CH4 [methane] by even more than 100% (Crutzen 
& Stoermer, 2000, p.17). 
 
The existence of the Anthropocene as a specific and ‘official’ geological epoch has not yet 
been codified, as doing so requires the completion and submission of geological research, 
including the demonstration of a visible layer in the rock of the planet that distinguishes 
this epoch from the last. However, its lack of ‘official’ definition has not prevented the 
emergence of an already quite substantial social scientific discourse dedicated to the 
posture of a variety of questions and theories regarding human society in relation to its 
new-found geological agency. As Bruno Latour (2017) writes, “these historians are 
proposing the most radical term of all for putting an end to anthropocentrism as well as 
to the old forms of naturalism; they are thus completely reconstituting the role of human 
agents” (p.117). Fundamentally, the possibility of the Anthropocene, and its implications 
in relation to the inextricable relationship between human society and planetary history, 
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makes possible and necessary a renewed critique of the presuppositions on which social 
scientific enquiry has, until this point, been consistently based. 
 This chapter focuses on the figuration of labour in the context of the emergence of 
the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene makes necessary the re-centring of questions 
regarding the relationship of the human subject with nature and the manifestation of that 
relationship within history itself. This chapter argues that a humanist conceptualisation 
of labour – corresponding precisely to this relationship between humans and nature – 
figures at the centre of a renewed theoretical humanism within the Anthropocene 
discourse. In this way, the Anthropocene as a geo-historical juncture, marred by planetary 
instability, is formulated as a problem of human labour. The question of labour frames 
the problematic of the Anthropocene and also provides the foundation from which to 
imagine and deploy potential ‘solutions’ to these problems. 
 
LABOUR AND THE THEORETICAL HUMANISM OF THE ANTHROPOCENE 
 
A closer analysis of the Anthropocene discourse reveals that labour and the 
problematisation of the historical power of human labour sits as the theoretical pivot of 
this emerging discourse. The emergence of the Anthropocene and the conditions of 
planetary instability that it brings with it are presented, fundamentally, as problems of 
human labour. Human interaction with nature over the last two centuries – and its 
manifestation in the cities, industry, agriculture and technological advancement that has 
come to define the appearance of human society – has, whilst bringing to pass the 
conditions of liberal democratic capitalism, also brought with it conditions of planetary 
instability. The Anthropocene brings to the attention of its observer the power of human 
labour to not only produce the marvels that have revolutionised human existence but also 
the planetary conditions that place this existence in real peril. The essence of this 
paradoxical situation is, in all instances, the labour of humanity, the activity of the 
Anthropos of the Anthropocene: a reality that makes absolutely necessary the figuration 
of this labour as the central problematic of thinking this historical epoch. 
 With this problem of human labour at its centre, the Anthropocene emerges as the 
foundation for the construction and deployment of a renewed theoretical humanism. On 
the one hand, the Anthropocene itself is a problem of human labour, in the ways outlined 
above. The conditions of planetary instability that today confront humanity are a direct 
product of its own activity. On the other hand, however, the apparent geo-historical power 
of human labour in fact bolsters humanity and the human subject as a geo-historical actor. 
If the human subject is imbued with the power to bring the planet to the brink of ecological 
catastrophe then, surely, it is the actor with the power capable of transcending this geo-
historical trajectory and charting an alternative historical path. This theoretical 
humanism is reflected across the Anthropocene discourse: from natural scientific 
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considerations of ‘planetary stewardship’ that have built directly upon Crutzen’s and 
Stoermer’s (2000) geological conclusions; to developments within the social sciences 
which have argued that the realities of this geo-historical moment make both possible and 
necessary the emergence of “a new human condition” (Hamilton et al., 2015, p.4). 
 The discourse of the Anthropocene is not the first time that a theoretical 
humanism of this type has been deployed within critical analysis. In his Reply to John 
Lewis, Althusser ([1972] 2008) constructed a critique of a very similar theoretical 
humanism emerging within Marxist-humanist critiques of labour and history. In his 
essay, the target of Althusser’s (2008) critique was the observation of a particular 
historical quality within human labour: that is, the ability of human labour to make and 
re-make history. From a perspective of Marxist-humanism, it was easy to see the utility of 
this ideological notion. The idea that human labour made history qualified the notion that 
capitalism – as a historically specific social formation – could in fact itself be the product 
of historically alienated human labour: that is, historical activity carried out against the 
interests of those who completed it (Althusser, 2008). Moreover, this humanist 
ideological consideration of labour was important because it also qualified Marxist-
humanist analyses of revolution as the ability of the human subject, now conscious of its 
alienated condition, to transcend its historical situation through the conscious application 
of its own historically-powerful labour (Althusser, 2008). In this way, as Althusser (2008) 
argued, “to make history is therefore ‘to negate the negation’, and so on, without end” 
(p.72). 
 In this humanist ideological figuration of labour and its reflection in historical 
progress, the precise emancipatory force of human labour exists not in its simple power 
of creation, but in its power of transcendence: that is, the ability, when confronted with 
particular conditions of historical existence, to overcome those conditions and chart an 
alternative historical path. As Althusser (2008) wrote of this approach, it 
 
Does not endow [the human subject] with a power of absolute creation (when one 
creates everything it is relatively easy: there are no limitations!) but with 
something even more stupefying – the power of ‘transcendence’, of being able to 
progress by indefinitely negating-superseding the constraints of the history in 
which he lives, the power to transcend history by human liberty (p.75, original 
emphasis). 
 
This property of transcendence, inherent to humanist ideological considerations of 
labour, proves itself to be particularly important in the considerations of labour and 
history made by the theorists of the Anthropocene too. In fact, this theoretically humanist 
framework outlines the entire approach of the Anthropocene theorists to the problems of 
labour and of history. It is, on the one hand, the ability of the human subject to make 
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history in the first instance that explains the emergence of the geo-historical conditions of 
the Anthropocene: the idea that “‘we’, the human species, unconsciously destroyed nature 
to the point of hijacking the Earth system into a new geological epoch” (Bonneuil & 
Fressoz, 2016, p.XII). But on the other hand, it is the precise ability of the human subject 
to use this power to transcend the geo-historical conditions that confront humanity that 
marks an historical path out of the crisis of the Anthropocene too: “In the time of the 
Anthropocene, the entire functioning of the Earth becomes a matter of human political 
choices” (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016, p.25). 
 In different ways and from varying perspectives, it is possible to observe the 
presence of this theoretical humanism throughout the Anthropocene discourse. For 
example, it finds its most simplistic reflection in the discourse of ‘planetary stewardship’ 
that emerges primarily within natural scientific approaches to the Anthropocene. Building 
on the original conclusions of Crutzen and Stoermer (2000), a number of theorists within 
the natural scientific approach to the Anthropocene (see Chapin et al., 2010; Rockström 
et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2011) have argued that the Anthropocene marks both a moment 
of crisis but also a particularly useful opportunity in which to re-evaluate humanity’s 
relationship with the planet. As Chapin et al. (2010) write, “this unsustainable trajectory 
demands a dramatic change in human relationships with the environment and life-
support system of the planet” (p.241). These scientists observe the completion of this 
dramatic change in the occupation of human beings of a role as planetary stewards. 
According to these authors, humanity’s ascension to a geological force in the era of the 
Anthropocene has not only meant that they are responsible for the setting of the planet 
upon an unstable ecological trajectory, but also that they remain the only force capable of 
potentially reversing the effects of their actions and creating more stable climatological 
conditions. As Steffen et al. (2011) write, “we are the first generation with the knowledge 
of how our activities influence the Earth System, and thus the first generation with the 
power and the responsibility to change our relationship with the planet” (p.749). 
 For the natural scientists, the solutions to this problematic are largely techno-
scientific in nature. There is an emerging consensus regarding the design and deployment 
of models of planetary stewardship around Rockström et al.’s (2009) model of ‘planetary 
boundaries’: the establishment of nine key ecological boundaries of differing variables 
(such as, for example, levels of ocean acidification, rates of biodiversity loss and the 
observation of ozone depletion), over which human beings become responsible for 
ensuring the equilibrium and sustainability. As Steffen et al. (2011) write of this approach, 
it is designed to “define a ‘safe operating space’ for humanity by analyzing the intrinsic 
dynamics of the Earth System and identifying points or levels relating to critical global-
scale processes beyond which humanity should not go” (p.753). The barriers to achieving 
the successful deployment of this programme are, for the natural scientists, largely 
problems of global governance. For these authors, fundamental alterations in 
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international and domestic structures of governmentality are the crucial first step to 
successfully completing this programme of planetary stewardship. As Chapin et al. (2010) 
write, “transformations involve forward-looking decisions to convert a system trapped in 
an undesirable state to a fundamentally different, potentially more beneficial system, 
whose properties reflect different social-ecological controls” (p.246) with Steffen et al. 
(2011) echoing this, arguing that “human impacts on Earth System functioning cannot be 
resolved within individual jurisdictions alone; supranational cooperation is required” 
(p.751). 
 This theory of planetary stewardship is a limited one, insofar as it places a great 
deal of faith in governing institutions such as governments, corporations or supranational 
bodies, without properly interrogating the particular inequalities and social harms often 
incubated by these institutions. Moreover, as Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016) write, within 
the natural scientific discourse, “everything is presented as if the environmental 
knowledge and initiatives of civil society did not exist” (p.82) and that the knowledge of 
this particular planetary predicament emanates exclusively from these scientists and their 
geological discoveries, in which the scientists appear not only “as spokespeople for the 
Earth, but also as shepherds of a public opinion that is ignorant and helpless” (p.80). 
Limitations aside, what is evident is that reflected within this theory of planetary 
stewardship are the ingredients of a particular theoretical humanism, which pivots on the 
concept of labour. The Anthropocene as an historical moment is here formulated as a 
product of the inherent historical power of human labour to not only shape the products 
that it pulls from nature (in the form of the industrial development of human society and 
production across the last two centuries), but also, in so doing, to shape the very nature of 
the raw material from which it extracts this productive capability (in the form of the 
ecological instability of the world which now faces this humanity). Finally, and perhaps 
most crucially, the knowledge of the Anthropocene catalyses the transcendent ability of 
human labour, of its ability to shift fundamentally and negate the constraints of this 
historical moment by virtue of the application of its own action in an alternative direction. 
 Social scientific approaches to the Anthropocene have been more successful in 
considering questions of social inequalities in their approach. More than this, it is argued 
that the Anthropocene, in forcing together human and natural histories in such a dramatic 
fashion in fact undermines the modern epistemological orientation on which knowledge 
– but also, power – has been based. As Hamilton et al. (2015) write, “the Anthropocene 
means that natural history and human history, largely taken as independent and 
incommensurable since the early nineteenth century, must now be thought as one and the 
same geo-history” (p.4). The Anthropocene therefore is expressive, for the social 
scientists, of an opportunity to re-interrogate notions such as ‘equality’, ‘justice’ and 
‘democracy’ by exposing the inadequacies of a constellation of power relations now 




Human-induced climate change gives rise to large and diverse issues of justice: 
justice between generations, between small island-nations and the polluting 
countries (both past and prospective), between developed, industrialised nations 
(historically responsible for most emissions) and the newly industrialising ones, 
and so on (Chakrabarty, 2015, p.49). 
 
Despite the fact that the social scientific approach to the Anthropocene is more developed 
in its considerations of power, inequality and social justice, what is evident is that the 
theoretical humanism of the ‘planetary boundaries’ approach in fact finds itself reflected 
– albeit with greater sophistication – in these social scientific approaches too. The 
adaptation of the human relationship with the planet demands the problematisation of 
human labour and the extent to which it itself is the reflection of the modern separation 
between human and natural histories. The result is an echo of the considerations of the 
natural scientists: that humans, who have laboured towards the Anthropocene, are the 
only geological agents, catalysed by the reality of their actions, capable of reformulating 
this relationship with nature. 
 The evidence of this theoretically humanist approach is located primarily in the 
way that labour is used to describe humanity’s geo-historical emergence at the time of the 
Anthropocene and its discontents. This depends firstly upon the establishment of labour 
as the historical motor, which is set out well by Mackenzie Wark (2015). For Wark (2015), 
labour is an important concept for the theorists of the Anthropocene because it is 
descriptive of an historical motor which, though it originates from the hands of the human 
subject, nonetheless has interpenetrative historical effects upon both human and natural 
histories. The concept of labour is important because it allows for the theorists of the 
Anthropocene to construct a version of history that undermines the modern idea of nature 
as a space upon which history itself merely unfolds. Rather, the concept of labour allows 
for the theorists of the Anthropocene to demonstrate a historical causality that emerges 
from human labour, in its ability to shape natural history as well as its own (Wark, 2015). 
As Wark (2015) writes, 
  
Labor finds itself in and against nature. Labor is always firstly in nature, 
subsumed within a totality greater than itself. Labor is secondly against nature. It 
comes into being through an effort to bend resisting nature to its purposes. Its 
intuitive understanding of causality comes not from exchange value but from use 
value. Labor experiments with nature, finding new uses for it. Its understanding 
of nature is historical, always evolving, reticent about erecting an abstract 




In this way, the theorists of the Anthropocene can stress the central importance of human 
labour as a historical motor, but justify its inclusion in their anti-modern critique by 
showing how – by virtue of the emergence of the Anthropocene itself – it is an historical 
activity with implications for both humans and non-humans alike. As Wark (2015) writes, 
“labor is the mingling of many things, most of them not human…almost already a cyborg 
point of view, in which the human organism and its machines interleave in an apparatus” 
(Wark, 2015, p.217). However, despite the fact that labour, thought in this way, implicates 
more than simply human actors or human history, the question that is left necessarily 
unanswered is the question of precisely who is carrying out this labour. The configuration 
of labour in this way, as a historical motor, still depends upon the existence of a human 
subject to carry it out. 
 For example, it is evident within these social scientific approaches that it is the 
human being – wielding this geo-historically powerful form of labour – that has made 
planetary history, albeit in a particularly unstable form. The Anthropocene, as a geo-
historical moment defined by potential ecological catastrophe, is, unequivocally, the 
product of this human labour. The Anthropocene “captures the realization that humanity 
is interfering, interacting, and communicating with the Earth’s long-term systems with 
increasing intensity” (Schwägerl, 2013, p.29). Human action as human labour is the 
precondition for historical development, as “real history only commenced when humans 
began to do unnatural things: cultivate crops, make tools, build cities, and create societies 
and cultures” (LeCain, 2016, p.15). What is repeatedly made clear is that, despite the fact 
that labour has been shown to have effects across both human and non-human histories, 
it is in the specifically historical character of human labour that these histories are 
themselves made: “The more we interfere with resources and ecosystems, the closer we 
get to natural phenomena and the deeper we move ‘into’ the new nature that arises 
through our actions” (Schwägerl, 2013, p.36). The Anthropocene forces humanity to 
confront the geo-historical power of its own labour and how it resolves itself in the 
appearance and trajectory not of human history alone but of natural history too. 
 However, it is this precise moment of confrontation that also compels the human 
subject to transcend the geo-historical conditions of the Anthropocene – conditions of its 
own making – and chart an alternative historical path. This transcendence of history 
through human labour is reflected in what the social scientists have often termed a ‘new 
human condition’: a new sense of responsibility felt by the human subject in the context 
of the planet and the natural world, with an alternative geo-historical trajectory 
emanating from this new-found responsibility. As Palsson et al. (2012) write, 
 
The new era, characterized by measurable global human impact – the 
Anthropocene – does not just imply conflation of the natural and the social, but 
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also a ‘radical’ change in perspective and action in terms of human awareness of 
and responsibility for a vulnerable earth – a ‘new human condition’ (p.4). 
 
Consciousness of the power of human labour – of its inherent ability to cross both human 
and natural histories – underpins a new human condition in which the human subject, 
armed with this consciousness, transcends the present historical situation. In this way, 
“the Anthropocene therefore really commences when humans become aware of their 
global role in shaping the earth and, consequently, when this awareness shapes their 
relationship with the natural environment” (Palsson et al., 2012, p.8). Despite the fact that 
the Anthropocene is considered an important era insofar as it presents a version of history 
in which human beings are neither the main nor the sole actors, the human subject 
nonetheless finds itself re-asserted at the centre of history in this view: it is the 
consciousness of the human subject as to the power of their labour that catalyses an 
alternative geo-historical trajectory. Though, as LeCain (2016) writes, “humanism may 
never be the same again” (p.15), it is still very much a ‘humanism’ with which these 
theorists are concerned. 
 Across these examples, it has been possible to show how approaches to the 
Anthropocene – expressed across quite different disciplines with quite different political 
aims – share a central theoretical framework, the nature of which is fundamentally 
humanist. The central problematic with which the theorists of the Anthropocene are faced 
is one of human labour and the fact that its deployment over the last two centuries has 
resulted in the production of a particularly unstable geo-historical epoch, marred by a 
changing climate, biodiversity loss and ozone depletion. In the face of these realities, 
human labour is configured as the precise force capable of transcending this geo-historical 
situation and forging an alternative historical trajectory that can avoid potential 
catastrophe: either reflected in renewed systems of governance and the enforcement of 
planetary boundaries; or reflected in the emergence of a new human condition, wherein 
the human subject is conscious of their geo-historical power and aims to use it for the 
better. 
 It is at this point that the chapter arrives at the fundamental point of critical 
interrogation, particularly in relation to social scientific approaches to the Anthropocene. 
It is evident that the Anthropocene itself is a product of human labour; and it is also 
evident that human labour remains the potential ‘solution’ to the problems here 
presented. What remains to be accounted for by the theorists of the Anthropocene is why, 
precisely, human labour over the last two centuries has resulted in the production of these 
catastrophic geo-historical conditions. More pressing still, this question is important 
because its answer points towards the precise change that will be necessary if humanity is 
to transcend these contemporary geo-historical conditions. It is here that the 
Anthropocene discourse relies – as many theoretical humanisms in the past have also 
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done – on the construction and deployment of a theory of human alienation in order to 
problematise the Anthropocene. Addressing the last two centuries of human labour 
demands their consideration in the context of an historical alienation, the struggle against 
which will provide the precise geo-historical tools with which humanity can transcend the 
present situation. 
 
ALIENATION, MODERNITY AND THE ANTHROPOCENE 
 
The explanation of the Anthropocene as an unstable geo-historical manifestation of 
human labour, depends upon the centrality of human alienation as a theoretical 
problematic. For the social scientists of the Anthropocene, alienation is the precise 
conceptual device utilised to explain the geo-historical trajectory of human labour over 
the last two centuries, descriptive of a distance or separation enjoyed by humanity from 
its grounding within natural history. For these theorists, the critical analysis of this geo-
historical alienation is reflected in the completion of a critique of modernity. These 
theorists argue that the geo-historical trajectory of human labour and its alienated 
reflection in forms of society, production, culture and history that are cut off from their 
grounding in natural history, has been underpinned at all times by the reinforcement of a 
false separation between human and natural histories at the heart of modern discourse. 
The Anthropocene, as a geo-historical moment, not only provides humanity with the 
consciousness of its geological agency, but provides the opportunity for the reflection of 
this consciousness in a critique of modernity and for its embedding within discourse itself. 
For the social scientists of the Anthropocene, the critique of modernity is a corollary 
critique of the geo-historical alienation of the human subject and its labour. The reflection 
of geo-historical consciousness within discourse is here argued to parallel the expression 
of this consciousness in forms of social and political action necessary to transcend the 
dangerous planetary conditions of the Anthropocene.  
 However, this problematic of alienation reproduces particular limitations that 
undermine the explanatory potential of this discourse. Notably, despite the centrality of 
the critique of modernity and the modern ideological separation between human and 
natural histories, this problem of alienation in fact reproduces many of the modern 
ideological tropes from which it seeks a break. This is visible most obviously in its re-
assertion of the human subject as the central geo-historical actor in its analysis. It is the 
alienation of the human actor that explains the emergence of the Anthropocene, but it is 
also precisely the human subject, in achieving consciousness of its alienated condition 
(and reflecting this consciousness in its deployment of social and political strategy) that 
possesses the power by which to transcend these geo-historical conditions of its own 
making. More severely, from a sociological perspective, this story of human alienation also 
mystifies the social relations of human society and the extent to which they underpin any 
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possible social or political change. As the chapter will show in due course, this 
mystification of social relations is particularly problematic for the implication and 
analysis of the social relations of capitalist production in the context of planetary crisis.  
 Social scientific approaches to the Anthropocene are littered with signposts that 
point toward the existence of a condition of human alienation. It is manifest in 
descriptions of the way in which human beings “unwittingly” (Chakrabarty, 2009, p.206) 
laboured their way into the Anthropocene. As Chakrabarty (2009) writes, “it is true that 
human beings have tumbled into being a geological agent through our own decisions. The 
Anthropocene, one might say, has been an unintended consequence of human choices” 
(p.210). Moreover, the links between this alienated condition and the development of 
modernity and modern discourse are also evident in the foregrounding of this analysis. 
Just as Klaus Eder (1996) wrote that “modernity’s characteristic pride in dominating 
nature has caused us to forget that we are living in the culture that more or less 
unconsciously ‘forces’ us into a self-destructive relationship with nature” (p.VII-VIII, 
emphasis added), the theorists of the Anthropocene today observe a similar problematic, 
arguing that “the moderns, having externalised Nature, were blind to the 
environmental/geological impacts of the industrial mode of development” (Hamilton et 
al., 2015, p.7). There is a recognition, at the forefront of the Anthropocene discourse of a 
particular unconsciousness or alienation that defines the human condition and, 
importantly, is reflected in modernity itself. 
 The recognition of this condition of alienation underpins the celebration of the 
Anthropocene as a moment within the social sciences. In forcing humanity’s 
consciousness as to the geo-historical power of its labour and its occupation of a position 
of geological agency, the Anthropocene provides an opportunity through which to 
undermine this condition of alienation, articulated through a critique of modernity as the 
concrete epistemological reflection of this alienation. As Hamilton et al. (2015) write, “the 
Anthropocene represents a threshold marking a sharp change in the relationship of 
humans to the natural world” (p.3), that is expressed in “the ‘impossible’ fact that humans 
have become a ‘force’ of nature and the reality that human action and Earth dynamics 
have converged and can no longer be seen as belonging to distinct incommensurable 
domains” (p.3). This violent coming-together of world histories necessitates the 
imagination of “a new human condition and requires us to reintegrate nature and the 
Earth system at the heart of our understanding of history, our conception of freedom and 
our practice of democracy” (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016, p.19-20). In this way, as Bonneuil 
and Fressoz (2016) continue, “the grand narrative of the Anthropocene is thus the story 
of an awakening. There was a long moment of unawareness, from 1750 to the late 
twentieth century, followed by a sudden arousal” (p.73). 
 The social scientists of the Anthropocene pinpoint this alienated human condition 
in the false separation between ‘human’ and ‘natural’ histories that underpins the modern 
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episteme. For the theorists of the Anthropocene, ideas of ‘society’ and ‘nature’ are 
themselves recent inventions of a modern discipline which has presided over a division in 
the production of knowledge, observing human history in one set of disciplines and 
discourses (the ‘human sciences’) and observing natural history in another, entirely 
separate set of discourses (the ‘natural sciences’). It is through this epistemological 
arrangement, peculiar to modernity, that social science has arrived at the categories of 
‘Man’ and ‘Nature’ as distinct entities with distinct histories: 
 
From Buffon to Lyell and Darwin, biology and geology extended terrestrial time 
to hundreds of millions of years, creating a context that was seemingly external, 
almost immobile and indifferent to human tribulations. In parallel with this, the 
bourgeois and industrial Enlightenment emphasized the value of man, the 
modern subject, as autonomous agent acting consciously on his history and 
settling social conflicts by dominating nature (Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016, p.19). 
 
Exposing the peculiarity of this epistemological orientation to modernity is the 
centrepiece of Bruno Latour’s (1993) assertion that We Have Never Been Modern. Latour 
(1993) argued that modernity and modern knowledge were problematic insofar as they 
relied upon and reproduced this false separation between human and natural histories. 
The invention of modernity, so Latour (1993) argued, was based upon a sustained 
separation of human politics and society from the phenomena of the natural world, as 
knowledge of each was produced necessarily in isolation. As Latour (1993) wrote, modern 
knowledge produced a world in which “the representation of things through the 
intermediary of the laboratory is forever dissociated from the representation of citizens 
through the intermediary of the social contract” (Latour, 1993, p.27). Human history, 
expressed in theories of politics and society were kept at arms-length from natural history 
as reflected in the study of biology or chemistry. Latour’s (1993) argument was that the 
entire modern episteme was based upon this fundamental separation, but that it was 
ultimately a false one, reproduced in order to secure the functionality of discourses of 
knowledge, but which had no real basis in the reality of things:  
 
By rendering mixtures unthinkable, by emptying, sweeping, cleaning and 
purifying the arena that is opened… the moderns allowed the practice of mediation 
to recombine all possible monsters without letting them have any effect on the 
social fabric, or even any contact with it (p.42). 
 
However, with the arrival of the Anthropocene, it becomes impossible to maintain the 
separation between these monsters of the natural world and the social fabric of human 
history (Latour, 2017). The coming-together of human and natural histories implicated by 
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the discoveries of the Anthropocene explodes the modern separation of these histories 
and the discourses of knowledge that were founded on this sustained separation: “The 
Anthropocene does not ‘go beyond’ this division: it circumvents it entirely. The 
geohistorical forces ceased to be the same as the geological forces as soon as they fused at 
multiple points with human actions” (Latour, 2017, p.120, original emphasis). In the 
Anthropocene, it becomes impossible to think about ‘human’ and ‘non-human’ actors 
within the social and political arena, as the two are forced together and become 
inseparable. As Latour (2017) continues,  
 
Where we were dealing earlier with a ‘natural’ phenomenon, at every point we now 
meet the ‘Anthropos’… and, wherever we follow human footprints, we discover 
modes of relating to things that had formerly been located in the field of nature 
(p.120). 
 
For Latour (2017), it is simply impossible to any longer maintain the separation of human 
and natural history, making necessary the explosion of modern discourse and its 
presuppositions. For Latour (2015) it is expressive of an opportunity to construct and 
deploy a critique of modernity and is “the best alternative we have to usher us away from 
the notion of modernisation” (p.146). 
Crucially, the realities presented by the Anthropocene extend the impetus of this 
critique of modernity beyond mere academic interest. The Anthropocene does not simply 
present a conceptual or epistemic crisis in terms of modernity and its assumptions. It also 
presents a very real crisis in which the geo-historical existence of both humans and the 
planet is placed in particular danger. As Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016) write, “while 
triumphant industrial modernity had promised to prise us away from nature, its cycles 
and its limits, placing us in a world of boundless progress, the Earth and its limits are 
today making a comeback” (p.20). The reinforced separation between human and natural 
history within modernity is reflected in the real-world incapability of human beings to 
react to a warming climate, to rising sea levels, mass extinctions and to the increase in 
climate-related disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes and floods: an incapability that 
is rooted, fundamentally, in an inability to comprehend this reality. In this way, the 
critique of modernity is not simply the search for better theory in the era of the 
Anthropocene, but also the search for a way in which to make humanity conscious of its 
geohistorical agency and therefore able to avert incoming ecological catastrophe. 
For authors such as Latour (2014), the focus of such an endeavour resides in the 
adaptation of human politics. For Latour (2014), contemporary politics is reflective of 
humanity’s modern alienated condition, deploying political strategies and structures in a 
way that remains cut off from its grounding in nature and natural history. In the modern 
era, Latour (2014) argues that human beings lack “the mental and emotional repertoire” 
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(p.1) to face the challenges of the Anthropocene. Problematically for Latour (2014), this 
modern human alienation is reflected in the “impotence” (p.15) of humanity when 
confronted with the ecological realities of the Anthropocene: 
 
Either we agitate ourselves as traditional political agents longing for freedom – 
but such a liberty has no connection with the world of matter – or we decide to 
submit to the realm of material necessity – but such a material world has nothing 
in it that looks even vaguely like the freedom or autonomy of olden times. Either 
the margins of actions have no consequence in the material world, or there is no 
freedom left in the material world for engaging with it in any politically 
recognizable fashion (p.15). 
 
For Latour (2014), this human impotence stems from the spectre of the modern 
separation between human and natural history that continues to haunt human political 
strategies. As Latour (2014) argues, it is impossible to think politics in this condition of 
alienation: impossible to think politics when “what is to be composed is divided into two 
domains, one that is inanimate and has no agency, and one which is animated and 
concentrates all the agencies” (p.14, original emphasis). 
 The solution, for Latour (2014) is the construction and deployment of  politics and 
forms of political agency that transcend this historical alienation and conflate human and 
natural histories through the distribution of political agency across human and non-
human actors alike: “far from trying to ‘reconcile’ or ‘combine’ nature and society, the 
task, the crucial political task, is on the contrary to distribute agency as far and in as 
differentiated a way as possible” (p.15, original emphasis). Crucially, however, this task 
remains a fundamentally human one: the task of a human subjectivity, imbued with geo-
historical power and agency, to construct and deploy a form of history that embeds this 
political image. For example, Latour’s (2014) considerations of political agency in the 
Anthropocene are driven fundamentally by the potential recognition of all non-human 
actors and entities by a humanity that acts as a geological force, with Latour (2014) 
arguing that geo-historical agency in the Anthropocene will be located by its recognition 
and inclusion in the historically conscious action of the Anthropos. As Latour (2014) 
writes, 
 
This time we encounter, just as in the old prescientific and nonmodern myths, an 
agent which gains its name of ‘subject’ because he or she might be subjected to the 
vagaries, bad humor, emotions, reactions, and even revenge of another agent, who 
also gains its quality of ‘subject’ because it is also subjected to his or her action 




In Latour’s (2014) formulations, the humanity of the Anthropocene not only possesses the 
ability to make history but, in so doing, names the agents of this history too through its 
recognition – in the context of its own historical action – of actors of various kinds. 
Natural history comes to matter only to the extent that it becomes bound up in the 
historically-powerful action of the Anthropos: a binding that ascribes meaning and agency 
to this history. As Latour (2014) writes, “existence and meaning are synonymous. As long 
as they act, agents have meaning” (p.12, original emphasis). 
 This notion is reflected more starkly in accounts such as those of Dipesh 
Chakrabarty (2009) and his reconsideration of Enlightenment. In much the same way as 
Latour (2014), Chakrabarty (2009) argues that the values of freedom, democracy and 
equality that have come to define modern, liberal politics are deployed in contemporary 
society in a condition of fundamental and essential alienation, in which they correspond 
to the false separation between human and natural histories. As Chakrabarty (2009) 
writes, in modernity, “philosophers of freedom were mainly, and understandably, 
concerned with how humans would escape the injustice, oppression, inequality, or even 
uniformity foisted on them by other humans or human-made systems” (p.208). In the 
Anthropocene, where human and natural history interpenetrate one another, this narrow 
conception of freedom in fact, for Chakrabarty (2009), forecloses its fuller understanding 
and realisation: it is in this way that Chakrabarty (2009) poses the question, “is the 
geological agency of humans the price we pay for the pursuit of freedom?” (p.210). The 
full realisation of freedom demands its conceptual development in relation to the shared 
historical destiny of humans and the natural world. For Chakrabarty (2009), it is no longer 
adequate to consider freedom within the confines of human societies and man-made 
political structures: rather, it must be a value conceived of in relation to the non-human 
actors who have been thrust into an inextricable relationship with humans by the 
Anthropocene. As Chakrabarty (2009) writes, 
 
Whatever our socioeconomic and technological choices, whatever the rights we 
wish to celebrate as our freedom, we cannot afford to destabilize conditions (such 
as the temperature zone in which the planet exists) that work like boundary 
parameters of human existence. They have been stable for much longer than the 
histories of these institutions and have allowed human beings to become the 
dominant species on earth (p.218). 
 
Chakrabarty (2009) argues that this does not mean that these values should be 
abandoned: on the contrary, their achievement must be re-orientated as the central task 
of the human struggle against alienation. For Chakrabarty (2009), “the Anthropocene is 
about waking up to the rude shock of the recognition of the otherness of the planet” (p.55, 
emphasis added), that is, about humanity’s becoming-conscious of its alienation and its 
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struggle to redeploy these concepts of Enlightenment in the wake of this consciousness. 
For Chakrabarty (2009), the answer must be the reflection of this new-found 
consciousness across all areas of life in the Anthropocene, where politics and society, and 
its expression in democracy, in collective action and in public discourse is at all times a 
manifestation of the shared historical destiny of both human and non-human actors. As 
Chakrabarty (2009) writes, “for humans any thought of the way out of our current 
predicament cannot but refer to the idea of deploying reason in global, collective life” 
(p.210). Just as the Young Marx (1981) argued that communism was the social 
manifestation of humanity’s consciousness of the reflection of its own labour in nature, 
the Anthropocene as a geo-historical era must be, for Chakrabarty (2009), one in which 
humanity similarly recognises itself in the planet as a whole: “Logically, then, in the era of 
the Anthropocene, we need the Enlightenment (that is, reason) even more than in the 
past” (p.211). 
 Theorists like Jane Bennett (2004, 2010) echo this in a more philosophical 
argument, arguing that the Anthropocene provides the context in which to re-think 
materialism and materialist philosophies. Bennett (2004) problematises modern 
considerations of materialism – particularly implicating Marx’s materialism – as 
foreclosing the contemplation of a “less specifically human kind of materiality” (p.348) 
and the idea that “attentiveness to (nonhuman) things and their powers can have a 
laudable effect on humans” (p.348). For Bennett (2004), the Anthropocene offers the 
opportunity to re-think materialist philosophy in the way that it centralises the notion that 
human society is not the product of isolated human action (as the modern view would 
have it), but in fact is the material product of a complex interplay between matter of 
human and non-human varieties. It is an argument for what Bennett (2004) calls ‘thing-
power materialism’: 
 
Thing-power materialism does not endorse the view, absorbed from the 
nineteenth-century roots of the science of ecology by deep ecologists, that 
‘ecological’ means ‘harmonious’ or tending toward equilibrium. To be ecological 
is to participate in a collectivity, but not all collectivities operate as organic wholes 
(p.365, original emphasis). 
 
For Bennett (2004), contemporary philosophy reflects modern alienation, unable to think 
human and natural history together in its materialist vision. This version of materialism, 
as opposed to its modern predecessor, “figures things as being more than mere objects, 
emphasizing their powers of life, resistance, and even a kind of will” (Bennett, 2004, 
p.360). In the era of the Anthropocene, this materialist vision points towards a more 
suitable method of philosophical comprehension in the wake of potential ecological crises. 
It signals the fact that planetary history is the culmination of collective action across 
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species boundaries: a culmination that implicates not only the problems, but also the 
solutions of the Anthropocene (Bennett, 2004). As Bennett (2004) concludes, “these are 
powers that, in a tightly knit world, we ignore at our own peril” (p.360). 
 This theoretical critique of modernity and alienation is also evident in Donna 
Haraway’s (2015, 2016) considerations of subjectivity. Though Haraway (2016) has 
reservations about the name ‘Anthropocene’ (“surely such a transformative time on earth 
must not be named the Anthropocene!” [p.30-31]), Haraway (2016) recognises the 
present moment as one of significance, insofar as it allows for the interrogation and 
deconstruction of anthropocentric conceptualisations of subjectivity. For Haraway (2015), 
the Anthropocene as the coming-together of human and natural histories undermines the 
modern humanist notion that human subjectivity is cut off from nature or other non-
human entities, instead exposing subjectivity as a messy and co-created product of 
multiple entities. As Haraway (2015) writes, “no species, not even our own arrogant one 
pretending to be good individuals in so-called modern Western scripts, acts alone; 
assemblages of organic species and of abiotic actors make history, the evolutionary kind 
and the other kinds too” (p.159). In the Anthropocene, the conception of subjectivity in 
any other way becomes inadequate, as subjectivity ceases to correlate to its modern, 
individualistic notion and instead has meaning only in a time of geo-historical agency: 
“What used to be called nature has erupted into ordinary human affairs, and vice versa, in 
such a way and with such permanence as to change fundamentally means and prospects 
for going on, including going on at all” (Haraway, 2016, p.40). 
 For Haraway (2016), the Anthropocene is an important moment insofar as it 
allows for humanity to think beyond its alienated condition. Haraway (2016) argues that 
the Anthropocene is the manifestation of a particular alienated condition, in which 
humans are unable to think catastrophe due to the persistence of modernity and modern 
ideologies in the way that bodies, agents and subjects are conceived and thought to matter. 
As Haraway (2016) writes, 
 
What is it to surrender the capacity to think? These times called the Anthropocene 
are times of multispecies, including human, urgency: of great mass death and 
extinction; of unrushing disasters, whose unpredictable specificities are foolishly 
taken as unknowability itself; of refusing to be present in and to onrushing 
catastrophe in time; of unprecedented looking away (p.35). 
 
For Haraway (2016), even in her distaste for the ‘Anthropocene’ as a descriptive term, the 
value of this geo-historical moment is that, in the wake of the consciousness of humanity 
as to the geo-historical power located in its labour, this capacity to think returns to 
humanity in a way that potentially inaugurates a new way of understanding subjectivity 
and thus a new way of reflecting subjectivity and recognition within society and culture 
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(Haraway, 2016). In this way, the Anthropocene allows for “making persons, [but] not 
necessarily as individuals or as humans” (Haraway, 2015, p.161). 
 Through the examples here discussed, it is clear to see the translation of the initial 
theoretical humanism of the Anthropocene discourse into a critical analysis of human 
alienation and its reflection in modern discourse. Modernity and modern discourse have 
been shown here to reflect a condition of human alienation, in which the human subject 
has found itself essentially cut off from its grounding in natural history. The precondition 
for humanity’s transcendence of the geo-historical parameters of the Anthropocene and 
its capabilities in escaping potential ecological activity, demands human consciousness of 
the geo-historical power of its own action and the reflection of this consciousness in 
alternative social and political strategies. In this way, humanity finds “the power to 
transcend history by human liberty” (Althusser, 2008, p.75, original emphasis). 
Therefore, the Anthropocene is not simply a moment of crisis, but celebrated here as a 
moment of opportunity through which humanity can – through the consciousness of its 
position, through its achievement of reason in the Anthropocene – chart an alternative 
geo-historical path.  
 However, this theory of alienation observed by the theorists of the Anthropocene 
is not unproblematic. What is evident is that the theoretical humanism of the 
Anthropocene discourse and its resolution in a problematic of human alienation is 
reproductive of a number of theoretical and ideological weaknesses that force the 
questioning of its analytical applicability. For example, the apparent break that the 
Anthropocene discourse proposes to make with modernity and modern ideology is 
betrayed by the re-assertion of the human subject at the centre of its theoretical critique. 
Despite the fact that the Anthropocene is celebrated in creating the conditions for the 
construction of a post-anthropocentric approach to social science, the position of the 
human subject as the defining geo-historical actor betrays this break, reflected in the 
reproduction of humanist ideological tropes regarding concepts such as human labour, 
human subjectivity and human history. In this way, 
  
This fable, claiming to break with the world-view of the moderns that it 
incriminates, in the end actually reproduces it. It proceeds from the same regime 
of historicity that dominated the nineteenth century and a part of the twentieth, 
in which the past is assessed only as a backdrop, for the lessons it yields for the 
future, and in representation of time as a one-directional acceleration (Bonneuil 
& Fressoz, 2016, p.77-78). 
 
Moreover, by insisting upon an analysis and observation of geo-historical alienation, 
crucial social relations are forced to the background. Though the proponents of the 
Anthropocene discourse suggest the development and deployment of alternative social 
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and political strategies for averting potential ecological catastrophe, the precise social 
relations (and potential social upheavals) that would foreground any such developments 
are obscured from view, hidden behind this ideological story of human alienation. As 
Palsson et al. (2012) write, “it is remarkable how little these concepts tell us about the 
process, the driving forces, and the social consequences of the changes they imply” (p.7). 
 Particularly problematic is the fact that, obscured by this humanist story of 
alienation are the social relations of production and reproduction inherent to 
contemporary capitalism. Nowhere figured in the social scientific response to the 
Anthropocene is the relationship between strategies of capital accumulation and the 
degradation of the planet. The idea that the inability of humanity to think or comprehend 
the crisis with which it is faced is the epicentre of human catastrophe “are just so much 
ideological noise, intended to obscure the real peril that humanity is today exposed to: 
that is to say, the impasse that globalised capitalism is leading us into” (Badiou, 2018, 
para.3). Moreover, it is not entirely clear to what extent the social science of the 
Anthropocene and its notions of human consciousness directly contradicts the ideological 
reproductions of the contemporary capitalist class. As authors like Naomi Klein (2014) 
have highlighted, it is precisely within the comfort of such techno-scientific and humanist 
ideological reactions to the problems of climate change that capitalists such as Richard 
Branson – the CEO of Virgin Atlantic airways and its fleet of fossil-fuel dependent jets – 
and policy-makers like Al Gore – the 2000 US Presidential Candidate – locate their 
concern about climate change and ecological disaster. They do so, because such an 
anthropocentric perspective that puts the blame squarely upon the “ingenious if unruly 
species” (Crist, 2016, p.16-17) of Man, foregoes the attribution of any blame to the 
strategies of accumulation inherent in globalised corporations or Western-democratic 
politics. As Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016) argue, with caution, “the seductive Anthropocene 
concept may well become the official philosophy of a new technocratic and market-
oriented geopower” (p.49). 
 There is a considerable legacy of ecological critiques of contemporary capitalism 
that have attempted to expose the links between capitalist development and the growing 
climatological instability of the planet. Notable contributions include those of James 
O’Connor (1991) and his founding of the journal Capitalism, Nature, Socialism that has 
provided consistent leftist analysis of the relationship between capitalism and ecology. 
Also important were the contributions to Marxist political-ecology made by Paul Burkett 
([1999] 2014) and John Bellamy Foster (2000) who stressed the link between the 
contradictions of capitalist development and ecological catastrophe. Centralising the 
concept of “metabolic rift” explored by Marx ([1894] 1991, p.949) in Volume Three of 
Capital2, these authors argued that ecological instability was the result of a contradiction 
 
2 Marx (1991) wrote that “Large landed property reduces the agricultural population to an ever-
decreasing minimum and confronts it with an ever growing industrial population crammed together in 
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that emerged between the development of capitalist production and the shrinking 
availability of space and resources required to power this development: “This 
contradiction develops through the growth simultaneously of large-scale industry and 
large-scale agriculture under capitalism, with the former providing the latter with the 
means of extensive exploitation of the soil” (Foster, 2000, p.156). Since then, there has 
been a notable proliferation of critical examinations of the relationship between 
capitalism and climate change that have focused on this relationship in the context of 
developing technologies (Hornborg, 2016), fossil fuels (Malm, 2015; Mitchell, 2013) and 
alternative economics (Wall, 2015). 
 The theoretical humanism of the Anthropocene discourse and its expression in 
the observation of geo-historical human alienation is problematic insofar as it forecloses 
the critical analysis of these social relations and the relationship between capitalism, class 
and ecology in the context of planetary crisis. Through the discourse of the Anthropocene, 
labour only becomes available in its humanist ideological form, expressive of the geo-
historical act through which humanity is able to make and re-make history. In order to 
arrive at an analysis of work and labour which makes available the critique of this present 
geo-historical juncture in the context of the social relations of capitalism, an alternative 
theoretical approach is demanded that can more adequately deconstruct humanist 
ideology and produce an analytical framework based upon this ideological deconstruction. 
For this, the chapter turns to the work of Jason W. Moore (2015) and his world-ecological 
approach to work, capitalism and ecology.  
 
LABOUR AND THE CAPITALOCENE 
 
The Anthropocene has told a particular story about the relationship between society, 
politics and the planet. It is a story, essentially, of the human being: in particular, an 
alienated human being that has unwittingly mined, burned and consumed its way into 
geological history. For Moore (2015), such a view completely obfuscates the role of 
capitalism in this story, in particular its unique relations of production, reproduction and 
appropriation: as well as the ideologies that facilitate the exercise of these relations. As 
Moore (2015) writes, 
 
The Anthropocene makes for an easy story. Easy, because it does not challenge the 
naturalized inequalities, alienation, and violence inscribed in modernity’s 
strategic relations of power and production. It is an easy story because it does not 
ask us to think about these relations at all (p.170, original emphasis). 
 
 
large towns; in this way it produces conditions that provoke an irreparable rift in the interdependent 
process of social metabolism, a metabolism prescribed by the natural laws of life itself” (p.949). 
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Though resistant to such epochal labelling, Moore (2015) argues that such a period would 
be better defined as the ‘Capitalocene’: an “historical era shaped by relations privileging 
the endless accumulation of capital” (p.173). Such a picture shifts the emphasis away from 
the human subject, towards the structural relations inherent within contemporary 
capitalism: a shift, in other words, away from the unwitting arrival of humanity into its 
role as a geological agent through the reckless burning of fossil fuels, to “the relations of 
power, capital, and nature that rendered fossil capital so deadly in the first place” (Moore, 
2015, p.172). 
 Of particular interest to the analysis here conducted is the concept of 
‘appropriation’ as a concept that “names those extra-economic processes that identify, 
secure, and channel unpaid work outside the commodity system into the circuit of capital” 
(Moore, 2015, p.17). Moore (2015) uses the concept of appropriation to bring a Marxist 
analysis of work together with the conditions of planetary crisis that today confront the 
social sciences. For Moore (2015), the production of capital does not depend simply upon 
the exploitation of human labour-power: rather, a fuller picture of capitalist production 
demands an analysis of the precise social processes through which capitalism 
appropriates cheap sources of food, water, land and reproductive labour as a way of 
reproducing this labour-power. In this way, Moore (2015) argues that it is inadequate to 
analyse contemporary capitalism merely as a mode of production: rather, capitalism is 
better explained as a world-ecology, where class struggle is reflected not simply in the 
social relations of production, but in the social relations of appropriation, manifest in 
historically specific forms of nature as well as society. 
 What is evident throughout this analysis of Moore’s (2015) work is that the 
application of his analysis demands a consistent deconstruction of humanist ideology. To 
access this world-ecological view of capitalism and expose the reflection of historical class 
struggle in both the relations of production and those of appropriation, demands a 
theoretical approach that consistently decentralises the human subject as the focal-point 
of theoretical analysis. This is evident in the critique of modernity that Moore (2015) 
undertakes at the beginning of his critical analysis, but is carried throughout as Moore 
(2015) persistently critiques the human subject as an unhelpful ideological notion that 
obscures the social (that is, class) grounding of the conditions of planetary instability 
today confronting humanity.  
 At the top of Moore’s (2015) analysis is a fundamental critique of modernity. 
Moore (2015) dedicates a significant portion of his work to the deconstruction of a 
‘Cartesian Dualism’ (p.76) predicated upon the false separation of human and natural 
histories upheld by modern discourse. As Moore (2015) writes, 
 
One of Cartesian dualism’s essential features is the tendency to circumscribe truth 
claims by drawing hard and fast lines between what is human and what is ‘natural.’ 
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We might call this an epistemic rift. At the core of this epistemic rift is a series of 
violent abstractions implicated in the creation and reproduction of two separate 
epistemic domains: ‘Nature’ and ‘Society’ (p.76, original emphasis). 
 
The language that Moore (2015) uses here in his critique would fit comfortably with the 
anti-modern critique conducted by the theorists of the Anthropocene such as Latour 
(1993). However, for Moore (2015), modernity is initially problematic not because it 
reflects and justifies the alienated condition of humanity, but because it mystifies the fact 
that contemporary capitalism occupies a ‘world-ecological’ (p.3) position in history. For 
Moore (2015), the contemporary geo-historical moment that has so far been classified as 
‘the Anthropocene’ in fact points towards capitalism’s position as a world-ecological social 
formation, implicating a set of social relations that penetrate not only human history but 
natural history too. This is what, for Moore (2015), modernity hides. It does not hide the 
fact that for two centuries human beings have been labouring in essential alienation, cut 
off from their basis in natural history: rather, it hides the fact that nature itself, rather 
than the objective or passive background upon which capitalist production takes place, is 
itself a historical product of capitalist productive relations (Moore, 2015). In this way, 
Moore’s (2015) analysis proceeds from an entirely different theoretical starting-point 
from the theorists of the Anthropocene, as Moore (2015) moves the field of observation 
away from the human subject and towards the historical structure of social relations in 
which human experience itself is mobilised. It is also for this reason why Moore’s (2015) 
critique implicates a deconstruction of modernity: 
 
The difficulty in pursuing this alternative analysis has been rooted in the dualisms 
immanent to modern thought; for to construct capitalism in the fashion that I 
have suggested is to transcend the man/woman, nature/society boundaries 
upon which the whole edifice of modernist thought depends (p.69, emphasis 
added). 
 
In this way, Moore’s (2015) critique of modernity and modern humanism is not central 
because of its necessity in cutting through the alienated condition of humanity in the 
Anthropocene. It is central because it is only by virtue of the break with the set of 
postulates set down by modern discourse that Moore (2015) is able to produce knowledge 
of his object: that is, the world-ecological relations of contemporary capitalism. What is 
here evident is a theoretical quality lacking in the Anthropocene discourse: a quality 
located fundamentally in the theoretical anti-humanism of the Marxist theoretical 
framework that foreground’s Moore’s (2015) approach. It is in this way that Moore (2016) 
justifies his utility of a Marxist approach, arguing that “what Marx understood better than 
most Marxists is that capitalism ‘works’ because it organizes work as a multispecies 
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process” (p.93, original emphasis), with Marx identifying a “‘deep structure’ of historical 
capitalism…[providing] a clue to how human and extra-human nature work is entwined” 
(Moore, 2015, p.60).  
 By virtue of his theoretical position, Moore (2015) constructs an entirely different 
consideration of history to that constructed by the theorists of the Anthropocene. For the 
theorists of the Anthropocene, history was a manifestation of human labour, either in its 
alienated form (manifest in the geo-historical emergence of the Anthropocene) or in its 
‘liberated’ form (through which humanity transcends the historical limitations reflected 
in modernity). However, for Moore (2015), historical progress is to be charted in the 
development of world-ecological relations. The motor of historical development – a 
development that has become expressed in the conditions of climatological instability 
experienced today – is, fundamentally, the historical forms of class struggle that are 
reflected within historically unique world-ecological relations: relations present not only 
in the organisation of production, the division of labour in society or the constellation of 
property relations, but also in historical appearance of nature itself which mirrors the 
relations that are established to (unevenly) appropriate, exploit, distribute and consume 
nature in various ways (Moore, 2015). In this way, and again, the Marxist historical 
analysis of class sustains the critique of modernity as through the world-ecological view, 
“relations of class, capital, and empire are already bundled with extra-human natures; 
they are configurations of human and extra-human natures” (p.37, original emphasis). 
The theoretical anti-humanism of Moore’s (2015) approach is here evident and essential 
again, as history itself is formulated as the development of social relations, not of human 
alienation. 
 Crucially, the theoretical anti-humanism of Moore’s (2015) approach – grounded 
in the world-ecological relations of capitalism as opposed to the observation of alienated 
human labour – is absolutely essential to Moore’s (2015) understanding of the nature of 
labour under contemporary capitalism. Moore’s (2015) understanding of labour is 
formulated in the context of a theoretical approach which observes its appearance not in 
the alienated reason of humanity as geological force, but as the reflection of historically 
determined world-ecological relations in which labour is mobilised. Crucially, these 
world-ecological relations interpenetrate human and natural histories, meaning that 
labour under capitalism not only reflects a particular historical orientation of human 
society (in the division of labour, the design of the labour process, the exploitation of 
surplus-value and the reflection of class relations therein), but also a particular historical 
orientation of nature itself (reflected in the fundamental changes to the landscape made 
necessary by mining, flattening and farming, in the emergence of new enclosures of land 
reflected in imperialism and colonialism and reflected in the setting-to-work of nature in 
the provision of food, water and labour-power in various ways) (Moore, 2015). In this way, 
labour under capitalism is reflective at all times of historically specific (in this case, 
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capitalist) world-ecological relations, through which the appearance of human society and 
nature itself are shaped. 
 This is particularly evident in Moore’s (2015) application of the concept of 
‘appropriation’ (p.54). Appropriation is Moore’s (2015) way of using labour as a means to 
bring the analysis of human and natural histories together in the context of a critical 
analysis of labour. However, whilst for the theorists of the Anthropocene the pivot of this 
conceptual application of labour is the ideological observation of human consciousness, 
for Moore (2015) it is located in the precise world-ecological relations that are brought 
into view by labour: specifically, the combination of relations of exploitation and 
appropriation. For Moore (2015), capitalist production depends upon the twin execution 
of two social operations: the exploitation of human labour-power (primarily through its 
mobilisation in the wage-labour relation and through a definite labour process) and the 
appropriation of nature (through the appropriation of land, water and resources, but also 
through the appropriation of various forms of free human labour too, in the form of slave-
labour or reproductive labour that goes unpaid). It is a law of capitalist world-ecological 
production simplified as follows: “Every act of exploitation (of commodified labor-power) 
therefore depends on an even greater act of appropriation (of unpaid work/energy)” 
(Moore, 2015, p.54). In this way, labour brings human society and nature together in the 
way that they are mutually constituted under capitalist world-ecological production, 
through the joint enterprise of exploitation and appropriation. 
 This world-ecological approach to exploitation and appropriation forces the re-
consideration of labour under capitalism. Exploitation under capitalism can no longer be 
considered within the parameters of a traditional consideration of ‘work’: the mobilisation 
of commodified human labour-power through a labour process, with the aim of capturing 
and reinvesting surplus-value. The coming-together of human and natural labour forces 
the re-thinking of exploitation, by insisting that an integral part of processes of capitalist 
exploitation in fact implicates labours and actors that have traditionally escaped this quite 
productivist view of work. As Moore (2015) writes,  
 
The rate of exploitation under the law of value is determined not only by the class 
struggle within commodity production (between capitalist and direct producers), 
and not only by the organization and value composition of commodity production. 
It is also determined by the contribution of unpaid work, performed by human 
and extra-human natures alike (p.100, original emphasis). 
 
Echoing feminist applications of the concept of reproduction, Moore’s (2015) argument is 
that the concept of appropriation forces the further development of the concept of 
reproduction, implicating the unpaid labour not only of human beings but of non-human 
actors too. As Moore (2015) writes, “the unpaid ‘work of nature’ – over the short-run of 
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agriculture, the intergenerational time of childrearing, the geological time of fossil fuel 
creation – is the pedestal upon which the paid ‘work of capital’ unfolds” (p.102, original 
emphasis). 
 Within Moore’s (2015) critique, the consideration of production in this way – as 
the result of a twinned exploitation and appropriation of labour – makes necessary a re-
evaluation of the history of work and production as well, in a way that is more sensitive to 
the realities of this twenty first century geo-historical moment. The world-ecological 
development of capitalism, in light of the concept of appropriation, no longer simply 
implicates the primitive accumulation of human beings in the form of wage-labourers or 
even as reproductive labourers alone. Rather, it implicates a more complex form of 
primitive accumulation, based on the securing and enclosure of an ever-expanding base 
of sources for food, water, land and energy through which to reproduce the relations of 
exploitation and appropriation on which capitalist production relies (Moore, 2015). As 
Moore (2015) writes, 
 
For the relations necessary to accumulate abstract social labor are – necessarily 
– more expansive, in scale, scope, speed, and intensity. Capital must not only 
ceaselessly accumulate and revolutionize commodity production; it must 
ceaselessly search for, and find new ways to produce, Cheap Natures: a rising 
stream of low-cost food, labor-power, energy, and raw materials to the factory 
gates (or office doors, or…) (p.53, original emphasis). 
 
The coming-together of humans and nature at the base of capitalist production forces a 
re-telling of the history of capitalism, as one that does not simply implicate human society, 
but implicates unique historical orientations of nature as well. The world-ecological 
development of capitalism is in this sense, as Marx (2013) himself argued, a history of 
“blood and dirt” (p.152) as its development does not inaugurate great violence upon 
human populations alone, but upon non-human natures in order to bend them towards 
the wills of capitalist accumulation. In this way, the Anthropocene argument is once again 
countered, as the degradation of nature can no longer be traced back to the alienation of 
human labour but must be formulated “as a specific expression of capitalism’s 
organization of work” (Moore, 2016, p.111). 
 Moore’s (2015) critique of labour also makes necessary the re-thinking of how the 
organisation of work is to be analysed sociologically. The social periodisation of 
production and work often collected under headings such as ‘Taylorism’, ‘Fordism’ and 
‘post-Fordism’ must also be re-assessed in the wake of capitalism’s world-ecological 
character. Science and technology were not only important insofar as they permitted the 
rationalisation of the labour process in which human labour-power was mobilised. These 
developments in the productive forces of capitalism also resulted in fundamental 
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alterations in the relations of appropriation that extended beyond the immediate human 
experience of work on the production line. As Moore (2015) argues, 
 
Great advances in labor productivity, expressing the rising material throughput of 
an average hour of work, have been possible through great expansions of the 
ecological surplus. The assembly line of classic Fordism, for instance, was 
unthinkable without Cheap steel, rubber, and oil (p.96). 
 
Again, the critique of modernity here resurfaces for Moore (2015), insofar as the modern 
reinforcement of the separation between humans and nature is figured here as an 
ideological reflection of the material relations of appropriation, as the precise justification 
for the heightened appropriation of non-human labour for little or no charge. As Moore 
(2015) writes, “at the core of the capitalist project, from its sixteenth century origins, was 
the scientific and symbolic creation of nature in its modern form, as something that could 
be mapped, abstracted, quantified, and otherwise subjected to linear control” (Moore, 
2015, p.86). 
 The world-ecological analysis of labour and capitalism that Moore (2015) here 
develops, has been shown to produce a remarkably different picture of human experience 
in this contemporary geo-historical moment from that of the Anthropocene. For the 
theorists of the Anthropocene, human labour implicated a story of human consciousness 
and the observation of the historical emergence of the Anthropocene as the manifestation 
of alienated human labour, of labour completed by a humanity unconscious of its power 
and its grounding in natural history. For Moore (2015) and his world-ecological view of 
the ‘Capitalocene’, the story painted by the concept of labour is much different. The 
coming together of humans and nature in their mutual exploitation and appropriation 
under capitalism – a coming-together exposed through the critique of modernity – does 
not implicate a story of human consciousness, but a specific and historical set of world-
ecological relations of capitalist production, in which notions of class, production and 
work must necessarily be re-thought in the wake of the exposed reflection of capitalist 
social relations in contemporary appearances of both human society and natural history. 
 Of crucial importance to this outcome is the critique of humanist ideology that 
exists and continues at the core of Moore’s (2015) theoretical approach. The theorists of 
the Anthropocene did not adequately critique humanist ideology but reproduced and 
reinforced it through their story of human consciousness and human alienation at the 
meeting point between labour and history. The ideological consequence of this was not 
only the mystification of key social relations, but the normalisation and reproduction of 
the very modern tropes they sought to distance themselves from. The definition and 
deconstruction of humanist ideology that underpins Moore’s (2015) analysis – located 
primarily in the theoretical anti-humanism of his Marxist approach – at one and the same 
166 
 
time allows him to maintain his critique of modernity (as the set of ideas that mystifies 
the world-ecological character of capitalism) but also stress the primacy of social relations 
over the consciousness of human subjectivity (capitalism achieves its world-ecological 
character not from alienated human labour, but through the historical development of 
relations of exploitation and appropriation).  
 What is evident is that the theoretical anti-humanism of Moore’s (2015) approach 
makes it a much more appropriate basis from which to think a sociology of work in 
relation to the conditions of life so often collected under the heading of the 
‘Anthropocene.’ Moore’s (2015) Marxist critique has revealed that behind the conditions 
of climatological instability that currently face humanity are not conditions of alienated 
reason, but historically unique world-ecological relations of exploitation and 
appropriation, which see humans and nature come together in their mutual involvement 
in capitalist production. The existence of these relations necessarily implicates a re-
assessment of the notion of class and class struggle: a re-assessment that looks set to be 
more convincing but also more materially grounded in its ability to think the unity of 
human and non-human actors, than the humanist ideological analysis of alienation told 




In conclusion, this chapter has demonstrated the effects of humanist ideology upon the 
ability to think the nature of labour in the context of the contemporary conditions of 
planetary instability today faced by humanity. From the theoretically humanist 
perspective of the Anthropocene discourse, labour is configured as the distinct and geo-
historical activity of the human subject, through which this subject is able to make and re-
make history. The conditions of the Anthropocene, in this formulation, confront the 
sociologist as the alienated product of this labour: an alienation that is codified in the 
reinforcement of a false separation between human and natural histories within modern 
discourse. The ability of the human subject to transcend these geo-historically 
unfavourable conditions depends upon this subject’s consciousness as to its geo-historical 
power in this way: a consciousness that first sees humanity confronted with the 
discontents of its historical action and thereafter compelled to transcend the historical 
conditions reflective of these discontents. 
 However, this theoretically humanist approach to the Anthropocene has been 
shown to reproduce ideological effects, mystifying the relationship between the social 
relations of capitalist production and appropriation and these conditions of planetary 
crisis. What modern ideology hides is not the geo-historical alienation of the human 
subject, but the world-ecological character of capitalism, the class-struggle of which is 
reflected not only in historically specific orientations of human society, but also 
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historically specific configurations of nature. The exposure of capitalism’s world-
ecological character and the inherent primacy of the social relations of exploitation and 
appropriation that underpin this character (relations that are reflective of class-struggle 
at all times) provides an entirely different theoretical framework through which to 
consider labour in the context of these contemporary planetary conditions: a framework 
that is more suitable for the establishment and development of a sociology of work. 
 The development of a sociology of work in the context of ‘the Anthropocene’ is still 
forthcoming. The discourse is relatively new, inaugurating a proliferation of exploratory 
theoretical texts within the social sciences. But what has been made clear in this chapter 
is that, theoretically, this discourse seems to leave humanist ideology unthought in 
relation to the consideration of work and labour: an oversight that could prove particularly 
problematic for the development of any future sociology of work. Moving into the 
concluding chapter of this thesis, the considerations of theory in the Anthropocene here 
completed, stress the necessity of the critique of ideology as a central theoretical task for 





The Humanist Controversy Revisited 
 
Across the chapters of this thesis it has been argued that humanism and humanist 
ideological concepts underwrite a significant and persistent theoretical weakness 
throughout the sociology of work. In various ways and through various sociological 
interactions with labour and work, humanism has been shown to repeatedly emerge to 
the detriment of sociological analysis, mystifying key social relations of work, prioritising 
certain social perspectives over others and reinforcing the precise ideologies with which 
contemporary social inequalities are justified. Analyses of the social relations of work – 
the commodification of labour-power, the inequalities that dictate its mobilisation and 
exploitation, the social relations that underpin the reproduction of this labour-power and 
the unique class struggles that are reflected in these relations – have all been mystified, 
obscured and rendered-invisible by repeated appeals to humanist ideology as an 
explanation for contemporary social phenomena. Ideological concerns regarding human 
essence, human alienation and human self-affirmation have, in various ways, been 
substituted for sociological analysis in relation to work, signifying human experience but 
offering a limited understanding of its concrete implications. 
 The thesis has therefore shown that both humanism and ideology are by no means 
problems of the past: they have been shown to pose a present and immediate danger to 
the sociology of work in the twenty first century. Despite the influences of Althusser and 
his contemporaries upon philosophy and upon social science more broadly, humanism 
has here been shown to persist as an ideological problem for contemporary sociology. 
What has been made clear in this thesis is that if the sociology of work is to emerge as an 
adequate and effective explanatory framework in the face of contemporary 
transformations of work, it must necessarily include a theoretical critique of humanism 
and ideology as a central task. In the face of a contemporary philosophical landscape that 
appears unable to permit this critique, this thesis has made the case for the importance of 
re-visiting Althusser’s critique of humanist ideology for the sociology of work. 
 
HUMANIST IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 
 
In the opening chapter, the thesis stated the case for the problematisation of humanism 
within the social sciences. Across a broad range of contributions to sociological research, 
humanism and the ideas and assumptions attached to it have been approached critically, 
recognised often as ideological attachments to many contemporary social inequalities. 
However, this thesis has shown that when it comes to considerations of work, the function 
of humanism in this way has largely gone unthought, with humanist ideology often 
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providing a normative framework for the way in which work is problematised and 
considered within sociological analyses. The chapters of this thesis have explored the 
extent to which this is the case within the sociology of work, detailing the ways in which 
humanism persists in the way that work is framed and thought about, whilst exposing the 
limitations that such framing places upon these sociological analyses. 
Chapter Two has shown how the development of sociological critiques of work, 
primarily throughout the twentieth century, have relied consistently upon humanism for 
both a normative framework and a critical edge. The chapter has demonstrated the 
prevalence of a persistent ideological temptation within the sociology of work to substitute 
an analysis of the social relations of work, for the articulation of critique through humanist 
ideological themes. This has been shown to resolve itself in the reproduction of a 
sociological critique in which work is examined not as a social expression of particular 
capitalist social relations – the commodification of labour-power, its motion in the wage-
labour relation, its place in the relationship between the forces and relations of 
(re)production and the gendered and racialised class struggles reflected in these relations 
– but instead is repeatedly explained as a manifestation of the alienation of the human 
subject from essential characteristics under capitalism, with emancipatory action 
synonymous with the struggle against this alienation. This persistent ideological 
temptation has been shown as problematic because it insists upon the bracketing of key 
social relations of work and their relegation to the side-lines of this more humanist 
historical event. Despite Althusser’s (1996) important interjection into Marxist theory, the 
chapter has revealed the surprisingly persistent nature of these humanist tropes within 
the sociology of work and has demonstrated a particular weakness of this discourse in 
resisting the ideological temptations offered by humanism.  
 This evident theoretical weakness in the sociology of work has been shown to be 
reflected in contemporary articulations of sociological critique. Chapter Three of the thesis 
has exposed the relationship between humanist ideology and the shortcomings of the 
contemporary ‘postcapitalist’ discourse and its attendant post-work imaginary. The 
shortcomings of the contemporary post-work imaginary have been shown to be 
numerous, culminating in the reproduction of the working experience of a very particular 
social subject: the white, male manual worker of Western Europe. The reproduction of 
this image has been shown to stem from a consistent mystification of key social relations 
of work: in particular the class character of technology and information as centrepieces of 
contemporary production, the dialectical relationship between production in the factory 
and reproduction outside the factory and the social character of money all remain 
necessarily absent in the formulations of this contemporary discourse. This chapter has 
demonstrated how these consistent mystifications are ideological in nature, rooted in a 
humanist conception of labour similar to that incubated and reproduced in the critical 
sociology of work throughout the twentieth century. The humanist ideological framing of 
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the post-work imaginary – that technology and information are important because they 
liberate the inherent and unalienated cooperative forces of human labour – entirely 
precludes these key social relations of work because they are nothing more than 
considerable externalities to a larger human story: namely, the historical struggle of the 
human subject against their alienation. It is this struggle against alienation which has 
been shown to define the transition into a postcapitalist era and a potential post-work 
society: a definition that has seen the social relations of work bracketed and removed from 
view.  
The problem of humanism is accentuated in Chapter Four, as it poses a danger to 
critiques within the sociology of work that have typically responded with theoretical 
strength to the problem of ideology: specifically, feminist analyses of social reproduction. 
Capitalism in the twenty first century is marked by a re-organisation of reproductive 
relations in which the industrial family unit is decentralised as the predominant 
reproductive institution under capitalism, with these relations today organised through 
emerging reproductive labour markets in domestic labour, sex work, tissue donation and 
surrogacy. Feminist theorists such as Cooper and Waldby (2014) have demonstrated how 
this emerging constellation of reproductive relations is indicative of the reconfiguration 
of gendered class struggle under capitalism, informing new strategies of primitive 
accumulation through the continuous re-negotiation of the productive and reproductive 
capacities of the body. However, this shifting social landscape – and its reflection in 
gendered violence – risks mystification beneath an emerging humanist tendency that has 
risen to meet the development of these reproductive ‘markets’, which argues that these 
industries are problematic in the extent to which they inaugurate new and heightened 
forms of bodily and emotional alienation. This humanist tendency has been shown to be 
problematic insofar is it reproduces many of the ideological limitations associated with 
this theoretically humanist approach: most dangerously, the reproduction of a normative 
separation between ‘work’ and ‘non-work’ (as a way of demonstrating the difference 
between ‘genuine’ and ‘alienated’ emotion). Here, humanist ideology has been shown to 
risk the foreclosure of the development and deployment of feminist sociological analysis, 
by obscuring the mutually informative nature of capitalist social relations of production 
and reproduction beneath mythical ideological representations of human alienation. 
 Finally, Chapter Five has confronted the ideological limitations that have been 
reproduced in a renewed theoretical humanism that sits at the heart of social scientific 
approaches to ‘the Anthropocene.’ The central theoretical pivot of this discourse has been 
shown to be a humanist conceptualisation of labour and the notion that contained within 
labour is the inherent and unique ability of human beings to make history. The historical 
power of human labour has been shown to frame social scientific approaches to the 
Anthropocene, allowing for both its problematisation (the planetary instability of the 
Anthropocene as a problem of human labour) and its potential ‘solution’ (that human 
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labour, imbued with this historical power is the only force capable of counteracting the 
discontents of this geo-historical period). The result is the re-emergence of a problematic 
of human alienation – reflected in a critique of modernity – which argues that the 
Anthropocene as a geo-historical period is the product of over two centuries of alienated 
human labour, in which humanity laboured without consciousness of the reflection of its 
action in planetary history. However, this theoretically humanist approach has been 
shown to be problematic insofar as it mystifies the relationship between contemporary 
conditions of planetary instability and the configuration and exercise of capitalist social 
relations. The social relationship between the exploitation of labour-power at the heart of 
capitalist production and the historical appropriation of natural resources such as land, 
food and water that have been necessary for the ongoing reproduction of this labour-
power, has been shown in this chapter to have been entirely mystified beneath the 
ideological productions of this theoretical humanism. The centrality of the story of human 
alienation in the discourse of the Anthropocene has been shown to preclude the fuller 
understanding of the social character of work in the context of planetary crisis: a fact that 
is particularly problematic given the growing prominence and popularity of the 
Anthropocene within the social sciences. 
 In each chapter, this thesis has clearly outlined the extent to which humanist 
ideology acts to limit the analytical and critical abilities of the sociology of work. In each 
instance, the production of sociological theory has been, in one way or another, foreclosed 
by the persistence of humanist ideological tropes. These tropes have bracketed and 
obfuscated key social relations of work from view, leading to the sociological discourse in 
each instance enunciating its critique through humanist ideological concepts: concepts 
which, though they are attractive, are at best moral and anthropological rather than 
analytical and sociological. 
 
THE CRITQUE OF HUMANIST IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 
 
At the same time as exposing the problem of humanist ideology, this thesis has looked 
favourably upon a number of critical sociological interjections which effectively critique 
these ideological concepts: a critique to which these accounts owe their explanatory force. 
Where sociological analysis has been successful in thrusting the social relations of work 
to the forefront of investigation, it has done so primarily through the implicit or explicit 
critique and deconstruction of existing humanist ideological tropes that have hitherto 
framed the problem.  
 Through the re-direction of Pitts’ (2017) ideological critique in the context of 
contemporary post-work thought, Chapter Three of the thesis has revealed important 
oversights in sociological confrontations with the ‘crisis of work’ in advanced capitalist 
economies. Pitts (2017) reveals how key social relations of work are missing from key 
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contributions to this contemporary post-work discourse, in particular the class struggles 
reflected in the historical development of productive technology missed in the fetishism 
of the forces of production, the class character of money missed in the valorisation of the 
UBI and the social relations of reproduction missed through the maintained focus of this 
discourse upon paid employment. Pitts (2017) articulates this through a critique of 
ideology, codified in the critique of ‘Fragment-thinking’ (p.328), arguing that it is the 
economistic and technologically deterministic ideology echoed in Marx’s (1974) 
‘Fragment on Machines’ that is to blame for this continued sociological oversight. Through 
an extension of this ideological critique, this chapter of the thesis has demonstrated that 
the ideology that limits this contemporary post-work discourse is as much humanist as it 
is economistic, relying on a humanistic interpretation of the ‘social’ characteristics of 
human labour which secured the functionality of an otherwise technologically 
deterministic historical account of the labour process, devoid of a serious analysis of class 
struggle. It was these ideologies – humanism and economism – which appeared to secure 
the functionality of these sociological contributions. It has been only through their 
identification and deconstruction that their shortcomings become apparent and that 
avenues for improvement and further investigation become available. 
 Chapter Four has explored the critique of humanist ideology inherent within 
Marxist-feminist approaches to social reproduction. Confronted with theoretical and 
sociological discourses which fetishised wage-labour and the experience of the male 
breadwinner on the production line, Marxist-feminist contributions such as those of 
Federici (2012) and James (2012) exposed the limitations of these contributions, pivoting 
on a critique of humanism. The humanist ideas attached to human labour – solidifying its 
image as something universal, productive and absolutely distinct from the ‘animalistic’ 
activity of reproduction – has been shown by Marxist-feminism to have contributed to the 
mystification of the role of social reproduction in the functioning of capitalism. The 
emergence of reproductive labour at the forefront of sociological conversations about 
work and class comes directly from a critical deconstruction of the humanist ideas that 
have contributed to the gendered division of labour: a critical deconstruction inaugurated 
by these Marxist-feminists. In the face of the expansion of global labour markets and the 
greater primitive accumulation of reproductive labour-power through expanding labour 
markets in sex workers, tissue donors and surrogates, Chapter Four has shown how this 
critique of ideology re-emerges again. Cooper’s and Waldby’s (2014) critique of ‘clinical 
labour’ (p.7) surfaces the gendered class antagonisms embedded in this labour-market 
expansion, primarily through the deconstruction of the humanist ideological concepts 
that have hitherto framed the way that this expansion has been thought about. Ideas of 
‘motherhood’ and the ‘gift’ of reproduction are restated by Cooper and Waldby (2014) as 
allegories of humanist assumptions around women as human subjects, the clearing away 
of which becomes a necessary precondition for the exposure of the gendered class 
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inequalities that function at the base of these economic trends: an exposure that 
fundamentally alters the strategy in the struggle for equality here (away from abolition, 
towards organisation and empowerment). 
 Pronouncing the social relations of work in the context of sociological 
considerations of ecology has also been shown to require a critique of humanist ideology. 
Mobilising Moore’s (2015) critique of the Anthropocene, Chapter Four has demonstrated 
the extent to which the shortcomings of the sociological confrontation with work and 
labour in the context of ecology stems from its humanistic ideological framing. Moore’s 
(2015) critique has demonstrated the extent to which ecological crisis is presented as a 
story of the Anthropocene – ‘the era of Man’ – focusing on a problematisation of human 
labour. Moore (2015) argues that this fetishism of human labour as the source of 
ecological problems erodes the role of capitalist social relations in this story, 
deconstructing the humanist assumptions of the Anthropocene to reveal the historical 
class struggles that lie behind climate change and other related crises. Moore’s (2015) 
critique of humanism is collected in his deployment of the concept of a ‘Capitalocene’ 
(p.77), arguing that in order to reveal the true social causes of ecological catastrophe, 
sociology must dispense with a reductive narrative of human culpability towards a 
structural analysis of class struggle and its reflection in ecological crisis. 
 The original contribution that this thesis makes to the sociology of work is the 
exposure of this ideological critique at the centre of these more favourable sociological 
contributions. The capability of these contributions to expose the class antagonisms that 
underpin work in the ‘platform economy’, in the clinical labour of the ‘bioeconomy’, or in 
the appropriated labour of the ‘Capitalocene’ emanates from an initial and productive 
critique of the existing humanist ideology that framed the way in which these things were 
considered. This crucial theoretical exercise, codified in the explicit and implicit critique 
of humanist ideology within the sociology of work, has the productive outcome of 
revealing the class antagonisms incubated in these different forms of work and of 
revealing the social relations of work which reflect this struggle. In this way, the critique 
of ideology has been shown as a methodology by which to clarify the object of sociological 
study and revealing the material basis of work and labour as social phenomena, by 
dismantling the pre-existing humanist mystifications of these phenomena. The critique of 
ideology is a theoretical tool that is useful for the sociology of work in this way and it is 
the demonstration of this utility that has been the primary objective of this thesis. 
 
THE CRITIQUE OF HUMANIST IDEOLOGY IN ‘PRACTICAL’ SOCIOLOGY 
 
The Althusserian critique of humanist ideology has an opportunity to provide a timely and 
forceful contribution to ongoing epistemological debates within the sociology of work and 
employment, which frame how more empirically-grounded or ‘practical’ sociological 
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analyses are approached. Increasingly, contemporary contributions to the sociology of 
work have found themselves more concerned with epistemological questions, including 
what the sociology of work should produce analyses of and how it should go about 
producing this knowledge. The rapidly changing conditions of work and employment 
covered in this thesis have spurred this reflection in the sociology of work to some extent, 
with these developments having “blown the debate over what constitutes ‘work’ wide 
open” (Komlosy, 2018, p.4). This has realised itself in the recent publication of new 
volumes dedicated to the re-assessment of what, exactly, is meant by ‘work’ today, such as 
Andrea Komlosy’s (2018) Work and Joanna Biggs’ (2015) All Day Long. Moreover, radical 
contributions to the sociology of work such as Mac and Smith’s (2018) Revolting 
Prostitutes and Sophie Lewis’ (2019) Full Surrogacy Now pivot fundamentally on 
troubling the epistemological assumptions of the sociology of work, revealing how the 
relations that govern sex work and surrogacy are the same as those which govern more 
traditional paid work and employment: “It becomes inconceivable that people could do 
something considered so strange and terrible for the same mundane, relatable reasons 
that govern everybody else’s lives” (Mac & Smith, 2018, p.46). 
 From the perspective of Marxist sociology, this epistemological problem finds 
itself expressed most readily in sociological misinterpretations of ‘class’ and ‘class 
struggle.’ In his text Class Matters, Charles Umney (2018) addresses this problem with 
force. For Umney (2018), many popular sociologists of work (such as Mike Savage [2015] 
and Guy Standing [2016]) have reduced the problem of class to individualist terms, 
utilising class as a way to distinguish between groups of individuals and their 
characteristics in society as opposed to examining class as a social role dictated by given 
forces and relations of production in society. The result, for Umney (2018), is the 
emergence of a hierarchy of ‘classification struggles’ within the sociology of work (replete 
with terminology such as “the elite, the ‘established middle class’, the ‘technical middle 
class’, the ‘new affluent worker’, the ‘traditional working class’, ‘emerging service workers’ 
and the ‘precariat’” [Umney, 2018, p.17]), with social movements in the context of work 
and employment framed within the struggle of workers to confirm or deny their 
occupation of a particular place within this hierarchy. For Umney (2018) this is a problem, 
because it formulates the relationship between work and class as one of individual and 
occupational characteristics, as opposed to a social relationship dictated by very particular 
and often unequal social relations:  
 
When talking about class, our objective should not be simply to provide a 
comprehensive categorisation of groups of people and the differences between 
them, but to consider how the interactions between people with different 
economic roles affects the working of society as a whole, from the experiences 
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people have at work, to the development and application of technology, to the 
economic and social policies pursued by governments (p.21, original emphasis). 
 
For Umney (2018), individualised misinterpretations of class and class struggle risk 
undermining the ability of the sociology of work to explain exploitation and contemporary 
social movements in response to it, by bracketing the structural social implications of 
changes to work and employment in favour of these more individualistic fetishisms. 
 The Althusserian critique of humanist ideology makes a forceful contribution to 
this epistemological conversation within Marxist sociology, adding a conceptual 
repertoire with which to pose and answer these epistemological questions. At the heart of 
the investigation carried out on the pages of this thesis has been the epistemological 
question of what the sociology of work sets out to study and analyse. The application of 
this Althusserian critique and its ability to track and expose the theoretical 
presuppositions of the sociology of work, has revealed that the object of much of the 
sociology of work today is in fact not the structural social conditions of labour, work and 
employment, but is instead a particular human subject, about which sociology attempts 
to draw conclusions through its position in the context of work and its characteristics. 
With specificity to these debates in Marxist sociology, the critique of humanist ideology 
would make for a particularly useful interjection here by not only helping to reveal how 
this individualism obscures the social character of class and class struggle, but also in 
answering the question in more detail as to how precisely this individualist 
conceptualisation of class can operate so easily within the sociology of work. Through its 
application in this thesis, the Althusserian critique of humanism has repeatedly 
demonstrated how the reduction of work to an individualistic as opposed to a social 
phenomenon has obscured the existence of exploitation and inequality in various ways. 
But more than this, the application of this critique has been successful in revealing the 
precise theoretical exercises on which this ideology has relied, be this ‘alienation’, the 
‘social’, ‘emotion’ or ‘history.’ 
 As Umney (2018) argues, the posing and answering of these important 
epistemological questions is crucially important for how social change and social 
movements in relation to work and employment are viewed empirically. The most 
important conclusion from Umney’s (2018) research is that inequality and exploitation do 
not present themselves obviously to the consciousness of the sociologist, but are 
conditioned by the epistemological framing of social class and how it is seen to be reflected 
in the social relations of work. For Umney (2018), re-visiting a Marxist sociological 
method provides a strategy for reflecting critically on how social class is framed 
epistemologically within the sociology of work and for drawing more accurate conclusions 
about inequality and exploitation at work from empirical data that is collected. The pages 
of this thesis have shown how a Marxist critique of humanist ideology, made through an 
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Althusserian detour, can make a positive contribution to this endeavour and provide a 
conceptual repertoire through which to further examine the epistemological framing of 
social class in the sociology of work and employment and make theoretical 
recommendations for its correction. 
  
HUMAN EXPERIENCE  
 
If an anti-humanist approach is necessary, does this make human experience 
unimportant? Do themes of human liberation, human freedom and human autonomy 
simply become meaningless? On the contrary, it is only in a capitalist society that these 
things are meaningless. Humanism, the valorisation of the human individual and the 
prioritisation of their wellbeing and independence are all meaningless ideas in a society 
based upon such severe class inequalities, in which the securing of even the basic means 
of existence is, for the majority of people, a daily struggle. As Althusser (1996) argued, the 
bourgeoisie developed these humanist themes of liberation and autonomy “since it hoped 
thereby to enroll at its side, by their education to this end, the very men it would liberate 
only for their exploitation” (p.234). Used in this way, ideological themes of liberation and 
humanism do not produce a fuller understanding of human experience: they mystify it, 
deployed tactically within a capitalist social formation whose structure is totally at odds 
with the spirit of these aims. In order for these humanist ideas to have any basis in reality 
at all, critical investigation must begin with the social conditions that foreclose their 
realisation in the first place. 
 Humanism itself has a limited utility in pointing towards an understanding of 
human experience. In fact, the extent of its utility is precisely in this capacity: as a pointer 
towards the need for further interrogation or analysis. As Althusser (1996) wrote of 
humanism, “while it really does designate a set of existing relations, unlike a scientific 
concept, it does not provide us with a means of knowing them” (p.223). Humanism is 
often a very useful communicative and demonstrative tool through which to designate the 
need for closer analysis: but it is precisely here, in the completion of closer analysis that 
extends beyond the significations of humanism alone that the realities of human 
experience become available for closer observation. This is particularly evident in Marx’s 
(2013) writings in Capital. One of the most famous chapters of Capital is Chapter Ten, on 
‘The Working Day.’ Contained within it were the most detailed and harrowing accounts of 
human experience under capitalism provided anywhere by Marx in his writings. Through 
his visits to the factories of industrial Britain and his experience of the realities of working-
class life, Marx (2013) draws a picture of existence in which “Dante would have found the 
worst horrors of his Inferno” (p.171). Marx (2013) uses this chapter to develop a picture 
of industrial working conditions, exposing the existence of rampant poverty, premature 
death among workers, the spread of disease and illnesses, and the widespread use of child 
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labour. Marx (2013) describes, in chilling passages such as these, “the motley crowd of 
labourers of all callings, ages, sexes, that press on us more busily than the souls of the slain 
on Ulysses, on whom…we see at a glance the mark of over-work” (p.176). In these ways, 
Marx (2013) uses humanism and an observation of human experience under capitalism 
as a way of pointing towards the social harms implicated by capitalism. 
 However, these humanist appeals to the degradation of the human condition 
under capitalism made by Marx (2013) are bookended by an exploration of the precise 
social mechanics that inform this experience. Whilst this humanist prose points towards 
the effects of capitalist exploitation, it is only in Marx’s (2013) analysis of the exploitation 
of surplus-value and the maximisation of this exploitation by the capitalist through the 
lengthening of the working-day, the opposition of employers and factory-owners to the 
implementation of labour legislation and the crushing of the organisational efforts of their 
workers – all of which, as Marx (2013) argues, are reflections of the historical class 
struggle raging at the base of capitalism – that Marx (2013) provides his reader with the 
knowledge of this human experience and how it comes to pass. Exploitation cannot, so 
Marx (2013) argues be located in “the good or ill will of the individual capitalist” (p.186): 
rather, its origins are found in “the inherent laws of capitalist production” (p.186), which 
do not bring men alone on stage, but classes, economic structures and “external coercive 
laws” (p.186). Humanism is helpful, but to a limited extent. Knowledge of human 
experience demands a movement beyond the ideologies that signify its existence, to the 
structures that dictate its reality. 
 Nowhere is this truer than in considerations of liberation, emancipation and 
revolution. Althusser (1996) was right when he wrote that “the objective of the 
revolutionary struggle has always been the end of exploitation and hence the liberation of 
man” (p.221). The attachment of humanist ideology to the prospect of revolution has 
always made it more attractive and more communicable: qualities that often account for 
the reasons why many have fallen for its temptations. But as Althusser (1996) wrote,  
 
It is not enough just to register the event, nor to record the concepts…in which the 
event itself thinks itself. The theoretical claims of the concepts must be tested to 
ensure that they really do provide us with a truly scientific knowledge of the event 
(p.223). 
 
Revolution and emancipation cannot themselves be based upon the notion of false 
beginnings or normative states of being that correspond or appeal to a shared sense of 
humanity that is lost under the conditions of contemporary social life: “The desire to fully 
actualise this ‘normal’ state is ideology at its purest and cannot but end in catastrophe” 
(Žižek, 2015, p.148). Sociology teaches that conditions of apparent ‘normality’ must 
always be subject to interrogation, as power is always concealed behind normality. It is 
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here, in the analysis of power and its reflection in the conditions of society, that the 
achievement of humanist aims becomes an actual possibility. 
 An anti-humanist approach to the sociology of work does not preclude human 
experience: it is, rather, the only approach that takes human experience seriously enough 
to refuse to compromise with ideology, even when it appears to correlate with the ends of 
its own analysis. It is for this reason that Althusser (1993) wrote that “only theoretical 
anti-humanism justified genuine, practical humanism” (p.185-186). Humanist slogans 
will always have a place and a certain utility in the provision of “a practical index” 
(Althusser, 1996, p.247) with which critique can be guided. However, as Althusser (1996) 
argued, “we must get down to the concrete problems themselves… if we are to produce the 
historical transformation whose necessity was thought by Marx” (p.247). In the rapidly 
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